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Abstract
In his 1859 work, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill asserts that' [i]n our times, from the
highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of a
hostile and dreaded censorship.' For Mill, this censorship was implemented not by
official institutions, but by social opprobrium, by a less explicit, but no less
devastating public opinion.
My thesis provides an account of late nineteenth-century censorship that does
not rely on traditional dichotomised models. These models present censorship as a
Manichaean struggle between an aggressive censor and a silenced victim. Mill's
observation provides a starting point for looking at censorship as a regulatory
mechanism that is more diffused and mobile than such rigid binaries suggest. I look
at instances of censorship in literature, the visual arts, and other disciplinary fields,
placing them in wider social, political, cultural, and intellectual contexts.
I take into account recent scholarship which has challenged traditional
models on theoretical grounds. These recent developments are useful for
investigating particular instances of censorship, but conversely, these instances,
despite their specificity, can also provide insights into, and elucidation of, the
theories themselves. By moving beyond a static understanding of censorship as
silencing and repression, I redress conventional assumptions about Victorian society
and popular myths of a draconian regime, while also reassessing the concept of
censorship itself.
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Censorship in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain
Writing in 1859, John Stuart Mill asserts that '[i]n our times, from the highest class
of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and
dreaded censorship.'1 Mill's statement controversially and emphatically characterises
his epoch as one of pervasive censorship, an allegation echoed to some degree by
writers against the late-century literary field. Mill's fiery descriptors seem ostensibly
incongruous in an age of liberal democracy, just as the writer's plaint may seem
redundant at a time when pre-publication censorship had long been abolished. Yet
the term itself had obvious purchase for these commentators, who reconfigured a
concept with historically pejorative associations for polemical usage in the
nineteenth century. These issues form the core of this thesis, which looks at the
practices and conditions that spurred these commentators to such contentions.
Central to this investigation are the questions of what censorship was, how it was
manifest, and how it was perceived in the latter half of the century.
Mill's blanket statement is an unequivocal indictment of nineteenth-century
society, yet it belies the extent to which censorship itself operated in multifarious and
not easily identifiable ways. Superficially, the issue of what censorship is seems
straightforward enough: in the most basic sense, censorship refers to the criminal
prosecution or the suppression of offensive and illicit publications or articulations.
YetMill's usage already points to a more diffuse form of cont/mrol beyond official
regulatory authorities. The dynamic between institutions of control, such as the
police or criminal law, less overt forms of regulation, such as the economic
1 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, The Collected Works ofJohn Stuart Mill, ed. John M. Robson, vol. 18
(London: Routledge, 1977) 264. The Collected Works will henceforth be cited in-text as CW.
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constraints of the marketplace, and more dispersed forms of influence, such as Mill's
public opinion, created specific contexts in which certain things could be written or
said. These forms of control not only had implications for the literary field, the visual
arts, and society in general, but also for the concept of censorship itself. At issue is
not just how censorship was exercised but more constitutively, what censorship was,
and its value not just as a descriptive, but as an ascriptive category; indeed, this
conundrum was one with which commentators of the day also grappled, as will be
evident in the chapters that follow.2
Traditional histories of censorship focus on legal forms of constraint through
an elaboration of statutes, key trials, and prosecutions.3 While not denying the role of
legal history in an account of censorship, to treat offence solely as a violation of law
fails to consider the multiple discursive and material positions a publication
occupies. The book, for instance, is in turns a physical object of printed pages, a
commodity in the marketplace, the result of artistic labour, a carrier of germs (as the
Lancet warns the library patron), or a symptom of degeneration (as in Max Nordau's
diagnostics).4 In these various guises, the book was subject to additional forces and
manipulations, sometimes contradictory ones, in addition to charges of obscenity.
There is also a tendency, especially in earlier studies, to map an emancipatory
trajectory from the tyranny of capricious censorships in early modern society to the
divesting of these in the twentieth century.5 Conceptually, such accounts set up an
opposition between the law and the accused, between the censor and the censored,
such that tracing the history of censorship becomes in effect the mapping out of an
ongoing contest between these two opponents. This dichotomised model of
censorship, presupposing distinct and identifiable subjects and objects of censorship,
21 take the terms 'ascriptive' and 'descriptive' from Frederick Schauer, who argues that censorship
masquerades as descriptive analysis, when in fact it operates as an ascriptive category: censorship
'does not describe a category of conduct, but rather attaches an operative conclusion (ascribes) to a
category created on other grounds' ('The Ontology of Censorship,' Censorship and Silencing, Post
160).
3
See, for example, Alec Craig, The Banned Books ofEngland and Other Countries: A Study ofthe
Conception ofLiterary Obscenity (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962); Donald Thomas, A Long Time
Burning: The History ofLiterary Censorship in England (London: Routledge, 1969); David Tribe,
Questions ofCensorship (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973).
4 These issues will be dealt with in greater detail in the chapters that follow.
5 John Sutherland, for example, refers to the process of 'decensorship' as part of a general trend of
cultural liberalisation in Britain in the 1960s and 70s (Offensive Literature: Decensorship in Britain
1960-1982 (London: Junction Books, 1982)).
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in turn invokes a familiar set of binaries in the discourse of western liberalism:
freedom and oppression; democracy and despotism; creativity and destruction. Yet
these terms were themselves subject to negotiation, as I will show in my discussion
ofMill and literary polemicists, and the binary distinctions untenable.
These accounts perpetuate what Michel Foucault famously calls the
'repressive hypothesis,' a retrospective construction of a prudish Victorian regime as
a foil for a putatively emancipated present. By associating sexual repression with the
rise of bourgeois capitalism, the repudiation of this subjugation and concomitant
embracing of sexual liberation take on a political significance. This apparently
subversive gesture propagates a myth of sexual and political emancipation: sex is
transformed into an 'opportunity to speak out against the powers that be, to utter
truths and promise bliss, to link together enlightenment, liberation, and manifold
pleasures,' even while allowing power to continue unchallenged because
unrecognised.6
For Foucault, underlying this misperception of the past is a failure to
recognise the ways in which power functions in modernity: exponents of the
repressive hypothesis adhere to a concept of power based on an archaic model of
sovereign might, one that exercises the 'power of life and death,' a hierarchical and
uni-directional power founded on seizure and destruction, whether of goods, time, or
ultimately, life.7 Since the Classical Age, however, there has been in operation a new
form of power, a power that is 'not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but
by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on
o
all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus.' Power no longer
operates through the threat to take life, but through the administration of life, not
through deprivation, but through preservation and multiplication. This 'bio-power' is
organised around two poles: at one end, it concerns the disciplinary control of the
human body, the aim ofwhich is to create docile and efficient bodies ('an anatomo-
politics ofthe human body') while at the other end, it involves the population species
6 Michel Foucault, The History ofSexuality, vol. 1, The Will to Knowledge, trans. Robert Hurley
(1976; London: Penguin, 1981)7.
7 Foucault, History ofSexuality 136.
8 Foucault, History ofSexuality 89.
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as a whole ('a bio-politics ofthe population')9 The deployment of sex is located at
the intersection of these two techniques of power: sex involves the individuating
processes that heighten the awareness of the body on the one hand, and the means by
which the concerns of the species—population control, fertility, health—might be
monitored, on the other. Where sovereign power operates on the principle of
consolidation and reinforcement and is thus a static force, bio-power, at once elusive
and pervasive, inheres in relations and is manifest as a continual process of
extension.10 Accordingly, power as a self-contained and finite entity, power 'in the
substantive sense, "/e" pouvoir, doesn't exist.'11
More specifically, Foucault excludes censorship from the processes of bio-
power, relegating it to the arsenal of sovereign rule: censorship is affiliated with
other 'negative elements ... [as] one great central mechanism destined to say no.'12
In this reading, censorship functions through prohibition and repression, denial and
renunciation. Yet this is a one-sided definition of censorship, the narrowness of
which belies the complexities of the origins of the terms. The term 'censorship'
derives from the Roman official of the censor with the dual responsibilities of the
regulation of morals and census-taking. The undertaking of moral guardianship is
largely consonant with conventional understandings of the censor's role: according
to Plutarch, it was the censor's duty to 'watch, regulate, and punish any tendency to
indulge in licentious or voluptuous habits and to depart from the traditional and
established way of living.'13 Superficially, this elaboration of duties is not unlike that
of the repressive exercise of power dismissed by Foucault, yet the additional task of
census-taking suggests a further dimension to the office. Foucault claims that power
mechanisms in the modern age involve 'methods of observation, techniques of
registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control';
Plutarch writes of the compilation of 'a register of all the citizens according to their
social and political classification.'14 The similarities are particularly striking given
9
Foucault, History ofSexuality 139.
10 As Felix Driver puts its, Foucault's is a 'colonizing form of power' ('Bodies in Space: Foucault's
Account of Disciplinary Power,' Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine and the Body, ed. Colin
Jones and Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1994) 127.
" Michel Foucault, 'The Confession of the Flesh,' Foucault, Power/Knowledge 198.
12 Foucault, History ofSexuality 12.
b
Plutarch, Makers ofRome, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (London: Penguin, 1965) 136.
14 Michel Foucault, 'Two Lectures,' Foucault, Power/Knowledge 102; Plutarch 136.
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Foucault's cursory dismissal of censorship from the 'polymorphous techniques of
power.'15 Foucault's 'devious and discreet' power seeks to penetrate into the core of
the family unit just as the Roman censor looks to 'personal preferences and appetites,
whether in marriage, the begetting of children, the regulation of his daily life, or the
entertainment of his friends.'16 This second part of the censor's role surely gestures
towards the panoptic nature of disciplinary power. The combination of punitive
threats ('they had authority to degrade a Roman knight or to expel a senator,' writes
Plutarch) and panoptic documentation would appear to exceed Foucault's
designation of censorship as a purely repressive force.17
Despite his ahistorical and narrowly conceived understanding of censorship,
Foucault has had a conspicuous influence on recent studies. Most notably, his
concept of the productive nature of power has been adapted by scholars to move
1 o
beyond a purely negative understanding of censorship. If power produces fields of
knowledge, discursive categories, and modern subjects, so too, argue these scholars,
does censorship produce creative measures to evade the censor's attention, categories
of legitimate articulation, and at the most constitutive level, the conditions that make
speech possible. These theoretical insights have informed my thesis, yet in a study
rooted in the material practices of a specific period, it is necessary to negotiate
between events in history, current scholarship on censorship, and nineteenth-century
speculation on the topic.
Mill's pronouncement was made between two significant dates in the history of
censorship: the 1857 passing of the Obscene Publications Act and the 1868 case of
15
Foucault, History ofSexuality 11.
16 Foucault, History ofSexuality 11, 42; Plutarch 136.
17 Plutarch 136.
18
Compare, for instance, Lord Radcliffe's claim in 1961 that '[historically and by accepted
convention, everyone in [Britain] is supposed to be against it,' or more recently, founding president of
the Free Speech Committee of Australia, Robert Pullan's assertion that '[a]t some level we know
instinctively that censorship is disreputable,' to Nigel Smith's observation that '[rjather than
censorship being a tyrannical evil, gradually erased in the histories of the most progressive societies,
we are nowadays more likely to think of it as an important aspect of the power relations which
permeate a society' (Lord Radcliffe, Censors: The Rede Lecture 1961 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1961) 1; Robert Pullan, Guilty Secrets: Free Speech and Defamation in Australia (Glebe: Pascal,
1994) x; Nigel Smith, Preface, Literature and Censorship, spec, issue of Essays and Studies 46
(1993): vi).
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Regina v. Hicklin.19 While Lord Campbell's 1857 Act granted authorities greater
powers of search and seizure in the fight against the traffic in obscene material, it
was not until the 1868 prosecution of Hicklin that a definition of obscenity was
articulated by Sir Alexander Cockburn:
The test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort might
fall20
Even while censorial procedures were thus more formally consolidated in law, Mill
and others pointed to the growing power of a less defined but no less effective public
censure. Writing from his nineteenth-century vantage, Thomas Macaulay claimed a
uniquely emancipated yet 'prudish' press for his nation:
From the day on which the emancipation of our literature was accomplished
[the 1695 Licensing Act which abolished pre-publication censorship], the
purification of our literature began. That purification was effected, not by the
intervention of senates or magistrates, but by the opinion of the great body of
educated Englishmen, before whom good and evil were set, and who were
left free to make their choice ... the liberty of our press has been constantly
becoming more and more entire ... [while] the restraint imposed on writers
by the general feeling of readers has been constantly becoming more and
more strict.21
Where Mill's public opinion was the onslaught of a collectively manipulated public,
as will be discussed in Chapter One, Macaulay's was that of an educated elite for
whom censure was an exercise of rational choice. Macaulay's insistence on the
freedom ofpolitical critique may be indicative of Whiggish revisionism, given that
political exigencies in the nineteenth century both international, as the Napoleonic
Wars, and domestic, as Chartist agitation, for example, led to multiple prosecutions
for blasphemous and seditious libel.22 Nonetheless, for the purposes ofmy thesis,
what is most significant is that censorship, even in this brief account of its abolition,
is fraught with contradictions. Macaulay locates the emergence of the strictest
19 For discussion of the 1857 Act and Hicklin, see M. D. J. Roberts, 'Morals, Art, and the Law: The
Passing of the Obscene Publications Act, 1857,' Victorian Studies 28.4 (1985).
20 Law Reports, 3 Q.B.D., 1867-8, 371.
21 Thomas Macaulay, The History ofEnglandfrom the Ascension ofJames the Second, vol. 4
(London: Longman, 1864) 109-10.
22 See Joss Marsh, Word Crimes: Blasphemy, Culture, and Literature in Nineteenth-Century England
(Chicago: U ofChicago P, 1998).
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restraint at the demise of the most explicit form of censorship: the abolition of pre-
publication licensing emancipated the press and conferred freedom onto the citizen,
the freedom to publish, but also the freedom to censure. The event that Macaulay
insists 'has done more for liberty and for civilisation than the Great Charter or the
Bill ofRights' thus also inaugurated an alternative mode of censorship, one in
service to a purifying impulse, to render publications henceforth 'more decorous than
the sermons of the seventeenth century.'23
These different manifestations of constraint suggest that censorship is an
elusive term and practice, but its putative target, obscenity, is equally slippery. While
the roots of the term are unclear, its etymology is suggestive. Peter Michelson uses
the term in the 'Greek sense of bringing onstage what is customarily kept offstage in
western culture': the obscene emerges in the making visible of what by consensus
should be hidden.24 Lynda Nead etymologically dismantles the term to suggest a
meaning of 'literally what is off, or to one side of the stage, beyond presentation': art
is that which can be represented while obscenity, or non-art, is that which is outside
9 S
of representation. The focus in these usages is on the Latin root, sccena, meaning
stage or scene, with its resonances of the visual or the spectacular. This idea of
staging, whether in Michelson's concept of a transgressive presentation of what is
conventionally proscribed or in Nead's obverse reading of the spatially marginalised,
suggests the theatre and the presence of an audience. This relationship between
obscenity and audience underwrites one of the primary areas of investigation in this
thesis: the relationship between censorship and the public.
The term 'public' encompasses both the sense of the visible, in terms of being
open to view, and the aggregate of consumers affected by this visibility. This
23
Macaulay 78, 110.
My thesis deals with this issue of the censorship of obscenity. Other studies of nineteenth-
century censorship have a different focus. Iain McCalman's study of'Grub Street radicals' explores
the overlap between professional pornographers and political radicals in the decades prior to the
timeframe ofmy thesis. These radical pressmen set up the commercial infrastructure of the
pornographic trade that was to trouble nineteenth-century reformers and legislators (Radical
Underworld: Prophets, Revolutionaries and Pornographers in London, 1795-1849 (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1993). Joss Marsh continues from McCalman, giving an account of blasphemy
prosecutions through the Victorian years. Gowan Dawson looks at the censoring of Darwinian science
and how allegations of obscenity were used to discredit evolutionary ideas (Darwin, Literature and
Victorian Respectability (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007).
24 Peter Michelson, Speaking the Unspeakable: A Poetics ofObscenity (Albany: State U ofNew York
P, 1993) xi.
25
Lynda Nead, The Female Nude: Art, Obscenity and Sexuality (London: Routledge, 1992) 25.
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connection is most clearly demonstrated in the theatre, in which a kind of prior
censorship in the form of pre-performance licensing determined what could literally
be staged and brought to public view. Empirically, too, anxieties over the morality of
cultural products and subsequent calls for censorship tend to intensify at the point
when these products reach a greater audience. The outcry in England over Emile
Zola's works, for instance, focused on Elenry Vizetelly's translations, while
objections to artistic nudes descried their accessibility in public galleries, as I will
show in Chapters Three and Six respectively.
This thesis further argues that censorship is linked more constitutively to the
idea of the public beyond the public as a corporate audience. Prior to the question of
what books might suitably be availed to the public readership, or what plays or
paintings to the public of viewers, is the question of what constitutes and who
participates in this public. That this question of the public was a site of contestation
will become clear in Chapter One, where I look at the changing concept of the public
sphere within a Habermasian framework; in later chapters, I will show that anxieties
about this public persisted in other areas of inquiry as well. Michelson's and Nead's
readings both show an interest in the peripheral areas of the stage, in the liminal
region between the visible and the invisible. In this sense, the metaphor of the stage,
specifically, the margins of the stage, aptly describe the ambiguities attending the
concept of the public and the problem of obscenity in this period. Censorship, as I
will show, was concerned with the negotiation of limits, whether of legitimate
interference or of the consensually representable or speakable.
This thesis is divided into three parts of two chapters each. Part One, 'Censorship
and the Public Sphere,' sets up the context of nineteenth-century censorship, looking
at censorship as a dialectic negotiation of the private and the public. In his Structural
Transformation ofthe Public Sphere, Jiirgen Habermas theorised the evolution and
decline of a bourgeois public sphere from a rationally debating and critically
informed public to a pseudo-rational mass of consumers. It is this debased public to
which Mill refers in his contention that mid-century Britain is afflicted by a
hegemonic, rather than a violent, censorship. Chapter One relates these general social
and political anxieties to the more specific context of literary censorship. Writers in
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the later decades of the century perceived the constraints of the literary marketplace
as a form of censorship, subordinating the literary arts to the demands of a mass
readership and the economic imperatives of a publishing industry. I then turn to
Habermas's subsequent work on communicative action, arguing that this linguistic
turn mirrors a similar shift in censorship scholarship from the chronicling of events
to more theoretical speculations on speech and silencing, and discourse and control. I
argue that these developments leave us at an impasse, vacillating between, on the one
hand, concrete acts of regulation or suppression, and on the other, a theoretical trend
that seeks to expand the category of censorship to embrace a multitude of power
relations.
Chapter Two turns to Henry James as a way of exploring these problematic
divergences. While James was not directly the target of prosecution, he was certainly
aware of the constraints facing the late-century author. The first part of this chapter
examines how the topics of literary freedom and authorial responsibility are explored
in his early writing. The second part is a reading The Turn ofthe Screw and The
AwkwardAge as texts that deal with issues central to censorship in the nineteenth
century: the young female reader; innocence and corruption; knowledge;
communication and silence. As such, I use James's texts to comment on the
problems of censorship, the assumptions made about and by censorship, and the
relationship between the putative agents and victims of censorship.
Part Two, 'The Trials and Discourses ofCensorship,' looks at obscenity
trials, placing them in a greater cultural context. Chapter Three deals with Henry
Vizetelly's prosecution for publishing translations of Zola. I argue that this is an
incomplete narrative: Zola's works and Zola's person were subject to further attack
by the discourse of degeneration, exemplified in the work ofMax Nordau.
Prosecution under obscenity law may be an explicit form of suppression, but the
delegitimating strategies by Nordau and others were equally censorious.
Where Chapter Three problematises simplistic binaries between law and
literature, Chapter Four looks at the analogous narrative of censorship as a contest
between law and science by examining the prosecution of George Bedborough for
selling Havelock Ellis's Sexual Inversion. While the trial has traditionally been
presented as an injudicious attack on science, I show that the case reveals complex
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interactions between disciplinary fields of law, medical science, and the nascent
science of sex. I examine these interdisciplinary struggles, looking at the implications
of legitimation strategies for the concepts of obscenity, scientific knowledge, and
their respective audiences.
Part Three, 'Censorship and the Visual Field,' looks at censorship in the
visual arts. Following the format of the previous section, Chapter Five begins with
the 1878 Whistler v. Ruskin libel trial and argues that what is at stake is the question
of authority. Ruskin claimed that Whistler's suit was an attempt to censor the critic's
expressive freedoms; Whistler counterclaimed that Ruskin's review impinged on the
painter's artistic freedom by causing financial losses through the denigration of
reputation. At issue were the category of art and the legitimacy of each party's claims
and definitions. More specifically, the contest was also articulated in terms of
legitimate ways of seeing, pitting Ruskin's moral criticism against Whistler's
aestheticism.
The idea of competing ways of seeing leads into Chapter Six, which looks at
the artistic nude. This chapter takes as a starting point the 1885 'British Matron'
affair, in which a letter to The Times from the self-titled 'British Matron' deprecating
the immorality of recent nude exhibitions led to a heated exchange with cultural
resonances beyond the letter pages. Calls for the banning of such displays were
countered by efforts to legitimate the genre. While looking at the controversy in the
context of the moral panics of the 1880s, this chapter also places the debates in the
greater context of the nineteenth-century concern over the public and the private: the
problem of regulation emerged only with the advent of the public display of art while
the nude became a problem only in public exhibition. The question of the morality of
the nude was in fact an intervention in the greater debates over what constitutes a
public. In this way, I return to the issues raised in Part One by commentators such as
Mill about censorship and the public.
As is evident from the chapter summaries, this thesis covers much ground, from the
literary to the visual arts, from Victorian polemics to recent theoretical debates. This
thesis does not seek to provide an exhaustive account of instances of censorship.
Instead, I start with key events in traditional histories of censorship, re-read them in
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different contexts, then read back into the histories of censorship. Donald Thomas
prefaces his account of censorship in England with the warning that the 'main
problem in writing a history of literary censorship is to avoid writing the history of
too many other things at the same time—and, on the other hand, not to confine the
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account to a mere chronicle of cases and statutes.' His judicious attempt to steer a
middle course is admirable, but I would argue that writing about censorship
unavoidably involves writing of other things: the issue is the extent to which these
'many other things' come under the rubric of censorship.
Limitations of space have meant that there are areas of investigation that I
have been unable to pursue. There are two omissions in particular. The first is the
kind of close reading that compares textual versions in order to examine alterations
and gaps. Such readings would highlight the issue of the relationship between
censorship, self-censorship, and editing, and questions of textual integrity, authorial
intentions, and the process of writing itself. The various editions of Thomas Hardy's
works, for instance, would be a suitable subject. While I do not have the space to
undertake such a reading, this thesis sets out the framework and the theoretic
premises from which this kind of analysis can be carried out.
Second, I have not dealt with the issue of theatrical censorship. This form of
censorship arguably has the longest official history, from the Master of the Revels'
duties in the early modern period to the pre-performance licences granted by the
Lord Chamberlain's Office in the nineteenth century. While there are studies of
theatrical censorship that deal with both the operation of the Lord Chamber's Office
and specific instances of censorship, my thesis suggests an alternative perspective by
looking at the play in performance as the intersection of the textual and the visual.27
The process of licensing dealt with the play as text; the play in performance,
however, becomes a cultural event that comprises both textual content as well as
visual consumption, returning to the processes of looking that I explore in Part Three
26
Thomas, Long Time Burning xi.
27 John Russell Stephens provides a valuable if straightforward history of the activities of the Lord
Chamberlain's Office (The Censorship ofEnglish Drama 1824-1901 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1980). Celia Marshik offers a specific study of the case of Bernard Shaw's Mrs Warren's Profession,
placing the play and its performance and reception in the context of late-century purity agitations
(British Modernism and Censorship (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006)). Richard Foulkes looks at the
relationship between the theatre and the church (Church andStage in Victorian England (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1997)).
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of this thesis. In this way, the theatre is aligned to other spectacular entertainments,
such as variety shows, tableaux vivants, and earlier popular entertainments such as
the diorama and the panorama.
These are possible areas of inquiry that have emerged from my research.
What I hope to achieve is to provide an alternative way of conceptualising censorship
that moves away from the rigid binaries informing older studies. Recent
developments in theories of censorship are useful for investigating particular
instances of regulation, but conversely, these instances, despite their specificity, can
also provide insights into, and elucidation of, the theories themselves. By moving
beyond a static understanding of censorship as silencing and repression, I hope to
redress conventional assumptions about Victorian society and popular myths of a
draconian regime, while also reassessing the concept of censorship itself.
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Part I
Censorship and the Public Sphere
13
Chapter 1
'A Hostile and Dreaded Censorship'
1 begin Chapter One by returning to Mill's controversial claim in On Liberty. 'In our
times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under
the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship' (CW 18: 264). For Mill, the most
pernicious effect of this censorship is its infringement on the individual's sovereign
rights, on the 'inward domain of consciousness' which underwrites his understanding
of liberty (CW 18: 225).1 A similar concern, as I will explain further in the next
section, is echoed in a more specific context by authors protesting the constraints of
censor and marketplace on artistic expression. In both circumstances, the culprit is an
undiscriminating public: for Mill, the 'social tyranny' of numbers, and for the
beleaguered writer, the despotic philistinism of public tastes (CW 18: 220). Yet
claims for the autonomy of art and the prerogative of the artist over the communal
demands ofpublic morality, however fervently espoused, do not in the end obscure
the material conditions binding author to the reading public. Thus, Henry James
might intone against a literary marketplace populated by 'millions for whom taste is
but an obscure, confused, immediate instinct,' and George Moore bewail the
'tyranny' of 'the tittle-tattle of the nursery or the lady's drawing-room,' but as
participants in the literary field, they were of necessity part of this public domain.
' This categorical distinction between private and public—censorship being the imposition of a public
or external force on a private and sacrosanct self—runs through much nineteenth-century protest
against censorship. Opposition to the Obscene Publications Act of 1857, for example, focused on the
issue of privacy. Reservations were voiced in parliamentary debate over the 'danger of making
mischief by an undue interference with the affairs of private life, and by encouraging an abuse of
power' (Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. 147 (12 August 1857): col. 1475).
2
Henry James, 'The Future of the Novel,' The Future ofthe Novel: Essays on the Art ofFiction, ed.
Leon Edel (New York: Vintage, 1956) 32; George Moore, Confessions ofa Young Man (London:
Heinemann, 1933) 176.
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Such writers designate the demands of their public as a debilitating censorship, yet
the changing conceptions of 'the public' in the nineteenth century mean that this
situation is less straightforward than suggested. In tracing these shifting
configurations, it will become clear that the meaning of censorship is itself a function
of context, and moreover, that the concept of censorship takes on a discursive utility
beyond its explicit function as a suppressive mechanism.
I start by analysing Mill's 'hostile and dreaded censorship' in relation to his
work on sovereign individuality and liberal democracy. In the next section, I suggest
that Mill's anxieties about a censorship by mass opinion were shared by late-century
writers. Just as Mill argued that popular opinion in its debased, uncritical form
inaugurates a regime of conformity, writers claimed that popular tastes and social
mores set artificial and stultifying parameters for their art. This ambivalence towards
the public is synthesised in Habermas's account of the degeneration of the political
public sphere into an administered pseudo-public in the nineteenth century, which I
discuss in the third section. In the final section, I look at the shift in Habermas's
work to communicative action, arguing that there is a similar 'linguistic shift' in
work on censorship.
Mill and the Tyranny of the Majority
This chapter takes as a starting point a working definition of censorship as the
controlling of what enters and circulates in the public domain, a broad understanding
that encompasses both processes of prior restraint and post-articulation regulation. It
includes explicit forms of censorship, such as bookburning, obscenity trials, and the
imprisonment of writers, as well as partial banning and expurgations, such as
Thomas Bowdler's 1826 edition of Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall ofthe
Roman Empire, subtitled 'For the use of families and young persons, reprinted form
the original text, with the careful omission of all passages of an irreligious or
immoral tendency.'3 Legal measures, such as libel law and intellectual property, also
fall within this purview as mechanisms which demarcate and patrol the boundaries of
J Bowdler also produced edited versions of Shakespeare's works (1807) and the Old Testament
(1822).
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the public domain. This definition also includes market or economic censorship, the
forms of control that function by determining the financial viability of publication.
Broadly speaking, the field of the literary marketplace consists of the following
players: the author; those in direct control ofmarket mechanisms, for example,
editors, publishers, and publishers' readers; the critic and the reviewer; and the
consumer or the general reading public. This chapter focuses on the interactions
between these agents, on the permutations of power between them, and perhaps as
significantly, the perception amongst these agents as to who holds the balance of
power, for the nature and severity of censorship measures were themselves
controversial topics of debate. While James Anson Farrer at the beginning of the
twentieth century lauds his period as one 'of almost complete literary impunity' with
its emergence from the 'age of barbarism' of centuries past, others treated such
optimistic pronouncements with scepticism.4 Robert Buchanan, for example,
protesting the suppression of his play, The New Don Quixote, by the Lord
Chamberlain's Office in 1895, alleges such action as more 'suggestive of the Dark
Ages or the Star Chamber than of the nineteenth century.'5 Uniting these
assessments, however, is the belief that censorship in whatever form is an anomalous
and anachronistic practice, incommensurate with Britain's reputation in the
nineteenth century as the bastion of civil and political liberties.6
Farrer and Buchanan define censorship as an official response to literary
production. By contrast, the censorship described by Mill in On Liberty is a
censorship, not by authoritarian government, but by the 'majority,' not politico-
judicial oppression, but 'social tyranny,' the 'moral coercion of public opinion' (CW
18: 219-20, 223). This latter form of control is more insidious than overt repression,
more 'formidable' despite being dispersed, for although 'not usually upheld by such
extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply
into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself (CW 18: 220). This is a
censorship whose methods are self-effacing, for the despotism of opinion and custom
4 James Anson Farrer, Books Condemned to be Burnt (London: Elliot Stock, 1904) 188, x.
5 Cited in Stephens 149.
6 As Robert Justin Goldstein argues, 'Britain was viewed by European liberals and radicals not only as
a model of political freedom but, more specifically, as a model of freedom for the press' ('A Land of
Relative Freedom: Censorship of the Press and the Arts in the Nineteenth Century (1815-1914),'
Writing and Censorship in Britain, ed. Paul Hyland and Neil Sammells (London: Routledge, 1992)
127).
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appears, not as unjust incursions, but as 'self-evident and self-justifying [rules]' (CW
18: 220). Thus, a 'social' censorship functions beyond the physical containment of
bodies, infiltrating into the fabric of life itself, and does so through a cunning
naturalisation that invalidates any opposition. Under the 'magical influence of
custom,' the tyranny of public opinion bypasses rational thought to make feeling the
determinant of behaviour (CW 18: 220). This is a tyranny of the majority in numbers,
but at heart, it exemplifies a collective solipsism, as the impulse arises from each
individual's belief that 'everybody should be required to act as he, and those with
whom he sympathizes, would like them to act' (CW 18: 221).7 The mark of rational
man—for Mill, as will be discussed below, the rights to liberty apply only to the
rationally thinking individual—is his corrigibility, and Mill is forthright in stating
that this capacity for self-rectification necessitates both discussion and experience:
'Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be
interpreted' (CW 18: 231). The censoring of opinion and the silencing of discussion
therefore assail the defining principle of the rational being, offering instead, pseudo-
rational justifications and uncontested opinion as irrefutable truths. Mill's primary
interest here is in determining the limits of legitimate interference, and the literary
enters into this task insofar as the writer's freedom of expression is a subset of the
inalienable freedom of thought, feeling, and opinion, while the rights of the reader
are protected by what Mill calls 'liberty of tastes and pursuits' (CW 18: 220, 226).
This concern for the autonomy of the individual is coupled with equal
attention to social cohesion. Mill's argument for the unfettered circulation of opinion
lies in part in his belief that truth 'is so much a question of the reconciling and
combining of opposites,' and this process requires the defence, not just of compatible
opinion, but more significantly, of antagonistic expressions (CW 18: 254). That is,
we must uphold the right of expression of opinions 'favourable to democracy and to
aristocracy, to property and to equality, ... and all the other standing antagonisms of
practical life' (CW 18: 254). This dual focus becomes clear in a passage on the
inimical effects of silencing:
7 Bruce Baum notes that while the primary focus in On Liberty is the tyranny of the majority, Mill is
also concerned with 'minority tyranny by the capitalist class,' that is, by those whose social power
exceeds that of say, the proletariat's power of numbers ('Freedom, Power and Public Opinion: J. S.
Mill on the Public Sphere,' History ofPolitical Thought 22.3 (2001): 523).
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But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those
who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion
is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. (CW 18:
229)
The harms of suppressing true opinion need hardly be justified; more significantly,
the silencing of false opinion is equally pernicious, for the harms of silencing extend
beyond that of its effect on the censored speaker to consequences for the race. While
upholding the pursuit of individuality, which, for Mill, is synonymous with
development, he is also insistent that the dividends of rational individuality cohere in
a richer, more diverse humanity, 'furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts
and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the
race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to' (CW 18: 266). Where
conformity through adherence to custom is merely a tyranny of numbers, consensus
arrived at through rational-critical debate serves a greater good. Underpinning his
position is a particular notion of truth as a process of contestation. Truth must be
subject to constant and rigorous testing to militate against a blind conformity which
can override reason and in turn transform 'living truth' to 'dead dogma' or mere
'superstition' (CW 18: 243, 244). Given that there is no 'absolute certainty,' merely
'assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life,' and given that such
approximation can be attained only through a dynamic 'process of a struggle
between combatants fighting under hostile banners,' the a priori suppression of
contradictory statements is not only an assumption of infallibility, but also the
eroding of a rational basis for ethical action (CW 18: 231, 254). Censorship of
opinion, regardless of the content of this opinion, renders one party of the 'violent
conflict' hors de combat, thereby derailing from the start the process necessary for
the constant renewal of truth and is therefore a 'formidable evil' (CW 18: 257).
Leslie Stephen, in his 1883 essay, 'The Suppression of Poisonous Opinions,'
argues that Mill's idea that truth is compromised by the suppression of contrary
opinion gives false credence to the efficacy of persecution. Stephen does not depart
substantially from Mill's reasoning that the 'collateral evils' of persecution far
outweigh its benefits, but claims that Mill both overstates its potency and understates
18
its harms.8 Persecution, if it is to fulfill its extirpative function, needs 'not only [to]
suppress the individual but [to] eradicate the opinion from society' and it is the
magnitude, and indeed, the impossibility, of this latter stipulation that calls into
question its effectiveness.9 While violence or the threat of violence might stifle an
isolated statement, it leaves untouched the network of ideas from which this
articulation springs. Where Mill, according to Stephen, assumes an opinion to be 'a
sort of definite object, a tangible thing ... and therefore capable of being laid hold of
and suppressed,' Stephen offers instead an organicist view of knowledge that resists
easy containment.10 Knowledge, being 'a system of interdependent truths,' is a
'unity' with each opinion being 'part of a single growth' such that the formation
itself survives separate assaults on individual elements." Stephen thus concludes that
an 'effectual censorship' insists upon the 'necessity of arresting a mental phase as
well as a particular error, and of altering the whole political and social
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organisation.' That is, for censorship to work effectually, not only must the
transgressive articulation be dealt with, whether a book, a play, or an isolated
expression of heterodoxy, the social, political, and economic conditions as well as
the intellectual currents cultivating this 'particular error' must also be eliminated.
The elusive nature of language itself, the 'possible divergence of meaning
under unity of phrase' which allows 'infidel opinions [to be voiced] in the language
of perfect orthodoxy,' further complicates the task of the persecutor, opening up an
ever expanding discursive space of potential transgression.13 Unless all thought and
all knowledge are suppressed in their entirety—and here is where Stephen claims
that Mill underestimates potential harm, if, that is, 'so wild an hypothesis [as this
complete destruction] can be entertained'—one is left with 'partial persecution'
which is itself detrimental to persecution's original purpose.14 Enforcing a superficial
deference, partial persecution fosters a hypocrisy that is a 'dry-rot of the system
defended' while generating ill-will through its oppressive actions.15 To continue
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Stephen's linguistic focus, censorship, to be wholly successful, must eradicate not
just the parole of each offensive utterance, but the entire langue as well. Moreover,
as a purely repressive force, it fails to promote orthodox belief since people, Stephen
argues, 'do not believe more vigorously because believers in a different creed are
burnt. They only become more cowardly in all their opinions.'16 What Stephen does,
in effect, is subject persecution to an interrogation on pragmatic grounds in order to
eliminate it as a viable option for dealing with heterodox opinion. This strategy, he
claims, offers a more persuasive argument against persecution than a mere
consideration of its evils.17
By contrast, the principle of tolerance, according to Stephen, is underwritten
by the conviction that 'truth is attainable, and only attainable, by the free play of
I o
intelligence.' Toleration provides the optimal conditions for such healthy
discussion by setting out procedural guidelines which 'ensure ... fair play' with the
goal of 'securing a possibility of ultimate agreement.'19 Yet this endorsement of the
'freest possible discussion from every possible point of view' seems disingenuous
90
given Stephen's writing elsewhere concerning the legitimate limits of fiction. In
'Art and Morality' (1875), Stephen ostensibly promotes an expansive mode of
(literary) discussion—'[w]e should know what all men think and have thought about
themselves and the world'—yet qualifies this freedom by delimiting a category of
91
'passions' to be proscribed, if not by 'sterner measures' then by 'public opinion.' In
this essay, Stephen defines morality as the 'system of rules for regulating our
passions' which stipulates that 'brutalising and anti-social instincts' must be
'stamped out.'22 Ostensibly, Stephen contradicts his thesis of the immorality of
persecution in 'The Suppression of Poisonous Opinions,' the assertion there that
'[rjestraint of opinion, or of its free utterance, by terror is the essence of persecution,
9 ^
and [that] all conduct intended to achieve that purpose is immoral.' Yet this
apparent incompatibility is reconciled by the distinction he makes between the
16
Stephen, 'Suppression' 505.
17 In questioning a form of control that represses without generating consent, Stephen in some ways
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'terror' of persecution, on the one hand, and the legitimate interference of public
opinion, on the other, between actionable offences that incite violence, and offensive,
though permissible, utterances. This distinction allows Stephen to maintain that
every opinion is given voice even while 'outrages upon good taste' might be
unofficially chastised.24 In this sense, Stephen has a much narrower definition of
persecution and censorship than Mill. Stephen focuses his discussion on the official
institutions of governance and sees public opinion as an alternative to these
measures. Thus, he concludes that 'offensiveness ofmanner belongs to that kind of
immorality which can best be suppressed by public opinion': suppression does not in
itself denote persecutory intent, but rather must be judged by the means by which it
is implemented.23 This is a distinction that Mill does not notionally make. On the
contrary, he argues that the weight of public opinion is as much a persecuting force
as that of explicit and formal censorships, and indeed, it is the public and its 'hostile
and dreaded censorship' that pose the greatest threat to liberty (CW 18: 264).
I qualify my assertion by suggesting that Mill only notionally condemns a
wider range of activity than Stephen as illegitimate exercises of force. Mill's
specification of the inner domain of freedom might on first perusal seem an
uncompromising defence of individual liberty, one that provides the principles on
which much argument for free speech has subsequently been based:
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of
the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that
one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind. (CW 18: 229)
While it would appear that the individual must be protected against the collective, it
is also clear that such statements are qualified from the start. Early on, Mill reminds
24
Stephen, 'Suppression' 666. Stephen's censorious activities in his capacity as editor of The Cornhill
Magazine—Stephen famously rejected Thomas Hardy's The Return ofthe Native and demanded
multiple expurgations when publishing Farfrom the Madding Crowd—might thus be placed in the
category of legitimate interference. As Stephen wrote, he was himself constrained by the editorial
policies instituted by the magazine's founder, William Thackeray, who stipulated that the Cornhill be
'strictly limited to the inoffensive—it was to contain nothing which could be unsuitable reading for
the daughters of country parsons whom Trollope was describing in its pages' {Some Early Impressions
(London: Hogarth, 1924) 136).
For an analysis of the revisions and omissions in the various editions of Farfrom the





his readers that these principles of freedom 'apply only to human beings in the
maturity of their faculties,' that is, those capable of 'free and equal discussion,' thus
debarring from these rights those who have not attained adulthood and 'those
backward states of society in which the race itselfmay be considered as in its
nonage' (CW 18: 224). These stipulations are attributable to mid-Victorian race
theory, yet these qualifications are not merely a clarification of the domain to be
protected but rather, in themselves, inaugurate a regime of censorship equally
stringent to that condemned by Mill. Mill's harm principle ostensibly sets out the
domain of legitimate external interference and concomitantly, the 'appropriate region
of human liberty' that is, in theory, sacrosanct from such incursions (CW 18: 225):
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society,
is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign. (CW 18: 224)
The distinction between self-regarding conduct which is immune from regulation and
harm-causing conduct which is subject to control and punishment, whether juridical
or social, is underwritten by the distinction between private and public that underlies
liberal ideology. Yet a closer examination ofMill's writing reveals that this
distinction is less clear-cut than is suggested, for Mill advocates repercussions for
both kinds of conduct. Joseph Hamburger argues that On Liberty is less a defence of
liberty than a justification of certain forms of intervention and control. Questioning
the accuracy of positioning Mill as a forerunner of twentieth-century liberalism,
Hamburger argues that 'Mill's regime was so censorious, and the range of conduct
that was discouraged and forbidden was so great, it must be considered whether Mill
was as great an enthusiast for liberty and toleration as generally believed.'26 David
Dyzenhaus likewise sees On Liberty not so much as an absolute defence of free
speech as the formulation of 'a liberal censorship policy.'27 K. C. O'Rourke claims
that Mill leaves intact the 'most powerful form of censorship available to
individuals': the right of avoidance.28 That is, whilst Mill contends that the silencing
of opinion is an assault on liberty, the individual is still free to exercise his right to
26
Joseph Hamburger, John StuartMill on Liberty and Control (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999) xiv.
27 David Dyzenhaus, 'John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography,' Ethics 102.3 (1992): 547.
28 K. C. O'Rourke, John StuartMill and Freedom ofExpression: The Genesis ofa Theory (London:
Routledge, 2001) 141.
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refuse to listen, an act O'Rourke suggests is itself a form of effective, if not the most
effective, censorship.
For example, Mill delineates a category of '[a]cts injurious to others'
requiring particular treatment, yet simultaneously undermines this distinction by
claiming that 'not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are
properly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence'
(CW 18: 279). A person may therefore 'suffer very severe penalties at the hands of
others, for faults which directly concern only himself,'' for faults such as 'lowness or
depravation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who
manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme
cases, even of contempt' (CW 18: 278, my emphasis). This censorious regime is
governed, not by 'whips and scourges,' but by social opprobrium, though arguably is
as censorious nonetheless (CW 18: 277). The public opinion previously excoriated as
a dreaded censorship is here harnessed as a socially beneficial and necessary force,
which, though 'severe,' is yet exempt from the allegation of harm-inducing effect.
ForMill as for Stephen then, despite his condemnation of public opinion as a severe
censorship, the sovereignty of the individual, even in matters directly concerning
himself, is not absolute, but can be legitimately curtailed. Hamburger attributes these
authoritarian elements to Mill's greater agenda of cultural reform, a project ofmoral
regeneration that sought to alter not just harmful action but moral character as well.
R. J. Halliday argues that apparent inconsistencies in Mill's conception of liberty can
be explained by a useful distinction between self- and other-regarding behaviour, the
curtailing of the former to be obtained only by non-coercive means, the latter by law
and sanction. Halliday's reading places Mill closer to Stephen's position, but
explains away the contradictions too smoothly, underplaying some essential tensions
in Mill's writing, as I will discuss below.29 Shannon C. Stimson and Murray Milgate
argue that what may seem to be inconsistencies in Mill's liberalism might be
explained by differentiating between individual liberty and economic liberty, the
former to which Mill applied utilitarian principles, the latter merely abstract
economic theory.30 Thus, they claim, interventions in the economic arena justified by
29 R. J. Halliday, John StuartMill (1976; London: Routledge, 2004).
30 Shannon C. Stimson and Murray Milgate, 'Mill, Liberty and the Facts of Life,' Political Studies
49.2(2001).
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arguments from political economy do not in any way infringe on individual liberty.
Stimson and Milgate might thus account for discrepancies in theory, but the
delineation of liberties is more equivocal in practice. As I will show in the next
section, this distinction collapses in the case of the literary marketplace and the
critique of literature as a capitalist venture.31
A further way of conceptualising these apparent contradictions is to chart the
changing role of the public and its relationship with the press in Mill's work. In his
earlier writings, Mill had championed the cause of press freedom, calling for the
abolition of the 'taxes on knowledge'—stamp duty, paper excise duty, and taxes on
advertising—which collectively shackled the educative potential of the press.32 'A
tax on newspapers,' he writes in Principles ofPolitical Economy (1848), 'is
objectionable, not so much where it does fall as where it does not, that is, where it
prevents newspapers from being used' (CW 3: 861). The value of the press rests, not
in the 'origination of useful ideas,' but in its capacity to transmit information to 'that
large part of the community who have been taught to read, but have received little
other intellectual education.' As the mode of instruction of potentially greatest reach
in terms of circulation and accessibility—Mill compares newspapers favourably with
'other more recondite sources of instruction'—newspapers foster intellectual activity,
'correct many prejudices and superstitions, and keep up a habit of discussion, and
interest in public concerns.' Its efficacy as a bulwark against 'stagnation ofmind'
can be felt 'in the lower and middle, if not in all, ranks [of society]. In these
readings, the press, in cultivating an informed public and facilitating debate, has an
infrastructural centrality for the conditions of individual and democratic liberty, and
Mill explicitly denounces any limits to its functioning.
Yet by 1859, there had been a significant shift in Mill's attitude towards both
the press and the public at large. Under earlier economic sanctions that were
tantamount to a censorship of the press, the public was figured as the victim of
31 This conflation of personal and economic liberty is also evident in Whistler's allegations of
censorious interference by Ruskin, as I will discuss in Chapter Five.
32 The campaign was at its most heated during the 1830-36 'war of the unstamped,' which resulted in
a reduction from fourpence per newspaper to one penny. It was not until 1855 that stamp duty was
abolished, while advertisement duty and paper excise duty were removed in 1853 and 1861
respectively.
33 In Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Mill claims that the press is a modern day
approximation of the Athenian agora (CW 19: 378).
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tyranny, deprived of the means to rational selfhood. In On Liberty, however, the
public itself has become the agent of tyranny. Newspapers, once the ideal public
forum for the dissemination of ideas and an arena for debate, are now complicit with
the mental stultification of its mass readership. Mill writes of the masses—here, he
indicates that he means 'chiefly the middle class'—that '[t]heir thinking is done for
them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on
the spur of the moment, through the newspapers'1 (CW 18: 269, my emphasis). The
reach and power of the press have not diminished, but where once it was crucial to
the processes of political will formation, now it merely fosters intellectual torpidity.
That Mill was aware of the tenuous instrumentality of the press was already evident
in his earlier commentary. Mill observed in 1834 that with the shift in the balance of
social power from the clergy to the press, newspapers were now 'the sole priesthood
of our time.'34 Yet while the press may 'govern the country ... govern the mind and
conduct of the people,' there was a conspicuous absence of any systematic training
and cultivation of its secular priests, and the execution of the highest office was thus
'abandoned to chance' (CW 6: 163, 164). The absolute freedom of the press
stipulated by Mill above is here qualified by an implicit call for some sort of
regulation to safeguard against the abuse of so powerful an instrument.
There is a similar ambivalence in Mill's attitude towards the public, one that
underlies his discussions of liberty, suffrage, and participatory politics. While for
Mill, liberal democracy is the ideal form of government, he is nonetheless alert to the
fragility of this institution.35 He writes,' [t]he natural tendency of representative
government, as of modern civilization, is towards collective mediocrity,' and there is
the ever-present potential, as forewarned in On Liberty, for a rational public—'a
virtuous and enlightened public opinion,' as Mill calls it in Representative
Government—to degenerate into a numbing conformity, and democracy into tyranny
(CW 19: 457, 390). On the one hand, Mill imputes great benefits to public
participation in political affairs. Mill argues that the individual is himself best
34 Mill, 'Notes on the Newspapers,' CW 6: 164.
35 In Representative Government, Mill asserts that the 'ideally best form of government is that in
which the sovereignty ... is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only
having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to
take an actual part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or
general' (CW 19: 403-4).
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situated to protect his own rights and interests.36 Moreover, public participation is the
most efficacious means of public education, and education the means to an ideal of a
'virtuous' and 'enlightened' public; the government is 'an agency of national
education' and franchise 'a potent instrument ofmental improvement' (CW19: 393,
468). Inclusion in public functions not only accrues in intellectual but also in moral
benefits, for not only does it create a critically informed public, it fosters an
awareness of the common good to extend the individual's sphere of apprehension
beyond myopic self-interests.
On the other hand, Mill is also concerned with the composition and nature of
• • 37 • •this public. His is thus a 'universal, but graduated suffrage,' with three a priori
exclusions: those not meeting basic standards of literacy; those who pay no taxes;
and those receiving parish relief (CW 19: 479, 470-2).38 Additionally, Mill promotes
a system of plural voting, in which 'superior' members of the electorate are given
greater electoral weighting, superiority understood as 'mental' superiority, to be
gauged in practice by occupation (CW 19: 473, 475). These stipulations, based on
36 Mill writes, 'the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded,
when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them' (CW 19:
404).
j7 After the 1832 Reform Act, the electorate increased to 931 735; after the Second Reform Act of
1867, to almost two million (John Hostettler and Brian P. Block, Voting in Britain: A History ofthe
Parliamentary Franchise (Chichester: Barry Rose, 2001) 210, 282).
38 Mill's concern with competence—intellectual, moral, and practical—obtains not only to the
individual voter but to the polity itself. Thus, the fitness of any political system must be measured in
relation to its subjects. From this perspective, despotism and slavery are justified when dealing with
the most primitive of societies, as long as such rule is directed towards progress to an eventual ideal of
self-government.
j9 Richard Arneson argues that these limitations reveal a fundamental incompatibility between Mill's
paternalistic conception of good government in Representative Government—paternalistic in its
insistence on educative criteria for government—and the principles of individual liberty as elucidated
in On Liberty, but as I have suggested above, even the private realm of self-regarding actions may be
subject to censorious opinion, calling into question what Arneson calls the Tibertarianism' of On
Liberty ('Democracy and Liberty in Mill's Theory ofGovernment,' Journal ofthe History of
Philosophy 20.1 (1982): 62). I would argue that there is less an incompatibility between the two texts
as an anxiety about the public and public opinion that spans the two.
At the same time, Arneson overlooks the extent to which Mill's exclusions are not permanent
and that franchise, in theory, is potentially universal. It is in Mill's commitment to an egalitarian
future and his belief in the universal potential for self-governance that Bruce Baum finds him most
radically democratic ('Millian Radical Democracy: Education for Freedom and Dilemmas of Liberal
Equality,' Political Studies 51 (2003)).
Contrary to Arneson, Alex Zakaras argues that On Liberty informs Representative
Government, insofar as the virtues ofMill's sovereign individual form the bulwark against conformity
and the buttress of democratic participation: individuality not only justifies liberal democracy, but
'functions as a conception of citizenship and a part ofMill's democratic theory' ('John Stuart Mill,
Individuality, and Participatory Democracy,' J. S. Mill's Political Thought: A Bicentennial
Reassessment, ed. Nadia Urbinati and Zakaras (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007) 220).
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the assumption that 'superior' voters are best able to determine, and will act
according to, the common good, are precautionary measures against the 'danger of a
low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion
which controls it' (CW 19: 448).40 Mill also recommends a form of proportional
voting based on a quota system both to ensure that minority groups are represented
and to obviate against class legislation based on 'sinister' or sectional interests (CW
19: 446). Mill's support for an extension of franchise which posits a qualified
universality thus also attests to reservations about the public.
These caveats and exceptions are a recognition of the fragility of liberty and
rational public opinion, and the disconcerting ease with which democratic processes
can degenerate into a censorship effected by sheer numbers. At issue was 'that
miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the
public' and how best to avert the dangers of numerical dominance without violating
the principles of liberty (CW 18: 232). In the next section, I consider this
'miscellaneous collection,' not in the context of the political public sphere but in that
of the literary sphere. Mill's anxieties arose from the tension between his optimism
about participatory politics and the consequences of radically altering the size and
composition of the political public sphere. For the writer, as I will show below, the
questions of censorship and freedom emerged from the tension between the writer's
reservations about public tastes and his dependence on the public's patronage.
Publishing and the Public: Censorship in the Literary Marketplace
Echoing with striking similarity Mill's statement with which I started this chapter,
George Moore asserts in 1885 that 'it is certain that never in any age or country have
writers been asked to write under such restricted conditions.'41 Where Macaulay
merely identified the peculiar conjunction of'the freest press' with the 'most
prudish,' Moore here controversially inflates the pernicious effects of the latter to
40 As C. L. Ten points out, Mill's confidence in intellectual superiority in consolidating democratic
processes draws a simplistic equivalence between education and moral rectitude ('Democracy,
socialism, and the working classes,' The Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed. John Skorupski
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998) 384).
41
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exceed even the most Draconian of pre-publication censorships.42 Of equal interest
are both the substance ofMoore's claim and the hyperbolic fervour with which it is
made, for as I will show below, accusations of censorship become themselves
strategic moves in the negotiation between author and public.
Moore's tirade is against the censorious acquisition policies of circulating
libraries, a system of 'illiterate censorship' capitulating to the sensibility of'young
girls and widows of sedentary habits,' rendering literature a 'pulseless, non-
vertebrate, jelly-fish sort of thing.'43 According to Moore, although the (English)
'public prosecutor does not seek to over-ride literature the means of tyranny are not
wanting,' and it is the tyranny of plebeian tastes and petty convention that has
inaugurated the severest of censorship regimes.44 For the librarian 'cater[s] for the
masses, and the masses are young unmarried women who are supposed to know but
one side of life,' and this infantilisation of literature, this need to confine literary
portrayals to the 'one side of life,' perpetuates 'characterless trash' at the expense of
the 'novel of observation, of analysis.'45 The 'librarian' referred to was Charles
Edward Mudie, proprietor of Mudie's Select Library, a dominant figure in the
publishing milieu whose power was inseparable from the predominance of the three
volume novel for the greater part of the century. From the time of Walter Scott's
successful novels in this format, the 'three-decker' was perceived as the primary
form of 'quality' fiction. At thirty-one shillings and sixpence for the three volumes,
the purchase of new fiction was beyond the means ofmost readers and access to
these works was through Mudie's circulating library and to a lesser extent, W. H.
Smith's rival institutions. As almost the exclusive buyer of three-deckers, Mudie's
reign was virtually supreme, and the epithet of'Victorian Leviathan' conferred by
Guinevere Griest is a well-deserved one.46 Mudie demanded and received substantial
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was thus in his interest to uphold what some, including Moore, believed to be an
artificial format.47
George Gissing likewise attributes an attenuated literary culture to an
impoverished public palette, to the economic clout of the 'quarter-educated; ... the
great new generation that is being turned out by the Board schools.'48 These are those
'who can just read, but are incapable of sustained attention,' whose ascendancy in an
increasingly consumerist literary field trivialises reading itself, turning it from a
morally profitable intensive study to an extensive, diffused perusal.49 Moore is
explicit in his allegations of censorship, castigating equally the 'odious tyranny' of
Mudie's regime and the facile tastes of the reading public, while Gissing is more
hesitant of apportioning sole blame to Mudie/70 While it is 'prevailing taste' which
debilitates literary production, for Gissing, culpability rests also on the community of
writers.51 In response to Moore, he argues that the 'course of literature is really
directed by the men who make literature,' rather than the machinations of any library
system, and in so stating, wrests authority away from Mudie back to the writer. But
cultural hegemony entails in turn cultural liability: such men must take responsibility
for the 'art decay' endemic to the age. According to Gissing, 'English novels are
miserable stuff for a very miserable reason, simply because English novelists fear to
do their best lest they should damage their popularity, and consequently their
income.'52 It is therefore not Mudie alone who is motivated by the exigencies of
'profit and loss,' but the English author also, and if that makes of Mudie a tradesman,
47
Rudyard Kipling's poem celebrating the demise of the three-volume novel, 'The Three-Decker'
(1894), for instance, uses the metaphor of an unwieldy naval behemoth to satirise the literary one.
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49 Concerns over the effects of publishing practice on modes of reading were not new. Matthew
Arnold in 1878 had already targeted the library system as 'a machinery for the multiplication and
protection of bad literature, and for keeping good books dear.' This system encourages an extensive
mode of reading, a propensity 'to reading imperfectly without discrimination, going through, for the
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Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001).
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which is the gist ofMoore's polemic, the same is true of the hapless novelist.53
Nevertheless, their differing views on culpability notwithstanding, common to both
Gissing and Moore is a deep resentment of an industry that deprives the author of
creative and economic autonomy, subjecting him to the vagaries of a partially
educated public, leading to a form of censorship that silences all but the most
intellectually, morally, and artistically innocuous.54
In the end, the tyranny of the circulating library and the triple-decker was
revoked, not by Moore's belligerent agitation, nor by Gissing's asseverations of
artistic integrity, but by the capitalist logic which instituted the system in the first
place. By the 1880s and the 1890s, the first beneficiaries of Forster's Education Act
of 1870—Gissing's 'great new generation' of the 'quarter-educated'—had become a
newly-constituted readership whose demands the essentially middle-class institution
ofMudie's could not meet, yet whose custom the publishing industry was eager to
exploit. The three-decker's dominance was increasingly challenged by the
production of cheap single volumes, both as first editions, as for example, Moore's A
Mummer's Wife, and as reprints swiftly following the publication of the three-
volume first editions. It was no longer economically expedient for Mudie to insist on
maintaining the expensive and antiquated format and it was in fact Mudie who
instigated its downfall.55
The release from a tyranny of form and what Nigel Cross identifies as a
'relaxing ofmid-Victorian pruderies' in the period roughly from 1880 onwards did
53 Moore repeatedly refers to Mudie as a 'tradesman,' calling into question Mudie's credentials for the
judging of literary matters. Mudie had refused to circulate Moore's first novel, A Modern Lover, at the
instigation of '[t]wo ladies from the country' on account of its 'immorality' ('New Censorship' 30).
Mudie, Moore states, is 'scarcely competent to decide the delicate and difficult artistic questions that
authors in their struggles for new ideals might raise,' and against this incompetence, proffers
favourable reviews of his novel by noted literary publications, amongst them, the Athenaeum and the
Spectator ('Literature at Nurse' 3). At issue is the question of literary authority, and Mudie's
sovereignty in the economic arena is pitted against the cultural legitimacy of these august institutions.
Indeed, the reader, too, is called upon in judgement, challenged to differentiate between the offending
passage which is cited at length, and comparable extracts from novels granted Mudie's approbation,
including offerings from W. H. Mallock and Robert Buchanan.
54 John Sutherland argues that such fictional denunciations of the literary trade as Gissing's New Grub
Street are somewhat 'untrustworthy witness[es]' to the real relations between publishers and authors,
but I would counter that the perception ofmistreatment on Gissing's part is as significant as the
empirical basis, if any, of his bleak renderings (Victorian Novelists and Publishers (Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1976) 1).
55 See Guinevere Griest, Mudie's Circulating Library and the Victorian Novel (Indiana: Indiana UP,
1970) for a history of the rise and fall of Mudie and the three-decker.
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not of course translate into the abolition of all constraints.56 By 1895, Gissing was
ostensibly writing of the novelist's comparative freedom from 'his bondage of only
ten or twelve years ago':
The great thing is, that public opinion no longer constrains a novelist to be
false to himself. The world lies open before him, and it is purely a matter for
his private decision whether he will write as the old law dictates or to show
life its image as he beholds it.57
This celebratory passage seems more a wishful rendering of authorial agency than a
faithful account of a waning public opinion.58 For while the now defunct three-
decker format is a 'triple-headed monster, sucking the blood of English novelists' as
Gissing claims in New Grub Street, the all-consuming machinery of popular success
is equally vampiric.59 The writer serves, 'not one master, but a whole crowd of them'
and as Henry Ryecroft reminisces in the semi-autobiographical The Private Papers
ofHenry Ryecroft, 'Independence, forsooth! Ifmy writing failed to please editor,
publisher, public, where was my daily bread? The greater my success, the more
numerous my employers. I was the slave of a multitude.'60 Given a publishing
industry which polarises the claims of artistic integrity and financial exigency, the
writer will always be caught between intellectual fulfillment and physical sustenance,
a stark choice between the 'literary conscientiousness' of the 'old type of unpractical
artist' such as New Grub Street's Edwin Reardon, and profitable mediocrity, the
'good, coarse, marketable stuff produced by a Jasper Milvain.61 Even victory in the
marketplace yields not independence, but further entanglement, success being a
monstrous hydra-like entity that multiplies at will. Where Reardon likens poverty to
slavery—both are demoralising and degrading—Ryecroft suggests that the
56
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alternative of financial success is equally enslaving.62 Critiques of consumption most
frequently focus on its effects on the consumers of popular cultural forms, but here,
consumption refers to the effect of being consumed by indiscriminate but
indefatigable demands. The privilege of'private decision,' as concerns the author's
choice of subject, is far removed from this grim prognosis.63
Gissing's initial response to Moore's outpouring in 'Literature at Nurse' is
uncharacteristically sanguine. Projecting an amicable and pliable reading public,
Gissing asserts,' [l]et novelists be true to their artistic conscience, and the public taste
will come round.'64 Elsewhere, he is less complacent. His proposal to counteract the
strictures of the marketplace was not the outright attack on Mudie, which was
Moore's strategy, but a radical purging of English literature. According to Gissing,
any measure of freedom for the literary practitioner can be attained only under the
following conditions:
[Tjhere will no longer exist a profession of literature, and all but the whole of
every library will be destroyed, leaving only the few books which are
universally recognized as national treasures.63
The foremost condition ofGissing's bibliophilic Utopia is not expressive freedom as
commonly understood, as in, for example, Grant Allen's 'Hill-Top Novels,' a
concept embodying the rural idyll Allen treasures, which allows him 'to say my say
in my own way, representing the world as it appears to me, not as editors and
formalists would like me to represent it.'66 Nor is this vision similar to the 'waning of
the plague of book-making' in William Morris's socialist Utopia, where books elicit
merely antiquarian interest once their ideological function of perpetuating false
consciousness is made obsolete.67 Gissing's vision is arguably a mandate for
censorship of the most extreme, a destruction order under the auspices of aesthetic
integrity for virtually the entire body of publications in the history of English fiction.
62 Reardon states, 'The curse of poverty is to the modern world just what that of slavery was to the
ancient. Rich and destitute stand to each other as free man and bond. You remember the line ofHomer
I have often quoted about the demoralising effect of enslavement; poverty degrades in the same way'
(New Grub Street 233).
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' [A]ll but the whole of every library will be destroyed,' muses the disillusioned
Ryecroft, condemning in one stroke, all but the finest of 'national treasures.' The
extremism of this proposal may well be attributed to Gissing's fictional persona, but
the anxiety over the profusion of literary ephemera recurs in Gissing's writings. For
the problem as Gissing sees it is not the hampering of production, but its
indiscriminate proliferation, not censorious constraints but their absence. In this
instance, Gissing includes in the 'collective mediocrity' of Mill's masses not only
partially literate consumers but also Grub Street aspirants. At issue is the
democratisation ofwriting, sustained by the professionalisation of authorship.
Literature is no longer a vocation, but a trade, one that fuels and is fuelled by a
parasitic advisory industry exemplified by the enterprising Whelpdale's various
schemes in New Grub Street. Commercialism veiled as encouragement compounds
the problem of overproduction, creating a 'flood of literature [that] swamps
everything but works of primary genius.'69 From this perspective, Mudie, the
circulating library, and the three-decker were censoring mechanisms specific to a
historical period; for Gissing, it is the whole structure of the publishing industry that
has incapacitated the writer's art.
This allegation that the nineteenth-century publishing industry functioned as a
market-driven censorship in some ways demonstrates a shift in the operation of
censorship that Sue Curry Jansen identifies, from the auspices of State and Church to
that of the market. This move forms the core of her critique of censorship in
contemporary western Liberal societies, her task being to challenge 'the
Enlightenment's history of itself, [that] the triumph of "The Age of Reason" marked
70
a decisive break with a superstitious, ignorant, and tyrannical past.' Instead, she
contends that this moment saw not the abolition of censorship with the ascendancy of
Reason and the dissolution of ecclesiastical and court hegemony, but a mere
71
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useful insofar as she problematises bifurcated models of censorship that displace
censorship onto a political other as 'a regressive practice of un-Enlightened (non-
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Liberal) societies,' but the details of her thesis are simplistic and unsatisfactory.72
First, Jansen's model does not account for the ways in which censorship measures
are a function of historically specific configurations of power. By shifting the agent
of censorship from the state and the church to the market—Jansen maintains that
there is no substantive change, merely one of semantics—she is replacing one
monolithic model of censorship with another while conflating what are distinct
methods of control. Jansen may be correct in identifying a 'far more comprehensive
and invasive [censorship] than the most Draconian measures envisioned by Roman
censors or Spanish inquisitors,' but in attributing this new censorship almost entirely
to the market, she overlooks other influences, not necessarily divorced from the
market, but certainly significant forces in their own right, such as the scientific
discourses I will examine in Part Two or art criticism and theory in Part Three.74
Second, Jansen's model is marked by a diachronic bias: the historical
linearity of her construction implies that the exigencies of market concerns
functioned as a form of censorship only after the demise of court and church
hegemony. This is empirically questionable. In the first place, economic pressures
were already evident, for example, in the Renaissance dramatist's negotiation
between the complexities of the patronage system and the demands of a popular
audience, less repressive forms of control which have received much attention in
work on early modern censorship.73 Another counterexample was the regulation of
the Elizabethan print industry, largely in the charge of the High Commission of
London with a primary focus on religious matters, and the Stationers' Company with
• • • 76its protectionist policies concerning its members' economic interests. It is thus
incorrect to suggest that market censorship arose as a sequel to state-organised
sanctions. At the same time, Jansen understates the role of the state in post-
Enlightenment censorship: nineteenth-century obscenity legislation and wartime
censorship are two examples which refute her claims.
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What is of greater interest to me is Jansen's identification of a 'private trust'
as the successor to the church and the state censor.77 This idea of a 'private trust'
falls within what JeffWeintraub describes as the model of the public/private
distinction conceived in utilitarian-liberal terms.78 Within this model, the state is
designated public while the private is synonymous with the market. Yet this is only
one of four models of this distinction proposed by Weintraub in his useful essay and
I would argue that any discussion of censorship must grapple with the complexities
of the multifarious nature of the term 'public.'79
I started the chapter with a working definition of censorship as the
mechanisms that control what enters and circulates in the public domain.
Nonetheless, the relationship between censorship and the public entails more than
that of filtering. Censorship involves more than the policies and material processes
which create and regulate the public domain: censorship itself can also function as a
public discourse. That this is so is evident from a brief look at the course of
censorship in Britain. Historically, public edicts denouncing specific texts had as
much performative as implemental utility. For example, the aim of royal
proclamations in Elizabeth's reign was to combat religious and political opposition
yet their legal clout was substantially less than that of statute and common law. The
efficacy of such proclamations rested in their effectiveness as propaganda, rather
than in the direct suppression or destruction of criticism. Thus, a kind of public
discursive warfare was inaugurated which pitted official opinion and accounts of
events against transgressive articulations.80 Likewise, obscenity trials relied more on
their publicity value as spectacle than as a means of destroying offensive material.81
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In this sense, censorship appears as a public articulation or performance rather than
physical acts of filtration and suppression.
In addition to a public discourse ofcensorship, there is also the public
discourse on censorship, that is, public debates on the function and place of
censorship. Discussions, such as New Review's 1890 symposium on 'Candour in
English Fiction' to which Walter Besant, Mrs Eliza Lynn Linton, and Thomas Hardy
contributed, attest to the controversy surrounding the issue of censorship and its
significance in late nineteenth-century cultural life. Other literary discussions, while
addressing topics as varied as the nature of realism, literary value, or the role and
prerogatives of authorship, were also interventions in the censorship debate, insofar
as their common point of departure was the issue of artistic freedom. Within these
discussions, allegations of 'censorship' take on polemical value, its pejorative
associations particularly striking in a nation which prided itself as one of the
foremost liberal states. Again, censorship is shown to be more than the material acts
controlling the flow of discursive objects in the public. Rather, censorship is itself a
discursive entity that gains currency in its public usage, its meaning and value
changing as the term itself circulates in the public.
Moore's use of the epithet in his struggle against Mudie—Mudie's refusal to
stock his first novel is denounced as the 'illiterate censorship of a librarian'—best
89
demonstrates its emotive power as polemic tool. By contrast, J. A. Froude endorses
an apposite and constructive censorship in his justification of copyright as 'a
censorship which would really divide the good from the bad.'83 Where anti-copyright
campaigners condemn copyright as monopolistic and inequitable, Froude presents it
as a process of natural canon-formation.84 Censorship, figured as an effective
winnowing of literary ephemera, is thus divested of its pejorative associations; no
longer a travesty against the writer's art, it is now a means of safeguarding the
nation's literary future, just as Gissing's Ryecroft muses on the possibility of
expunging inferior publications for a greater literary good. These two uses of
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censorship—as derogation and as self-professed altruism—suggest that the term
itself is unstable and open to mobilisation for oblique purposes. It is not so much that
Moore's sincerity in his campaign against Mudie should come under question—
Pierre Coustillas comments on 'the justice and utility ofMoore's crusade' while his
biographer, Adrian Frazier, commends the 'nobility' of his intentions85—but that this
hegemonic struggle is not incompatible with his financial interests.86 Equally
questionable is Froude's defence of the protectionism of intellectual property law as
a benevolent censorship, which scarcely hides his proprietary interest as an author
himself. Significantly, Froude's claim is not just a revaluation of the ethics of
censorship, but also of the concept of the 'public' and its role in censorship networks.
Copyright, he argues, 'allows a time for public opinion to weigh the merits of each
new contribution to its art or to its thought. If at the end of the period it continues in
demand, it is thus proved to be really valuable; and then, and not till then, it is passed
R7
onto become the property of the nation.' Where Mill's public opinion is a
censorship of 'collective mediocrity,' Froude's is an erudite minority to which the
task of cultural arbitration is arrogated (CW 18:268).
As is evident in the different senses of the term as used by Mill and Froude,
the notion of the 'public' and its etymological variants are multifarious yet
historically specific. In its adjectival form characterising the socio-political realm,
that is, the 'public' of the public domain, the term is most frequently understood in
opposition to the notion of the 'private' or to 'secrecy.' Within the first binary,
censorship is understood as that which infringes the private realm, as for example, in
Mill's defence of the individual's liberty. Within the second, censorship is aligned
88with secrecy or concealment, set up against openness and freedom. Another
85 Pierre Coustillas, introduction, Moore, Literature 18; Adrian Frazier, George Moore, 1852-1933
(New Haven: Yale UP, 2000) 128.
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variation is the concept of publicity and its part in censorship understood as spectacle
or staged performance. Yet this usage is alleged to be counterproductive to the aims
of censorship itself. As a noun, the 'public' refers to a general readership, a
designation of a particular segment of the population. Yet this 'public' takes on
different values and indeed, different referents in various usages. In the early stages
of bourgeois development, the term referred to a rationally-thinking citizenry. By the
end of the nineteenth century, the 'public' had become synonymous with the
'masses,' as characterised in, for example, Gustave Le Bon's crowd psychology.
Mill's ambivalence towards the public and public opinion exemplifies these
conceptual confusions. Nor was the term any less equivocal in the literary sphere, for
the term implies and imposes a false homogeneity to the literate segments of society.
Indeed, the source of dissatisfaction for Moore and Gissing, and as will be discussed
in the next chapter, for Henry James and others as well, was precisely the flattening
of differences in readerly tastes and desires such that all literature must defer to the
embryonic sensibility of the young reader. These complexities are theorised more
fully in the work of Jiirgen Habermas on the historical evolution of the public and
concomitant notions of publicity.
Habermas and the Bourgeois Public Space: Criticism and Censorship
Habermas's The Structural Transformation ofthe Public Sphere charts the
emergence of the bourgeois public sphere from its liberal-humanist origins to its
perversion and decline in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As defined by
Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere was the 'sphere of private people come
together as a public,' propertied and educated citizens engaging in rational-critical
debate.89 Emerging as a check to monarchical absolutism, its function was to ensure
the legitimacy of rule by compelling an open government answerable to a critically
debating public. Authority was no longer guaranteed by privilege and tradition, but
was to be secured by the best argument and topics hitherto the preserve of church and
state were now brought into the forum of debate and subject to rigorous interrogation
by the bourgeois citizenry. In theory, the principles of participatory parity, open
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discussion, and inclusiveness would obviate the arbitrary exercises of force by
institutional powers. All private individuals with requisite wealth and education had,
in principle, equal access to the bourgeois public sphere where differences in rank
and economic situation were suspended. As the arena of open discussion, the
bourgeois public sphere enshrined a series of basic rights that have been integral to
subsequent debates over censorship: freedom of opinion, freedom of the press, and
freedom of speech. This was the arena in which voluntas could be transformed into
ratio, a concept of a power-free discourse that would persist in Habermas's later
work (83).
In the context of a history of censorship in Britain, it is significant that in the
'model case' of the British public sphere, Habermas specifies the abolition of pre-
publication censorship with the Licensing Act of 1695, together with the founding of
the Bank of England and the first cabinet government, as significant events in its
development (58-9). In so doing, Habermas sets up a paradigm of political
legitimacy that opposes publicity and reason to repression and monarchical caprice,
albeit in a highly idealised model, and significantly, mandates an unfettered press for
its efflorescence. Moreover, these three events draw together three elements of
importance to a study of censorship: publication and the press; commercial interests;
and the state. In the particular context of literary censorship, Habermas's account of
the eighteenth-century public sphere in the world of letters that anticipated and
provided the blueprint for its counterpart in the political realm is of particular
interest. The institutional infrastructure developed in the precursor literary public
sphere—geographically, the coffee houses and salons in which participants
congregated, and socially, the book clubs and societies where communal bonds were
formed—laid the grounds for the emergence of the political public sphere (51).
Literary discussions developed modes of rational critique and cultivated the public
use of reason, while the nascent domestic novel with its psychological explorations
forged a new bourgeois subjectivity, interpellating readers as 'privatized individuals'
(50). The reader replicates in life private relationships depicted in fiction, even as he
animates fiction from his own experiences. This drive to self-knowledge produced
the individual as private subject with the critical capacity to probe and to interrogate,
attributes that were to characterise the bourgeois citizen in the political public sphere.
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A vibrant literary culture in terms of an active production, consumption, and
discussion of literature was thus a pre-requisite for the emergence of a political
public sphere that was to underwrite liberal democracy. Conversely, literary
censorship, as an impediment of the above, has serious political consequences.
Yet from the nineteenth century onwards, the overextension of the bourgeois
public sphere led to its degeneration. With electoral reform and the extension of
franchise, the public sphere expanded to the degree that the bracketing of differences
and individual interests was no longer tenable. Instead of consensus on common
goals and values arrived at through rational debate, the public sphere was now an
arena of negotiation and compromise in which private interests competed for
primacy. The effect was a 'mutual infiltration' of the public and private, a 'reciprocal
permeation of the state by society and of society by the state' (151). This merging
was due to, on the one hand, neomercantilist state policies—increased state
intervention that was eventually to lead to the welfare state—and on the other, a
refeudalisation of the public sphere—the taking over of public functions by private
institutions and a reversion to mechanisms of representative publicity (142). There
was, in effect, a 'socialization' of the state and a 'statetification' of society. The
political public sphere degenerated into a 'pseudo-public,' a 'sham-private world of
culture consumption' where critical debate no longer entailed rational political will
formation but was an administered semblance of its former political function, a form
of pseudo-critique (160). No longer a critically debating public, this 'pseudo-public'
became passive consumers of an administered culture, dupes of the 'culture industry'
(161). In the eighteenth century, the enlargement of the public sphere was effected
through the elevating of the petty bourgeoisie: '[t]he "people" were brought up to the
level of culture; culture was not lowered to that of the masses' (166). In this later
mutation, the reverse was true, resulting in a 'psychological facilitation' that
depoliticised the literary and the journalistic (169). The historical trajectory thus
presented by Habermas maps out more generally Mill's changing conceptualisation
of the public from political force to censoring mechanism, from rational citizenry to
mindless rabble, as well as his equivocal attitude towards the press and the
newspapers. Mill's anxieties over the weaknesses of representative democracy have
eventuated in Habermas's account: the refeudalisation of the public sphere attests to
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the intrusion of sinister interests and class bias into politics while interventionist state
policies stem from the kind of paternalistic logic that Mill argued was inimical to
self-cultivation. Likewise, the debasing of culture mirrors the warnings by Moore
against a feminised literature and Gissing against a literature dictated to by the
partially literate. In Gissing's New Grub Street, Jasper Milvain's adroit handling of
the commerce of literature and cunning successes in the profession place him at the
forefront of Habermas's culture industry. Literary and social commentators in
common trace the degeneration of the late-century public from a community of
critically debating individuals to an amorphous mass.
However, even at its apotheosis in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth
centuries, the emancipatory ideal of the bourgeois public sphere was never attained.
Nancy Fraser points to the gender exclusions largely untheorised by Habermas,
claiming that his privileging of the bourgeois sphere as the premiere public realm is
at the expense of other counterpublics, albeit less hegemonic ones.90 Elsewhere,
Habermas is accused of overlooking plebeian and proletarian publics; the virtues of
rational criticism and publicness idealised as bourgeois values were in fact available
to and appropriated by popular political movements. Concomitantly, Habermas fails
to deal with the radical press as part of the literary sphere.91 David Zaret disputes
Habermas's interpretation of history, locating instead the incipience of the public as a
political force in early modern petitioning rather than the eighteenth-century
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bourgeois public.
Moreover, the establishing and preservation of a public space of
unconstrained discussion unavoidably constitute an act of censorship, a point
cogently made by Richard Burt. Contrary to its purported inclusiveness, the
Habermasian public sphere, according to Burt, is itself a 'censored and censoring
space.'93 In order to ensure the inviolability of a public sphere of debate, any force
90
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threatening its autonomy must be expelled. In this paradoxical logic, the discursive
space that is in theory free from the distortions of censorship is itself protected by an
act of censorship: the censor must be censored to preserve the freedom of discourse.
Burt takes particular aim at scholars of censorship who, following Habermas, claim
the public sphere as 'a space of discursive circulation opposed to censorship.'94 Any
such dichotomy is historically and theoretically erroneous, for these practices do not
form a static binary but are situated on a 'continuum.' Instead of being a process that
dismantles and unveils censorship, criticism is itself a form of censored and
censoring discourse. 'Calling someone a censor is a means of excluding that person
from dialogue,' Burt claims, an assertion that brings a new perspective to George
Moore's contretemps with Mudie.'b Where Mudie exercises an 'intolerable'
censorship by proscribing Moore's works, by this definition, Moore's accusations
and championing of the 'liberty of speech' are equally censorious.96 Their struggle
exemplifies Burt's conceptualisation of censorship as a process of legitimation and
delegitimation, as 'a complex network of productive discursive practices that
legitimate and delegitimate the production and reception of the aesthetic in
general.'97 Where Mudie's censorship segregates transgressive from permissible
cultural artefacts, Moore's censorship of delegitimation not only challenges Mudie's
individual pronouncements but seeks to exclude him from the realm of the aesthetic
altogether. These are not antithetical acts of censorship and counter-censorship;
indeed, they are not even different in kind, but merely similar processes of
delegitimation located along Burt's 'continuum.' Reading Burt in conjunction with
Fraser and others then, one might conclude that the public sphere censors both
internally (Fraser uses the term 'intrapublic relations'), by determining who may
legitimately speak, and externally ('interpublic relations'), not only by suppressing
counterpublics but by upholding the bourgeois public sphere as the only legitimate
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Further, not only does the public sphere as described by Habermas constitute
a 'censored and censoring space,' Habermas's description of the public sphere,
especially in its decline, is itself censuring and censoring. It is in the latter part of his
thesis that Habermas's Frankfurt School roots become most evident, largely in the
pessimistic rendering of modern mass culture. Significantly, the terms with which he
deplores the breakdown of a literary culture proper are much reminiscent of, say, the
denigration of the gothic in the late-eighteenth century, the anxieties over sensation
fiction in the mid-nineteenth century, or the attacks on 'ephemeral' genres in the fin
de siecle, as for instance, 'New Women' fiction or French naturalism. Commenting
on a commercialised and debased press, Habermas criticises its output as 'ready-
made convenience, patterned and pre-digested' in a rhetoric that is not far removed
from, for instance, Henry James, lamenting in 1899 the 'demoralization, the
vulgarization of literature in general, the increasing familiarity of all such methods of
communication, the making itself supremely felt, as it were, of the presence of... the
reader irreflective and uncritical.'99 Both are censorious statements, insofar as they
attempt to trivialise certain cultural processes by invoking superior aesthetic
practices. Habermas's commentary is not just observation and analysis then, but a
continuation of a cultural critique offering a similar diagnosis of cultural malaise, and
in Burt's terms, a form of censorship.
While conceding Structural Transformation's shortcomings, it is still
necessary to clarify Habermas's position. It is not that Habermas is unaware of the
exclusionary nature of the public sphere or of the fact that the model public sphere
was never realised historically. The difficulty in his work is that it is at once
theoretical and empirical. As Geoff Eley points out, Habermas, in his critique of
mass culture in the Frankfurt School tradition, is less interested in historical
particularities than in the normative value of the model public sphere.100 This aspect
of Habermas's work is particularly salient in the context of censorship: at once
referring to material practices in history and involving theoretical discussion,
censorship studies also straddle the uneasy conjunction of theory, praxis, and
resistance. In part because of this tenuous balancing act between the theoretical and




the empirical, Habermas in his later work moves away from the historical in what is
known as his 'linguistic turn.'
The Linguistic Turn: Habermas and Theories of Censorship101
In his later work, Habermas moves away from socio-historical structures of
rationality to find normative criteria for judgement in the transhistorical values
inherent in communicative action. While the interest in communication and
intersubjectivity is already evident in Habermas's early work on the public sphere,
these issues are brought more sharply into focus in his 'universal pragmatics,' which
seek to 'identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding.'102
For Habermas, the goal of every communicative action is to come to a mutual and
reciprocal understanding, and every communicative action presupposes a set of
validity claims, consensus on which can be arrived at through rational debate: claims
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to Tightness in a normative context, to truth, and to truthfulness. For interlocutors
to come to an agreement presupposes consensus on these three claims which
correspond to the social world of interpersonal relations, the objective world, and the
subjective world: that there is a normative basis for what is being said, and moreover,
that these norms can be defended rationally; that what is being said is a truthful
statement about the objective world; and that the utterance is a sincere and truthful
expression of the speaker's subjective experience. These ideals are universalisable,
insofar as they are internal to every speech act, but this is not an abstract
universalism, because discourse ethics is rooted in the pragmatics of speech.104 It is
101 This section is not intended as an in depth analysis of Habermas's communicative theory. What I
take from Habermas is his shift in focus from historical structures to communicative interactions. This
overview thus serves two purposes: first, to contextualise Sue Curry Jansen's use of Habermas to
theorise resistance against censorship which I will examine below; and second, to set up a framework
for rethinking censorship.
102
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to these ideals that Habermas turns to salvage what he calls the unfinished project of
modernity.105
Habermas defends this project by repudiating pessimistic accounts of its
failure, ones which posit the ascendancy of instrumental rationality and the triumph
of bureaucracy at the expense of a loss ofmeaning. Such accounts, as exemplified in
the sterile purposive reason informing Max Weber's constricting 'iron cage' vision
ofmodern society, are a narrow construal of reason which fails to differentiate
between means-end rationality and communicative rationality. All action, Habermas
argues, can be classified into strategic action, that is, 'success-oriented' action, and
communicative action, that is, action 'oriented to reaching understanding.'106 The
former refers to action 'exerting an influence upon others' and is motivated by self-
interest, while the latter involves 'coming to an understanding with them' and is
motivated by reciprocity in communication. This prepositional difference suggests
that while strategic action enforces an asymmetrical relationship, that is, one of
domination and mastery, communicative action implies intersubjective parity. For
Habermas, communicative action is the 'original mode of language use,' and is thus
prior to strategic or instrumental action, which is 'parasitic' on communicative
action, and it is this priority that forms the basis for Habermas's attempt to ground
critique in a philosophy of language.107
These two forms of action and the respective rationalities underwriting them
provide the 'inner logic' of the lifeworld and the system respectively, two ways of
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conceptualising society neither ofwhich is sufficient in isolation of the other. The
lifeworld, 'represented by a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock
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of interpretive patterns,' is the domain of communication with the aim ofmutual
understanding.109 The system, on the other hand, is the domain of strategic actions
controlled by the steering media of power and money."0 The lifeworld is the site of
the symbolic reproduction of society—of cultural knowledge, group memberships,
and personalities—through the medium of communicative action.111 The material
reproduction of society—'securing its physical maintenance'—is effected 'through
the medium of the purposive activity with which sociated individuals intervene in the
world to realize their aims,' and involves what Habermas calls 'social labour.'112
For Habermas, the rationalisation of the lifeworld is not in itself pathological.
As societies become more complex, the lifeworld structures (culture, society, person)
become more differentiated and autonomous. Social integration is now secured not
so much by normative means, that is, by recourse to tradition, but communicatively,
that is, through negotiated consensus. While this development gives greater scope for
communicative rationality, it also leads to greater potential for problems and the
breakdown of consensus. At the same time, systemic mechanisms—'delinguistified
media of communication' such as power and money—become detached from their
norm-based lifeworld anchors. The process of differentiation only becomes
pathological when these systemic mechanisms penetrate the lifeworld such that the
lifeworld itself degenerates into a subsystem, subsumed under and distorted by the
imperatives of the system. This 'uncoupling' of lifeworld and system—the 'internal
colonization' of the lifeworld by the system—is what Habermas calls a 'second-
order differentiation,' and it is this encroachment and uncoupling that constitute the
crisis ofmodernity.113 Habermas argues that the project of modernity can be
recovered by looking to the emancipatory potential in language. The lifeworld might
109 Habermas, Communicative Action 2 124. The lifeworld is 'the transcendental site where speaker
and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective,
social, or subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their
disagreements, and arrive at agreements' {Communicative Action 2 126).
110 See Nancy Fraser for a critique of Habermas's androcentrism and his failure to consider gender as
another steering mechanism ('What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and
Gender,' New German Critique 35 (1985)).
111 Habermas writes, '[ujnder the functional aspect of mutual understanding, communicative action
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be reanimated and its domain bolstered against the colonising drive of the system,
not by rejecting rationalisation tout court, but by fostering a form of communicative
rationality unconstrained by the imperatives of the system. Communicative
rationality can thus be rescued from instrumental rationality, and the social scientist
secures for critique a powerful and recuperative role:
The same structures that make it possible to reach an understanding also
provide for the possibility of a reflective self-control of this process. It is this
potential for critique built into communicative action itself that the social
scientist, by entering into the contexts of everyday action as a virtual
participant, can systematically exploit and bring into play outside these
contexts and against their particularity.114
By appealing to the validity-claims implicit in communication in everyday practice,
Habermas attempts to secure for critique a universal but non-utopian grounding. By
reintegrating differentiated domains into the sphere of praxis, a process of
decolonisation can be engendered and cultural impoverishment reversed."5
While I am aware of the theoretical differences between Foucault and
Habermas, a rigorous examination of their argument is beyond the scope of this
thesis.116 Nonetheless, given the influence of Foucauldian notions of power on
censorship studies, I will comment briefly on this aspect of their quarrel. Amongst
other criticisms, Habermas alleges that Foucault's theory of power is relativistic and
cryptonormative. Habermas claims that a self-referential theory of power that
reduces truths to the effects of power undermines Foucault's own critique of the
human sciences.117 The counterpowers that emerge as nodes of resistance are co-
opted into new regimes of power and thus Foucault fails to articulate a coherent
resistance.118 On his part, Foucault is unconcerned by the contingent nature of these
resistances: as its ever-present antagonist, these resistances are 'the odd term in
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relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite.'119 To
assert that power is omnipresent is not a capitulation to a deterministic model of
power since the statement also implies the omnipresence of resistance; indeed,
omnipresence is not omnipotence, and power's existence is unsettlingly dogged with
the potential for confrontation with its opposite.120 For Foucault, an effective critique
need not be articulated outside of power structures nor need recourse to normative
grounds.121
I do not seek to intervene in what one critic calls 'fundamental disagreements
between Foucault and Flabermas,' but rather, suggest that this particular divergence
on the issue of power foregrounds two ways of conceptualising censorship and
resistance.122 The first follows a broadly Habermasian path, looking to the underlying
claims of communicative consensus as a procedural framework for ensuring that
power is exercised openly and rationally. Sue Curry Jansen, as I will discuss below,
follows this approach in her concept of'reflexive power-talk' as a means of
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'asserting some control over our controllers.' The second looks towards the
symbiosis of power and resistance, arguing that censorship engenders its own
opposition. Judith Butler's argument that censorship enables each intelligible
utterance while producing the possibility of'counter-speech' at each instance, or
Michael Holquist's claim that censorship is always thwarted by the elusive potential
of language (both discussed below), pursue this second path of inquiry. Indeed,
Mill's warning against the incursions of public opinion onto rational discussion, and
Stephen's notion of the necessary incompletion of any act censorship, might align
loosely to these two approaches.
Following Habermas, Sue Curry Jansen looks towards communicative norms
as a way of understanding censorship while avoiding both emancipatory myths of
119
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Enlightenment and a totalising conceptualisation of power: Habermas is '[o]ne of the
best hopes,' she argues, in attempting to 'develop "rational" and equitable rules for
conducting legitimating debates.'124 What is required is a means of 'identifying,
monitoring, challenging, debating, and, where warranted, legitimating forms of
organized censorship' and she takes Habermas's ideal speech situation as a blueprint
for her concept of 'reflexive power talk':125
Reflexive power-talk is a method for identifying and criticizing the socially
structured silences which make arbitrary forms of censorship possible. It is
also a strategy for democratizing dialogic opportunities and outcomes. It
offers a recipe for conducting legitimating discourses according to egalitarian
rules: rules based upon principles of rationality, consistency, and equity.126
Like Habermas, Jansen's interest is not in the content of debate but in the procedural
rules that ensure fair and equitable debate, and the prevailing of the better argument.
The principle of rationality demands that power must be justified according to the
best argument, and that the criteria for assessing the best argument must themselves
be open to rational scrutiny. The principle of consistency enables equal participation
by abolishing epistemological privilege, which, Jansen argues, is a check against
state secrecy and the dominance of a professional elite. The principle of equity is
upheld by the demand for reflexivity: '[pjositions must be secured by strong
arguments, not merely by strong arms or strong credentials.'127 All participants must
abide by the rules of rational argumentation with no a priori exclusions or privileges.
Jansen thus sides with Habermas in her belief in the emancipatory potential of
rational discourse and in the possibility of inaugurating a 'new enlightenment'—
terms themselves reminiscent of Habermas's 'project of modernity'—as a means, not
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of abolishing censorship, but of making visible the technologies of power.
Jansen's solution may be compelling, but there are theoretical deficiencies in
her proposals. Her understanding of language as that which requires 'double-
reading,' for instance, is based on a simplistic and rigid surface/depth model, and she
124 Sue Curry Jansen, 'The Censor's New Clothes: Censorship in Liberal Societies,' Patterns of
Censorship Around the World, ed. Ilan Peleg (Boulder: Westview, 1993) 200.
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has been accused of bypassing the post-structuralist problematisation of language.129
Moreover, holding up Habermas's ideal speech situation as a counter-censorship
blueprint is less straightforward than it appears. In a critique echoing Richard Burt's
reservations about the idealising tendencies ofHabermas's public sphere, Thomas
Dumm points out that the 'operation of the censor' can be found in Habermas's
delineation of an ideal speech situation, 'in that the proliferation of regulations and
conditions that will determine the reasons underlying ideal speech acts are
themselves laws that prohibit and confine the use of language between and among
those who are designated as speakers and listeners.'130 That is, the ideal speech
situation does not so much map out a power-free space undistorted by conditions and
stipulations as itself depend on certain conditions and stipulations to guarantee its
status. Jonathan Culler makes a similar point: if Habermas has failed to demonstrate
the primacy of communicative over strategic action (see note 107 above), then
positing the norms inherent in communicative action as a grounding for critique
misrepresents choice, on the part of Habermas, as a self-evident primacy, a choice
131
which requires the relegating of other forms of action to a secondary status.
Jansen's procedural blueprint, it would seem, entails a priori and hidden exclusions.
What is significant for my purposes here is the weight Jansen gives to rational
discourse as a means of resisting censorship: in Chapter Two, I look at Henry
James's The AwkwardAge and suggest that resistance can be imagined outside such
idealising structures.
This shift in focus in Habermas's work is akin to, although not homologous
with, a turn in the direction of scholarship on censorship, both perhaps being
symptomatic of a more general linguistic turn. This shift is most evident in debates
over the censorship of pornography, where arguments against pornography have
moved beyond allegations of direct causal harm, whether to its consumer or to those
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involved in its production, to claims, articulated within a framework ofAustinian
speech act theory, that pornography as a speech act silences and subordinates
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women. The appropriation of linguistic models to conceptualise censorship can
also be seen in Michael Holquist's work. Eschewing traditional models of censorship
predicated on antagonism between censor and censored, Holquist argues instead that
theirs is a symbiotic relationship akin to the structuralist notion of the linguistic sign.
'Any act of censorship,' Holquist claims, 'like any sign, is riven in its heart by a fatal
division: the prohibition that separates what is banned from what is permitted also
fuses them; the signifying sound and the signified meaning are at once divided and
joined within the linguistic sign.'133 It is likewise to language that he turns to explain
why censorship, though never fully divestible, is also never complete. Censorship, he
avers, 'comes to hate all that is uncertain' and language, which is intrinsically
heteroglossic, by nature resists such incursions.134
In a similar move away from traditional models of censorship as 'explicit
prohibitions,' Pierre Bourdieu locates censorship at the level of discourse formation,
a 'structural' censorship operating in the constitution of a field of knowledge: 'it is
the structure of the field itself which governs expression by governing both access to
expression and the form of expression, and not some legal proceeding which has
been specially adapted to designate and repress the transgression of a kind of
linguistic code.'135 The agency of censorship inheres not in an individual subject but
in the field of knowledge itself, and censorship is not a conscious nor a deliberate act
but the implicit inscribing of subject positions and the demarcating of the speakable
domain. Beyond the 'manifest censorship imposed by orthodox discourse,' beyond
the overt struggles between 'right' and 'wrong' opinion, is a more fundamental
censorship which 'delimits the universe of possible discourse'—that which can be
stated, whether as orthodoxy or heterodoxy—from that which is literally beyond
132 Catherine MacKinnon refers in passing to Austin, but the idea is more stringently developed by
Rae Langton. As a locutionary act, pornography is speech that depicts subordination. By this
depiction, it is an act ofperlocutionary subordination. Finally, and most significantly for Langton,
pornography subordinates and silences through illocutionary disablement (See Rae Langton, 'Speech
Acts and Unspeakable Acts,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 22.4 (1993); 'Subordination, Silence, and
Pornography's Authority,' Post).
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dispute—doxa—that which is undebatable because unspeakable or unthinkable.
The agonism between 'right' and 'wrong' opinions ostensibly played out on an open
battleground is in effect conducted in a circumscribed arena. The two levels of
censorship described here are mutually reinforcing: the play of'right' and 'wrong'
creates a semblance of discursive freedom that obscures the more insidious
censorship of doxic material, whose legitimacy, once arbitrarily determined, is now
seen as natural and inevitable.
There can therefore be no clear separation between the form of articulation
and its substantive content, when speaking of how censorship operates. Significantly,
those who speak with the greatest authority are the most subject to the structural
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constraints of the field, the 'norms of official propriety.' That this is so will be
seen in Chapter Three, when I look at how Nordau, one of the key proponents of
degeneration, was himself attacked by the normative values set out by his work, and
in Chapter Four, when I discuss how Ellis's science of sexology was judged and
defended not just in terms of thematic content (the topic of sexual inversion) but also
according to the disciplinary norms of science (such as stylistic propriety).
Bourdieu makes a persuasive argument for the significance of structural
constraints, but his formulation seems overly rigid and uni-directional, allowing no
room for the potentially subversive impact of the agent on the system. Bourdieu
claims that
[t]he need for this [structural] censorship to manifest itself in the form of
explicit prohibitions, imposed and sanctioned by an institutionalized
authority, diminishes as the mechanisms which ensure the allocation of
agents to different positions (and whose very success ensures their
anonymity) are increasingly capable of ensuring that the different positions
are occupied by agents able and inclined to engage in discourse (or to keep
silent) which is compatible with the objective definition of the position.138
Agents are conceived as passive entities: they are 'allocated' to certain positions and
they merely 'occupy' these positions. Subject positions within the field are already-
inscribed, and the authority of intelligibility comes at the price of conforming to
predetermined positions. For Judith Butler, Bourdieu offers a useful account of how
136 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline ofA Theory ofPractice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1977) 169-70.
137 Bourdieu, Language 138.
138 Bourdieu, Language 138.
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censorship functions as implicit disciplinary norms, but erroneously imputes the
power of utterance to sedimented social institutions and structures, to 'established
contexts of authority and their instruments of censorship.'139 Rather, Butler argues
that this performative force emerges at each iteration: Bourdieu's static formulations
both misread the provenance of performative power and foreclose the possibility of
resistance, for each iterative instance is also the point of potential rupture and
subversive reinscription. These contentions are central to Butler's own attempt to
theorise censorship beyond notions of sovereign subjectivity.
Butler argues that beyond the conventional definition of censorship as that
which suppresses speech is a form of censorship that occurs prior to speech as that
which determines the conditions of intelligibility: it is 'the constituting norm by
which the speakable is differentiated from the unspeakable.'140 The subject in
language is thus always-already subject to a censorship in the form of the rules and
norms which govern the domain of speakability and to speak of censorship is to be
already complicit in a form of censorship that authorises the speaking subject.
Conventional representations of censorship as a force wielded by the state or an
individual against another individual are predicated on the existence of an
autonomous subject who is outside and in control of power. Language from this
perspective is of purely instrumental value, a transparent medium of communication
the use ofwhich is the prerogative of the sovereign subject. The claim that the
pornographer or the utterer of hate speech silences or subjugates by frustrating the
expressive capacity of their victims is founded on this normative view of political
agency as the ability to guarantee the felicitous conclusion of a speech act, to borrow
an Austinian concept.141 There is in this view, according to Butler, a dual
misrecognition of sovereignty. On the one hand, the offensive speaker is erroneously
ascribed as the primary source of injurious power, leaving intact the historical and
social conditions empowering these utterances. This argument has obvious
implications for combative strategies against hurtful speech. On the other hand, the
139 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performance (New York: Routledge, 1997) 141.
140 Butler, Excitable 137-8.
141 Butler takes issue in particular with the pro-censorship attacks on pornography by Catherine
MacKinnon and Rae Langton, and Mari Matsuda's call for the regulation of words that wound. The
political subject for them, she argues, is construed as one with 'the ability not only to represent one's
intention in speech but to actualize one's intention through the act of speech' (Excitable 92).
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recourse to legal mechanisms of suppression is also an imputation of a false
sovereignty: we confer on the language of the law the authority to silence hurtful or
transgressive discourse, in effect resuscitating 'conventional notions ofmastery.'142
Standard accounts of censorship which merely attempt to deliberate between
alternative forms of sovereign expression are thus theoretically untenable.
According to Butler, the performative force of injurious speech, and indeed,
of any speech, inheres in its iterative structure:
If a performative provisionally succeeds ... then it is not because an intention
successfully governs the action of speech, but only because that action echoes
prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or
citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices.143
The privileging (or misrecognising) of the moment of utterance as the origin of the
performative—the 'overdetermination of the scene of utterance'—is in fact an elision
of the performative's temporality, a historicity that indicts more than the individual
but the framing historical and cultural structures as well.144 The positing of a
sovereign subject as the 'fictive origin' of injurious speech is a compensatory gesture
for a 'fundamentally unprosecutable history,' the attraction being the apparent ease
with which cessation of and retribution for an act of injury can be exacted.143
Conceding the temporal unboundedness of the performative, Butler claims, is not an
abdication of individual responsibility at the level of praxis, but a recognition that
responsibility lies not in 'origination' but in 'citation.'146 Instead of a myth of
linguistic origins, Butler posits what might be called a chain of interpellation, since
agency in language presupposes subservience to a prior interpellative power, whose
authority was itself conferred by a prior interpellative act, and so on.
Censorship, conceived not as a repressive force but as an enabling one—in its
inauguration of the speaking subject through determining the dual domains of
speakability and unspeakability—is thus a productive force in the Foucauldian sense.
Borrowing catachrestically from psychoanalysis, Butler uses the term 'foreclosure'
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enforcing the very distinction between permissible and impermissible speech.'147 In
the post-sovereign world, the constitutive act of foreclosure must be continually re-
enacted—the post-sovereign subject, the 'I' of the utterance, comes into being and
must be affirmed at each utterance—and it is in this reiteration, in the radical
instability of its temporality and the disjuncture between the utterance and meaning,
that the potential for resistance arises. For Butler, this potential for rupture is post-
sovereign agency. The constitutive or interpellative act is rendered vulnerable to a
subversive resignification or restaging, a 'kind of speaking that takes place on the
border of the unsayable [and] promises to expose the vacillating boundaries of
• 148 •
legitimacy in speech.' Linguistic dubiety thus engenders a 'counter-speech' that
threatens to redraw the limits of the intelligible.
Butler's concept of foreclosure is a useful corrective to a theoretically
problematic opposition between a predatory censorship and an essentialised notion of
speech as pure utterance, yet this awareness should not preclude an examination of
post-constitutive acts of censorship. Similar questions about subjectivity and agency
have been raised from the perspective of gender politics. For Seyla Benhabib,
Butler's 'Nietzschean position' undermines the feminist emancipatory project: the
subject, conceived merely as a discursive effect, is too deterministic a construction,
leaving no room for agency.149 Butler's performative model of subjectivity thus
erodes the individual's capacity to critique, change, or resist dominant structures, and
dissipates any basis for solidarity. Nancy Fraser is more willing to concede the
necessity of the deconstructive moment, but questions the efficacy of resistance
theorised as linguistic subversion. The issue, she suggests, springs from how Butler
conceptualises the problem in the first place. If Butler's target is subjectivication
through language, then resignificatory processes that destabilise these identities may
be sufficiently effective protest. But Fraser argues that this strategy, weighted
towards the deconstructive, fails to offer concrete alternatives for praxis: what is
147
Butler, Excitable 139.
148 Butler, Excitable 41.
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Seyla Benhabib, 'Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance,' Nicholson 21;
'Subjectivity, Historiography, and Politics: Reflections on the "Feminism/Postmodernism
Exchange,'" Nicholson, 110. On her part, Butler claims merely to have '[recast] agency within
matrices ofpower,' rather than to have dismissed the possibility of agency in its entirety ('For a
Careful Reading,' Nicholson 133)
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needed is 'both deconstruction and reconstruction.'120 Resignification, unlike
critique, lacks 'the normative moment' and thus the basis from which to differentiate
between good and bad forms of signification.151 At the same time, Butler's project,
despite her disavowal, is implicitly normative, though her stark terms—'reification
of performativity is bad, dereification is good,' according to Fraser—are of little
I CJ #
use. Linda Nicholson also questions Butler's concept of resignification on
evaluative grounds, but goes further to argue that Butler does not provide any means
of distinguishing resignifying iterations from iterations which are merely
• 1 SI •
repetitive. Nicholson is thus sceptical of the extent to which a linguistic theory of
subject constitution can account for change.
Butler does deal with material instances of censorship—the 'don't ask, don't
tell' policy of the US military, and the pornography debates, to name two—but her
primary objective is to outline a politics of resistance that does not rely on state
intervention nor resuscitate essentialist or sovereign concepts of subjectivity. With
this commitment to the discursive realm, there is lesser consideration of non-
discursive forces, as for instance, the vulnerability of subversive articulations to
incorporation by the economic sphere. Butler's model does not account for the
complicity between censor and marketplace nor the reification of marginality by
commerce. As I will show in Chapters Three and Five, both censorship and
resistance can be subject to further resignification. Nordau's pathologisation of Zola
and French naturalism invested the entity of 'Zola' with a racy attraction, while
Whistler's revisionist account of the Whistler v. Ruskin trial showed how the
symbolic capital of dissident notoriety could be translated into economic capital.
The 'linguistic turn' in censorship studies has led to a more nuanced
understanding of censorship and is most valuable in dislodging the traditional view
that presupposes a censoring power wielded by the state or its surrogate against its
subjects. This 'new scholarship on censorship,' as Robert Post calls it, under the
influence of Foucault, conceives of power no longer as locatable and tangible, but
dispersed and pervasive, not negative and repressive, but productive and
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generative.154 Yet the more inclusive model brings with it a new set of problems.
Like Foucault to whom it is so indebted, the new censorship has been accused of
losing specificity. As Frederick Schauer argues, the concept of censorship has
become 'so expansive as to be empty.'153 By focusing on the productive nature of
censorship—its function in constituting intelligible discourse, its indispensable role
in enabling communication—such studies risk overlooking the ways in which
censorship can and does encompass repressive activity. It would seem that we are at
somewhat of an impasse. On the one hand, more traditional examinations of the
material processes of censorship tend to bypass the theoretical insights offered by
Butler, Bourdieu, and others. On the other, a focus on the linguistic or discursive
nuances of censorship may seem divorced from praxis and problematises, if not
renders redundant, an ethical or oppositional stance.
In the next chapter, I turn to Henry James as a way of exploring these issues. As a
participant in the late-century publishing world, James can be considered a case
study of a writer negotiating the exigencies of audience and market. James wrote
fairly extensively on issues such as authorial freedom and stylistic constraints, while
in his fiction, he also dealt with tropes and issues salient to the censorship debate,
such as the young female reader, innocence and knowledge, evil and corruption, and
communication and silence. James himself was never subject to overt instances of
censorship nor was he as belligerent a combatant as Moore in the debate, but this
arguably less blatant position vis-a-vis censorship seems fitting when considering a
censorship that, according to Mill, was beyond that enforced by 'whips and scourges'
(CW 18: 277).




Henry James and Censorship
In the previous chapter, I suggested that there are broadly two tendencies in
censorship studies: the first has a more empirical focus, looking at censorship as
material practices in history; the second has a more theoretical focus, questioning the
definitions of censorship and their implications. This latter trend, turning towards the
linguistic, has been criticised for expanding the category of censorship to point where
it is of little theoretical use, while the focus on a more constitutive level risks
overlooking more explicit forms of control. At the same time, if entry into language
entails having always-already capitulated to a form of censorship, then it is also true
that there is no metalanguage available with which to examine censorship. It is into
this theoretical affray that I wish to insert Henry James. My aim in this chapter is to
look at James, not just as a writer negotiating the nineteenth-century literary field,
but also as a way, if not of overcoming, then of exploring, the impasse that seems to
have hindered recent censorship studies.
James himself occupies an ambiguous position in censorship debates. On the
one hand, his circuitous style and alleged homosexuality have led some to see in his
work a kind of self-censorship, to detect in his writing evidence of the internalisation
of social injunctions against non-normative behaviour.1 On the other hand, others
1 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's reading of'The Beast in the Closet' is typical of this approach: 'the
possibility of an embodied male-homosexual thematics ... is present as a—as a very particular,
historicized—thematics of absence, and specifically of the absence of speech' (Epistemology ofthe
Closet (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) 201.
Eric Savoy offers a useful historical overview of Jamesian queer criticism. Savoy makes a
tentative distinction between gay and queer readings, the former with a biographical focus and seeking
to recuperate James for a gay history, while the latter locates the homoerotic in the text itself, looking
at discursive effects and sexual themes. Savoy does concede, however, that the two categories are not
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have noted the surprising audacity with which he flouts social and narrative
convention. I also contend that James's work can be used to connect the two aspects
of censorship discussed above. In the traditional sense of censorship as the external
pressures to which an author is subject, James, as a prominent figure in the
publishing world, was very much enmeshed in these forces. At a time when literary
censorship was less explicit than threats of imprisonment or destruction orders,
critical censure itself became a form of non-coercive censorship. For David
McWhirter, indignant responses to James's fiction, on account of both its formal
innovations and its subjects, were 'almost explicit threats of censorship.'3 Like
Moore and Gissing, James was himself alert to the constraints placed on the writer by
the demands of his reading public and it is in this respect that his work and his
awareness of these work conditions are consonant with Habermas's examination of
the public sphere. This consonance can be seen in the thematic affinities between
James's fictional explorations and Habermas's narrative of decline: the manipulation
ofpublicity; the nature of the literary marketplace and the culture industry; the rise of
modern advertising; the dissolution of the distinction between the public and the
private domains: these are common issues in both their works.4 As Richard Salmon
claims, 'James's cultural criticism may, indeed, be read as a prolonged experiential
articulation of the historical process which Habermas externally and retrospectively
reconstructs.'5 In this usage, Habermas's Structural Transformation acts as
mutually exclusive ('Entre chien et loup: Henry James, Queer Theory, and the Biographical
Imperative,' Henry James Studies, ed. Peter Rawlings (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)).
2
See, for instance, David Kurnick, '"Horrible Impossible": Henry James's Awkward Stage' Henry
James Review 26.2 (2005) or Kevin Ohi, who alleges that 'the sexuality in the work of this legendarily
reticent writer is sometimes startlingly perverse' ('"The novel is older, and so are the young": On the
Queerness of Style,' Henry James Review 21 (2006) 140).
3 David McWhirter, "'Saying the Unsayable": James's Realism in the Late 1890s,' Henry James
Review 20.3 (1999): 237.
4 For discussions of James in these areas, see Jean-Christophe Agnew, 'The Consuming Vision of
Henry James,' The Culture ofConsumption: Critical Essays in American History 1880-1980, ed.
Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears (New York: Pantheon, 1983); Jonathan Freedman,
Professions ofTaste: Henry James, British Aestheticism, and Commodity Culture (Stanford: Stanford
UP, 1990); Richard Salmon, Henry James and the Culture ofPublicity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1997); Ian F. A. Bell, Henry James and the Past: Readings into Time (Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire: MacMillan, 1991).
5 Salmon 8. Eric Leuschner places James in the 'transitional moment between the critical public
sphere and the more diffused one of advertising,' which in turn led to contradictory desires on James's
part: on the one hand, the longing for popular acclaim from the mass market, and on the other,
nostalgia for the rational-critical public sphere of the past ("'Utterly, insurmountably, unsaleable":
Collected Editions, Prefaces, and the "Failure" of Henry James's New York Edition,' Henry James
Review 22.1 (2001): 30.
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supplementary contextualisation, a useful backdrop for locating James in the late
nineteenth-century milieu. James's fictional explorations ofpublicity and the public
and his publishing experiences can then be understood as an interaction with, and
negotiation of, a fragmented public as delineated by Habermas. This is the public as
social tyrant, in Mill's terms, a public whose demands and conventions in effect
create a censorious regime, albeit under the veneer of a bourgeois sociability.
In addition to this sense supplied by Salmon, James's work also has salience
in the context of what I've called the 'linguistic turn' in censorship studies. If, as
Butler and others have argued, censorship is more than a purely negative and
repressive force, but is that which enables communication, then James's fascination
with the structures of communication, its possibilities and its failures, can be seen as
an early engagement with what in current theorisations is deemed a form of
censorship. Insofar as we can no longer say that censorship merely inhibits
communication but that it enables it, James's exploration of the possibilities of
communication when these networks are distorted is particularly instructive. Where
Jansen sees in the communicative ideal the basis for ethical action, James explores
such potential in the violation of these communicative norms. James is less interested
in the ideal speech situation than in the failure of communication, in its distortion and
manipulation, and in the power relations permeating these communicative networks.
These problems of communication—the difficulties in finding a receptive audience,
the possibility of community, the forces thwarting intercourse—are dealt with both
Actively and in his critical writings. More radically, communicative experimentation
is also carried out performatively by James's texts: these frequently enact the
problems of communication, demonstrating for the reader, and also implicating the
reader in, the hermeneutic ambiguity in any act of communication.
The rest of this chapter is divided into two sections. First, I discuss 'The Art
of Fiction' as a commentary on artistic prerogative, looking at his pronouncements in
the context of extant views on writing and authorship. I show how issues of literary
form and method debated on the public stage are continuous with more explicit
debate on censorship and freedom. Next, I turn to The Turn ofthe Screw and The
AwkwardAge. Not only do these two texts explore topics that are central to the
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censorship debate, they also dramatise processes of textual communication to forge a
new critical and ethical reading public.
The Censoring of Taste and the Censoring of Form: The Art of
Fiction
James's most candid plea for artistic licence is in his 1884 essay, 'The Art of
Fiction,' in which he asserts that the foremost condition for the 'good health' of
literary art is that 'it be perfectly free.'6 In this work, he does not depart significantly
from the anti-censorship arguments of, say, George Moore. James argues for a
literary art free from all coercive and normative forces, whether the demands of
audience and market, the moralistic injunctions of evangelism, or the rules and
conventions of artistic practice. In terms of strategy and tone, however, the essay
lacks the acrimony ofMoore's attack on circulating libraries and their clientele. As
polemical practice, Moore's writings astutely and ruthlessly identify an arch-villain
in Mudie, deploying affective delegitimating rhetoric, at times descending to the
vitriolic. Yet Moore presents a simplified version of censorship, useful as self-
• 7
aggrandisation, but overstating his role in the fight against censorship. If Mudie is
designated censor on high, his national library network the infrastructure of power,
and the three-decker his weapon of domination, then the overthrow of his stronghold
and of the cultural primacy of the three volume format—through cheap first editions
and free public libraries—would logically signal the end of all censorship, with
Moore's standing as freedom's champion becoming correspondingly inflated. James
advances a more nuanced reading of market forces, one that recognises the
complexities and fragmented nature of the late nineteenth-century public.
To appreciate James's more nuanced understanding, I will turn, not to Moore,
but to Walter Besant, to whose lecture of the same title James's essay was a
response. Both are ostensibly defences of fiction, calling for recognition of the novel
6
Henry James, 'The Art of Fiction,' The Critical Muse: Selected Literary Criticism, ed. Roger Gard
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987) 91.
7 Moore's part in the demise of the three-decker was not indispensable, although his contribution was
fairly substantial. His collaboration with rogue publisher Henry Vizetelly (whose problems with
censorship are dealt with in Chapter Three) in both the publication of Literature at Nurse, his
'polemic' on censorship, and the single volume A Mummer's Wife, would signal his renegade status.
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as a serious and legitimate art form. If we take Richard Burt's definition of
censorship as a process of delegitimation, then this legitimating project forming the
core of both texts renders both counter-censorship efforts in Burt's terms. For James,
'the province of art is all life, all feeling, all observation, all vision', just as fiction's
'field' for Besant is 'the whole ofHumanity,' yet their approaches are in fact
ideologically, conceptually, and methodologically different.8 For Besant, the
diminution of the novel arises from the absence of institutional structures,
professional qualifications, pedagogical expositions, and other signifiers of value by
which the novelistic arts might receive public recognition. Besant thus counters the
majority, and trivialising, view of writing as a frivolous pastime—the claim that the
novelist is merely 'a person who tells stories'—by adducing the rigour of
compositional laws, 'those general rules and principles which must necessarily be
acquired by every writer of Fiction before he can even hope for success.'9 By
contrast, James indicts such prescriptive measures as censorious constraints, whether
as a priori conditions imposed on artistic execution or as dogmatic criteria for
gauging value. The development of art depends on discursive dynamism, for it 'lives
upon discussion, upon experiment, upon curiosity, upon variety of attempt, upon the
exchange of views and the comparisons of standpoints.'10
There are two points to note here. First, the valorisation of productive discord
and discursive struggle resonates with Mill's anti-censorship arguments. For Mill, a
'living truth' can only be sustained through continual testing; for James, a living art
is forged through contestation: good art 'derives a considerable part of its beneficial
exercise from flying in the face of presumptions.'11 Second, although art is presented
as an adversarial process, at this point for James, the forces which seek to stifle it
might still be combated by untrammelled discursive exchange that is both 'frank and
sincere.'12 He sees the growing public interest in the theory of the novel as 'signs of
returning animation,' ushering in, hopefully, an 'era of discussion'; indeed, the
dialogue between James and Besant attests to some degree to the existence of a late-
8
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century version of a literary public sphere.13 Such exchanges were not uncommon,
with issues like censorship, the function of fiction, or the nature of realism, being
debated with vigour in journals such as the Pall Mall Gazette or The New Review.
While official participants were largely drawn from literary circles, these discussions
frequently elicited responses from the broader reading public through letters to the
editor.14 James promotes a form of discussion valuing openness and participation that
is not unlike that of Jansen. As I will discuss below, in James's later fiction, the
feasibility of this kind of 'frank and sincere' exchange becomes highly questionable.
Underlying Besant's and James's divergent approaches to regulatory
principles are their different understandings of two concepts: the nature of realism,
and the relationship between author and reader. Besant promotes a character- and
story-driven narrative form governed by strict fidelity to life, a conception of the
novel that seems to curtail severely the writer's scope and sits uneasily with his
earlier call for literary freedom. For Besant's understanding of fidelity is a strictly
empiricist one: 'the conditions of place, ofmanners, and of thought must be drawn
from personal experience' and the writer is adjured 'never to go beyond your own
experience.'16 Such are the demands of a reading public to which the writer must
comply, a public which 'recognise before any other quality that of fidelity,' which
measure 'the greatness of a novelist... chiefly by the knowledge of the world
displayed in his pages.'16 Of other technical aspects of the novel, they are by and
large impervious. This is the reading public that was so problematic for Moore and
Gissing, yet Besant's approach is placatory even while he is condescending in his
characterisation of this public. Moreover, Besant's elevation of character and plot
entails a narrative practice that in its selective process institutes a regime of self-
discipline that ruthlessly excises all, to Besant, extraneous elements of narrative, and
13
James, 'Art of Fiction' 187.
14 Michael Warner's comments on the eighteenth-century literary public sphere are pertinent here:
publications such as serials, newsletters, and almanacs 'developed reflexivity about their circulation
through reviews, reprintings, citation, controversy. These forms single out circulation both through
their sense of temporality and through the way they allow discourse to move in different directions. I
don't speak just to you; I speak to the public in a way that enters a cross-citational field ofmany other
people speaking to the public' (66). The intertextual exchange between Besant's lecture and James's
essay formed part of broader debates over fiction that traversed different periodicals, addressing, and
in the moment of addressing, constituting, specific publics, as, for example, Besant's addressees of




is articulated in terms not unfitting for the most particular of censors: 'All
descriptions which hinder instead of helping the action, all episodes of whatever
kind, all conversation which does not either advance the story or illustrate the
characters, ought to be rigidly suppressed.'17 James takes issue with this hierarchy of
narrative components, questioning the efficacy, and indeed, the possibility, of
separating, for example, description and dialogue, or character and incident. These
elements rather ' [melt] into each other at ever)' breath and [are] intimately associated
parts of one general effort of expression.'18 Jamesian mimesis involves not the
rendering of experience into story as such, but the creation of 'the illusion of life,'
the success ofwhich depends on the extent to which 'the air of reality (solidity of
specification)' is produced.19 James's famous dictum that '[a] novel is in its broadest
definition a personal impression of life' suggests that its value may be judged purely
'according to the intensity of the impression,' and such intensity, he adds, can only
be had if 'there is freedom to feel and say.'20 Literary realism and literary freedom
are thus inextricably connected; freedom from censorship becomes not merely the
most felicitous conditions for the writer's art, but a constitutive element of genre
itself.
It is on the basis of these contrasting attitudes to realism that Vivien Jones
argues that while Besant looks to external criteria for legitimation, James turns
inwards to authorial sensibility in his conception of literary impressionism.21 At this
stage though, this claim is not entirely true. While eschewing the public validation
that Besant courts, James, in his attempt to rescue the beleaguered fictional genre,
nevertheless appeals to an equally public institution, that of the discipline of history.
Literature, James contends, 'must speak with assurance, with the tone of the
historian,' and the task of both novelist and historian is to 'represent and illustrate the
past, the actions ofmen.'22 As Roslyn Jolly cogently argues, James, in a temporal
sleight, suggests that the novel, rather than generating narrative in its unfolding,
recounts events post factum, thereby harnessing for the novel the epistemological
17 Besant 20.
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authority of history.23 The intentions of this generic alignment are twofold: first, to
appropriate for the novel the disciplinary gravitas accorded a 'science,' and thus to
combat allegations of either frivolity or falsehood, and second, to absolve the author
from moral considerations. Claiming to deal exclusively and objectively with the
facts of the past as history does, the novel cannot by definition be bound by petty
concerns of propriety, its commitment to historical truth exempting it from bourgeois
sensibility. Yet as Jolly rightly points out, in emphasising the facticity of realism,
James inadvertently replicates anti-fiction prejudices by denying and derogating the
fictionality of narrative.24 James purports to battle against the 'weight of...
proscription,' whether in the form of the 'old evangelical hostility to the novel' or a
more contemporaneous dismissal of the novel as 'only a "make belief',' but in the
end, he is less confrontational than he supposes, having retained and reinforced a
value system underlying these very proscriptive measures. This early attempt to
circumvent censorship thus fails to move beyond the terms of censorship's discursive
regime.
That Besant adheres to an older moral code is more evident. For Besant, the
power of the novel inheres in its efficacious didacticism, its ability to impart moral
values without the overt sermonising that alienates:
[The novel] gives ideas, it strengthens faith, it preaches a higher morality than
is seen in the actual world; it commands the emotions ofpity, admiration, and
terror; it creates and keeps alive the sense of sympathy; it is the universal
teacher; it is the only book which the great mass of reading mankind ever do
read; it is the only way in which people can learn what other men and women
are like.26
23
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Besant here attempts to recuperate the potency of fiction, but his conceptualisation of
its force remains within a framework of Protestant meliorism and Utilitarian logic.
Besanf s objective, as was that of the Society ofAuthors, ofwhich he was chairman
from its inception in 1884 to 1892, is to assert the social and professional standing of
the novelist in the context of the late-century cultural scene. However, in invoking
this powerful 'sense of sympathy,' he in effect harks back to a Dickensian publishing
clime in which the readership addressed was largely a uniform one and whose
outlook and values, in turn, were largely consonant with those of the author.27 In
contrast to this return to a nostalgic harmony, James depicts a literary field riven with
antagonism. In his short fiction of this period, the public is presented as a rapacious
and vulgar force wielding an immense power, dangerous, because arbitrary and
undiscriminating. The hapless writer Neil Paraday, 'a prime attraction, a creature of
almost heraldic oddity,' is 'capture[d]' and exhibited by the formidable yet fickle
Mrs Wimbush, herself a 'blind violent force,' in 'The Death of the Lion.'28 Her
capricious attentions are no less stultifying than those ofMiss Hurley, whose initial
desire 'to look straight into his face' is sublimated into an equally obsessive
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compulsion to avoid contact. In 'The Next Time,' Ray Limbert's attempts to court
popular success in his unavailing experiments to produce 'the mediocrity that
attaches, that endears,' the 'middling good,' are enervating and lead ultimately to his
death.30 Even in death, the author is not immune from the intrusive attentions of the
public, as demonstrated by the morbid voracity with which the narrator of The
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Aspern Papers pursues Jeffrey Aspern's 'sacred relics.' John Goode attributes this
difference to how each writer conceives of the relationship between fiction and its
27
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public. While Besant is confident of the salutary effect of fiction on its readers,
James's primary concern is the public's assault on novel and writer.32 For Besant,
fiction acts on its reader; the novel functions as a curative, as a kind of Arnoldian
cultural restorative that promotes social cohesion by fostering a sense of sympathy.33
James, by contrast, reverses the schema and it is the reader instead who acts on
fiction. Like Moore, James rejects the censor's tutelary justifications for intervention:
it is not the reader who needs protection from a literature that corrupts, but literature
that must be preserved from its readers.
It is important not to overstate James's antipathy towards his public. Much
has been said of James's abortive foray into theatre in the 1890s and subsequent
disillusion with an unappreciative public.34 Yet in 1898, when addressing the
'question of numbers' in the American reading public, albeit using an alarmist
rhetoric of deluge and excess—he refers to 'the flood of books,' 'the fast-arriving
billion,' 'the extraordinary dimensions of the public'—James, with a somewhat
uncharacteristic optimism given his negative depictions of the reading public, allows
that it is also a question of opportunities as well.35 Here, James muses on the
possibility of the market not as artistic nemesis but as untapped potential, reversing,
if briefly, the Habermasian narrative of the internal colonisation of the lifeworld by
the system. The market, the exemplary nineteenth-century system, and its habitue,
'the typical American figure' of the businessman 'whom the novelist and the
dramatist have scarce yet seriously touched,' with their potential for epic heroism,
might provide ample new material for the literary imagination.36 Yet as Millicent
Bell points out, James did not avail himself of these opportunities.37 But as
significantly, James reveals a sensitivity to the exigencies of the literary marketplace
that was perhaps missing in Besant's appeal to an anachronistic, homogeneous
32 John Goode, 'The Art of Fiction: Walter Besant and Henry James,' Tradition and Tolerance in
Nineteenth-Century Fiction: Critical Essays on Some English and American Novels, ed. David
Howard, John Lucas, and Goode (London: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1966) 261.
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public. One's readership, James asserts, 'is really as subdivided as a chessboard, with
each little square confessing only to its own kind of accessibility.'38 This
fragmentation of the public is viewed less with trepidation than as a specification of
audience, and should warn us against imputing to James any facile deprecation of the
public as the new agent of censorship.
This timorous optimism in tense conjunction with a brasher denunciation of
the reading public in the short stories recall Mill's ambivalence towards the public.
Mill's democratic model of government was predicated on inclusion and
participation, yet the precautionary measures and specific exemptions written into his
model suggest his awareness that the body politic, expanding at an unprecedented
rate, could also—and without guidance, was likely to—degenerate into an irrational,
censorious force. Likewise, James's benign treatment of the 'question of numbers' is
tempered by the more hostile depictions of a vulgar public infringing on the author's
life and work.
If the texts discussed in this section deal with these material conditions of the
author's profession—the most 'restricted conditions' of any age or country, by
George Moore's hyperbolic account39—in The AwkwardAge and The Turn ofthe
Screw, James explores ideas and tropes that inform the operation of this censorship.
Innocence and Corruption, Inclusion and Exclusion: The Awkward
Age and The Turn of the Screw
If'The Art of Fiction' is James's disquisition on censorship and artistic prerogative,
The AwkwardAge (1899) is his most direct fictional exploration of the freedom of
social intercourse and the trope of the innocent female, a figure at the centre of
censorship debates throughout the century. The novel takes as its object of study the
case, as James informs his reader in the 1908 Preface, 'in a circle of free talk, of a
new and innocent, a wholly unacclimatized presence, as to which such
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reputation as a 'temple of analysis' (205) is not unlike the salons of the eighteenth
century referred to by Habermas, and indeed, is described by Vanderbank in terms
reminiscent of Habermasian rational discourse: 'What is splendid, as we call it, is
this extraordinary freedom and good humour of our intercourse and the fact that we
do care—so independently of our personal interests, with so little selfishness or other
vulgarity—to get at the idea of things' (179). Yet where Habermas in Structural
Transformation is alleged to idealise the nature of public discourse and its
emancipatory potential, James, by contrast, is more interested in how social
intercourse is constrained and how intersubjective bonds are forged, not only through
consensus and common interest, but through exclusionary mechanisms as well.
Where Habermas errs in understating, in Richard Burt's words, the 'censored and
censoring' tendencies of the public sphere, James's interest here is the ways in which
talk is both censored and censoring. What is explored here and elsewhere is the
obverse ofHabermas's theory: where Habermas looks to the emancipatory potential
of communicative action, James examines the constraints in communication and the
ethical potential in and the ethical imperative demanded by these constraints.
As James himself comments, his novel examines the cross-Channel
differences in handling the awkward presence of 'the hovering female young': on the
one hand, 'the inveterate English trick of the so morally well-meant and so
intellectually helpless compromise' and on the other, the 'wise arrangement' of
Continental proprieties in which the 'better the talk prevailing in any circle, ... the
more organized, the more complete, the element of precaution and exclusion' (7).
The trope of reading and the nature of the offensive text, issues at the heart of literary
censorship, are used to explore these national differences and the efficacy and ethical
implications of each respective system. As Tessa Hadley argues, James's interest in
his fictional readers is almost 'anthropological': reading, especially in his later
fiction, is 'social performance,' and the significance of books resides less in their
contents than in their sociological implications.41 Thus, in The AwkwardAge, for
example, reading 'operate[s] as an initiation into significant groups,' and the book
'becomes a marker for performances of permitted and impermissible sexual
41 Tessa Hadley, 'Seated Alone With a Book ...' Henry James Review 26.3 (2005): 230.
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knowledge.'42 This symbolic significance is emphasised in an early scene in which
Longdon recalls meeting Vanderbank's 'awfully clever' brother: 'I lent him books—
partly, upon my honour, to make him think that, as I had them, I did know
something' (29). The signifying relationship between book and reader, or perhaps
more accurately, between book and possessor, is explicitly stated here; knowledge in
the abstract, incarnated in the material form of the book, is metonymically
transferred to its possessor.
James further exploits this configuration of book, reader, and knowledge in
his study of his cases, Nanda and Aggie, readers respectively of an 'impossible book'
and a 'possible' one (197, 145). Product ofContinental principles, little Aggie's
sequestered state is both sustained and defined by her unobjectionable reading
practice and materials. Her docile nature corresponds to the innocuousness of the
bowdlerised history that the Duchess seeks for her, a text that 'leaves the horrors
out,' being both metonym and metaphor for its young reader (145). This comparison
is more than a figurative one. In thus aligning Aggie with her expurgated history,
James gives a sly indication that her purity ofmind is merely a transitory state. The
censored text and the tabula rasa ofAggie's mind share a similar vacuity but in a
kind of temporal chiasmus, we see that the insubstantiality of the text results from the
expunging of provocative material while Aggie's unblemished status is merely
prelude to the provocation of experience. Her face, though '[fjormed to express
everything ... scarce expressed as yet even a consciousness' and she is, in Longdon's
view, a 'slate [on which] the figures were yet to be written,' but the chiasmic
construction, taken to its logical ends, gestures towards the moment of inscription,
the anticipatory 'yet' signalling the imminence of the act (147, 146). This sanitisation
of history also recalls Thomas Bowdler's projects earlier in the century. In the
introduction to his edition of Gibbon's Decline and Fall, Bowdler describes his
efforts to expunge objectionable—'on account of irreligious tendency or indecent
expression'—matter: 'From defects of this nature, it is extremely desirable that
historical composition should be as strictly guarded as possible.'43 Here, too, there is
an implicit conflation of text and young reader, for both are to be 'strictly guarded.'
42
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The earnestness with which Bowdler undertook this censorious task is lost when the
post is transferred to the Duchess. The pragmatic thoroughness of her actions accedes
readily to what was only implied through an unintentional association of ideas in
Bowdler's assertion that his expurgatory practices were 'extremely desirable': the
fetishisation of purity by the social institutions of courtship and marriage, and
censorship's complicity with it.
It is also a bibliographical association that characterises Aggie's initiation
into society. Her marriage to Mitchy renders her 'accessible' to Petherton, who in the
past had been co-opted into the protective guard by the Duchess, but now engages in
a less innocent game of hide and seek involving the 'impossible book' (255, 197).
The precipitousness with which Aggie 'come[s] out' leads Vanderbank to question
how 'she apparently was,' which in turn 'make[s] one wonder a little ifshe was'
(247, 225). The question thus raised is whether censorship fulfills a protective
function or whether it merely defers the moment at which feminine purity is revealed
to be an expedient fiction. Nanda's situation likewise encapsulates this predicament.
In his preface, James informs us that 'Nanda's retarded, but eventually none the less
real, incorporation means virtually Nanda's exposure.'44 James is here referring to
Nanda's exposure to the 'mal' aria,' as the Duchess has it, ofMrs Brookenham's
drawing room (159), but there is another sense in which the novel stages Nanda's
'exposure.' Not only is she exposed, in the sense of being rendered vulnerable, but
she is also exposed in the sense of a disclosure, with the public revelation of'the
preposterous fiction, as it after all is, of Nanda's blankness ofmind' (170). Yet it is
Nanda who is most aware of this duplicity, pointing out herself that 'there was never
a time when I didn't know something or other and ... I became more and more aware
as I grew older, of a hundred little chinks of daylight' (302). Preposterous and
fictional Nanda's purity may be, but this fiction nonetheless has the power to curtail
the freedom of discourse in the Brookenham sphere, to be a 'resented interference
with ancient liberties.'45 The perpetuation of this fiction calls for censorship
measures to keep 'the place tidy ... for the young female mind' (170), which in turn
calls into question the objective of censorship. At issue is the temporal sequence of
44
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censorship: innocence is not an originary state prior to the fall, since Nanda has
always known 'something or other,' but is that which is performatively produced and
renewed with each act of censorship. In this reading, innocence becomes the fictional
and retrospective effect of censorship, masquerading as origins, which in turn throws
censorship into an unexpected light. Censorship is no longer the adversary of fiction
but is itself a fiction-producing mechanism.
These explicit forms of control belie the fact that the initiates into the
Brookenham circle are themselves implicated in structures of power. Designations of
censor and censored are ostensively straightforward in this novel. The Duchess, as
Aggie's legal and moral guardian, erects protective structures around her charge—
'[w]e sift and we sort, we pick the candidates over,' Petherton remarks in jest but not
without reason—and in so doing institutes a rigorous programme of censorship of
which the filtering of 'possible' books is merely one aspect (148, 145). Aggie, as Mrs
Brookenham informs us, is 'the Duchess's morality, her virtue; which, by having it,
that way, outside of you, as one may say, you can make a much better thing of
(184). At once a displacement and a colonisation, the Duchess's censorial measures
allow her to project her 'morality' onto Aggie, appropriating her niece as a
manipulable and visible vessel as a public signifier of her own 'virtue.' This is less
an act of antagonism than one of symbiosis, for theirs is a complementary
relationship, 'the association of the pair being so markedly favourable to each other'
(68). The equivocal nature of these subject positions is made particularly clear in the
description of the Duchess as the navigator of a ship. The Duchess's machinations,
rather than her ward, are the focal point of her peers' attention. For as Mrs
Brookenham herself says, they watch, '[n]ot of course on the chance of anything's
happening to the dear child—to whom nothing obviously can happen but that her
aunt will marry her off in the shortest possible time and in the best possible
conditions. No, the interest is, much more, in the way the Duchess herself steers'
(122-3). The notion of captaincy suggests an authoritative position—she is, after all,
'an experienced mariner'—but the Duchess, being 'in a boat... that will take a good
bit of [steering],' is nonetheless enmeshed in currents not altogether in her control
(123). The distinction between the subject and the object of censorship can no longer
be maintained and it is in this sense that James's novel presages later critiques of
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censorship. Michael Holquist, for example, points to the inadequacy of the
'prosecutor-victim' model of censorship: '"Who-whom?" is a traditional way to pose
questions about censorship but is one that elides many difficulties by psychologizing
the topic, thus transforming it exclusively into a contest ofwills.'46 Holquist posits
instead a more nuanced model of censorship using the concept of a 'force field'
rather than a unidirectional deployment of power, a field that 'encompasses, creates,
and limits the censor as well as the censored.'47 Yet this is a point made abundantly
clear by James some one hundred years earlier. The captain marooned on the seas,
the watchful guardian herself under public scrutiny: these examples show that the
censor is as much implicated in the 'force field' and indeed, as censored, as the
4o
object of her attentions.
Concomitantly, censorship also produces that which it purports to curtail, and
this can be seen by returning to yet another bibliographical reference, this time,
Nanda's 'impossible book.' It has been said that in The AwkwardAge, '[djiscussion
of an experience is more important than the experience, which ... is hardly real until
it's discussed.'49 The same might also be said ofNanda's 'impossible book,' playing
an integral role in precipitating the narrative's climax, yet existing for the reader only
through the mediation of the characters' descriptions. We are merely told that it is 'a
French novel in blue paper' (223), 'something very awful,' from Lord Petherton via
Tishy Grendon (249), 'too hideous,' according to Mrs Brookenham (251). That it is
'revolting,' we are left in no doubt, yet its 'awful subject' is withheld, and the book
itself remains, in the end, a cipher (251).50 A comparison to another of James's texts,
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this novella, James asserts that evil explicated is less striking than evil imagined, a
strategy that might equally apply to The AwkwardAge:
Only make the reader's general vision of evil intense enough ... and his own
experience, his own imagination, his own sympathy ... and horror ... will
supply him quite sufficiently with all the particulars. Make him think the evil,
make him think it for himself, and you are released from weak
specifications.51
In thus compelling the reader into collusive involvement in imagining evil, the risk
of indecorous representations is bypassed even while evil becomes an individuated,
because personally conceived, entity. So too, is the author exempt from 'weak
specifications' of the obscene in The AwkwardAge. The physical presence of the
French novel, its materiality heightened by its prominence in the game of hide and
seek played by Aggie and Petherton, coupled with its substantive blankness, serves
perversely to intensify its transgressive quality. This is characteristic of the novel's
strategy in general: it gestures towards aberrant sexuality—the novel is, as one critic
has it, a 'veritable roll call of late-century deviance'52—but significantly, these
possibilities are only ever intimated and never fully eventuated, and the reader is left,
not with transgressive behaviour, but with talk of it. As Tzvetan Todorov observes,
talk in the salon is governed by the following rules: 'one may say anything, and one
must never say anything directly.'53 Verbal indirection, it would appear, does not
denote moral pusillanimity, but is the means to discursive licence. Linguistic
refinement is therefore not decorous suppression but decorous expression.
The novel is the catalyst for both narrative crisis and Nanda's downfall, yet
by emptying the book—literally—of substantive significance, James in effect
detaches this agency from any empirical basis. By describing, not the book's
obscenity, but merely talk of it, the concept of the obscene loses any objective
mooring, becoming merely a function of discursive speculation. I suggested above
that censorship produces the concept of innocence and the same might be said of the
category of the obscene. Censorship, whether it is the Duchess's regulation of
51
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Aggie's reading or Mrs Brookenham pronouncing the volume 'so revolting' (251),
becomes, not the prohibition of the obscene, but the creation and definition of it, and
the causality between reading and corruption that underpins calls for censorship is
overturned.
This reversal becomes most apparent if we compare The AwkwardAge with
other novels dealing with the trope of the female reader, as, for instance, Gustave
Flaubert's Madame Bovary and its English derivative, George Moore's A Mummer's
Wife.54 These two novels are frequently presented as intractable texts for the
nineteenth-century censor, Flaubert being acquitted of the charge of obscenity and A
Mummer's Wife published in a single volume in defiance of the 'odious tyranny' of
Mudie's circulating library.55 Both flout literary propriety in their depiction of
adultery without moral censure, yet both leave intact the assumption that fiction—in
its sentimental contents and in a solipsistic reading process that estranges the reader
from lived experience—can be a dangerous practice. In these earlier novels, the
causal link between romantic fiction and catastrophic delusion is taken for granted.
Emma Bovary indulges in the fictional romances of Walter Scott, in the works of
Balzac and George Sand, 'seeking to gratify in fantasy her secret cravings,' which in
turn lays bare her own dissatisfaction for her life with Charles.36 Kate Ede similarly
becomes 'fevered and enraptured' by tales of love lost, her seduction by words
preparatory to her seduction by Dick Lennox.57 Fiction—in books and on stage—
elicits from Kate a somatic response: she is overcome by a 'whirling sense of
intoxication,' 'shaken with quick shudderings'; the effect is Tike wine,' Tike
champagne,' an ominous foreshadowing of her decline into alcoholism but also
resuscitating the trope of reading as addiction familiar from mid-century critics of
sensational fiction.58 In both Madame Bovary and A Mummer's Wife then, fiction and
54 For discussions of the Victorian female reader, see Kate Flint, The Woman Reader: 1837-1914
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); Barbara Leckie, Culture andAdultery: The Novel, the Newspaper, and the
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life collapse into one another, resulting melodramatically in adultery and death. By
contrast, because Nanda's novel remains contentless, and because our consciousness
of its dangers is garnered purely through talk of the novel, these dangers appear not
to be inherent to the offending text, but ones that are socially ascribed. It is not that
Nanda has read the book that leads to the narrative's denouement, but the public
revelation that she has done so.
It is in this sense that James provides a more incisive critique of the trope of
innocence and the dangers of reading, for what he does is interrogate the assumptions
behind the rationale of censorship. Contemporary arguments for the autonomy of
literature concede the need for a censored library for the young, such commentators
being, in most cases, ready exponents of Eliza Lynn Linton's 'locked bookcase.'59
Linton draws on the authority and responsibility of the paterfamilias to combat the
'unwritten law' of censorship, an indiscriminate muzzling of the writer's art which
results in a 'feeble, futile, milk-and-water literature.'60 '[M]ay not men and women,
who know of life, have their acre to themselves where the ingenue has no business to
intrude?' she asks rhetorically. Instead, the 'locked bookcase' in which the father
might keep his 'masculine literature' allows a robust fiction to propagate while
keeping from the Young Person 'food too strong for them to digest.'61 It is true that
in 'The Art of Fiction,' James gestures perfunctorily towards the sensibility of the
Young Person, conceding that '[t]here are certain things which it is generally agreed
ZT'J
not to discuss, not even to mention, before young people.' Yet the reference is
cursory, and this brief concession to the necessity of proscription is importantly
presented as a social construct: 'it is generally agreed' that the young must be
shielded; the condition of innocence is not endemic to youth, but arbitrarily
determined, given validity only through social consensus. Moreover, on closer
inspection, the segregated literature advocated by Linton, Moore, and other
campaigners to forestall censorial intentions is oddly in line with the Duchess's rigid
which they are in part both the effect and the cause; called into existence to supply the cravings of a
diseased appetite, and contributing themselves to foster the disease, and to stimulate the want which
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system of censorship, founded on the belief that the presence of unmarried women is
'the ruin also of conversation and literature' (150). This system, one might recall, is
pronounced 'very charming and old-fashioned and, if you like, aristocratic, in a
frowsy, foolish old way' (47). Read thus, The AwkwardAge becomes less an adjunct
to extant critiques of censorship but an implicit critique of those positions.
This elision of textual centres functions similarly in The Turn ofthe Screw as
an evasive strategy that gestures towards, yet falls short of articulating, greater evils.
In this sense, both texts showcase a similar defiance of censorial forces, not
pugnaciously in a George Moore style attack, but more subtly, by unravelling the
logic of silencing which underlies calls for a moral censorship. As Nanda astutely
points out, 'what's so awfully unutterable is just what we most notice,' and in these
texts, silence does not suppress but amplifies (226). This point is made persuasively
by Roslyn Jolly, who argues that The Turn of the Screw 'mocks the idea that the
reader really needs protection from fiction, or that censorship really offers such
protection.' Nor was this irony unmarked by James's contemporaries. Reviewing
The AwkwardAge, the Academy comments on the dexterity with which James
'make[s] repression a factor of art instead of an impediment.'64 The Spectator notes
that James 'never calls a spade a spade, or a "d—d shovel"; he does not visit "mean
streets," or minutely describe the symptoms of epilepsy, or deal in physical or
physiological horrors.' Yet his 'external suavity' cannot conceal the underlying
depravity, a 'mental and moral squalor' far exceeding the excesses of naturalism.
The novel, 'with its scrupulous avoidance of candour, its wealth of sinister
suggestiveness, is a marvel of enigmatic insinuation.'65 Some two decades later,
Bram Stoker was to write in praise of reticence as a form of beneficial self-
censorship and self-preservation:
The measure of the ethics of the artist is expressed in the reticence shown in
his work; and where such self-restraint exists there is no need for external
compelling force. In fact, self-restraint is the bulwark of freedom, inasmuch
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Authorial reticence for Stoker is a demonstration of personal integrity; however, for
James, reticence itself can signify in alternative and subversive ways. Self-restraint
obviates external coercion not through pre-emptive suppression as conceived by
Stoker, but by shifting the onus of interpretation onto the reader such that offensive
meanings do not inhere in the text itself, but emerge at each perusal. The affiliation
between reticence and moral probity is dislodged and silence is no longer the result
of censorship but a means around it.
Viewed thus, reticence becomes less a timorous capitulation to propriety than
its devious circumvention. It is necessary, then, to revisit the judgements of critics
who allege such circuitousness as self-censorship on the part of James. George
Moore, for example, accuses James of yielding to 'the prudery of the age,'
compromising his work with 'concessions [which] are to a certain extent self-
imposed.' Tempering praise with frustration at James's prolixity, Moore writes of
The Portrait ofa Lady, 'his whole book is one long flutter near to the one magical
and unique word, but the word is not spoken, and for want of the word his characters
are never resolved out of the haze of nebulae.' Edmund Wilson speaks out more
strongly against the 'swathing process' by which James 'pad[s] out' his prose, the
'unnecessary circumlocutions and the gratuitous meaningless verbiage' that pervade
say, The Tragic Muse and The Wings of the Dove69 But read otherwise,
circuitousness can be seen, not as linguistic dilettantism, but as deliberate evasive
ploy. Moore's 'one magical and unique word ... not spoken,' a kind ofmotjuste
manque, instead of being a narrative flaw, might be considered synecdochic of
James's larger narrative method. His narratives are frequently structured around
textual lacunae in the manner ofNanda's 'impossible' novel: the headmaster's
missives in The Turn ofthe Screw, Milly's letter burnt unopened in The Wings ofthe
Dove, Mark Ambient's manuscript in 'The Author of Beltraffio.' The pivotal role of
these diagetic texts is undeniable but crucially, their contents are never revealed. It is





69 Edmund Wilson, 'The Ambiguity of Henry James' Henry James: Critical Assessments, ed. Graham
Clarke, Vol. 3, A Twentieth-century Overview (Mountfield, East Sussex: Helm, 1991) (originally
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unspeakable is articulated. These are less instances of 'gratuitous' self-censorship
than of astute expression.
Yet despite this common exploitation of absent centres, there are significant
differences between the two texts, the one ofmost concern here being on the
attribution of the source of obscenity. In The AwkwardAge, the substance of the
corrupting French novel may be absent, but causality, while divorced from the book
and reading, is shown to be socially determined. It is in this sense that I depart from
Peter Brooks's otherwise perceptive reading of the text. Brooks discusses Nanda's
French novel in terms of James's 'scenic' construction. Such 'evacuated centers of
meaning,' he argues, are part of a melodramatic presentation that shifts attention
from content to effect, from depth to surface, with the result that knowledge is seen
• 70
to derive from 'effect rather than cause and substance.' While this emphasis on
effect, as discussed above, produces a more nebulous, because indeterminate, evil, I
hesitate to conflate 'cause' and 'substance' to the extent ofBrooks's reading.
Substanceless effects may proliferate in this novel—the contentless 'impossible
book' certainly, but also the many intimations of transgressive behaviour—but I
would argue that these effects are not causeless, albeit diffused into a less tangible
discursive presence. Though dependent on the fickle consensus of the Brookenham
clique, there is never any doubt that knowledge and its consequences, however
contingent, are, in the end, determined by this discursive circle. By contrast,
Brooks's argument does hold for The Turn ofthe Screw, a text which explores the
affective possibilities of a situation devoid of epistemological certainties. In this
latter text, the absence of substance is contiguous with the absence of cause. The
governess's histrionic insistence that 'there are depths, depths!' is never
substantiated, leaving the reader, and indeed, the governess herself, with no more
than mere effect, with 'unspeakable impressions' (183, 211).
At issue is how each text conceives of knowledge. The Turn ofthe Screw, the
greater part of which is presented as the governess's first person testimony, puts
forward the possibility that knowledge is a dangerously solipsistic entity. The
AwkwardAge, constructed along theatrical lines with its emphasis on dialogue and
70 Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama, and the Mode of
Excess (New Haven: Yale UP, 1976) 166, 173.
79
the intersubjective, argues for a socially produced knowledge. Perhaps one of the
most striking features of The AwkwardAge is the appearance of the word 'know' in
its various forms. At the level of dialogue, there is a noticeable recurrence of an
idiomatic 'you know,' a verbal idiosyncrasy that permeates the language of all
characters, from Longdon to Aggie, Mrs Brookenham to Vanderbank. At other times,
knowledge becomes almost a concrete entity, as, for instance, in Vanderbank's
response to Longdon: "'I know the thing you just mentioned—the thing that strikes
you as odd." He produced his knowledge quite with elation' (23, my emphasis).
More interesting is the shift from the concept of knowledge as a noun to its verbal
form, 'to know.' Not only is the content of knowledge of lesser concern in these
instances, the process of knowing itself has consequences beyond the
epistemological: it becomes a means of intersubjective exchange, the channels
through which interpersonal relations might be negotiated. As such, significance
inheres less in the substantive than in the relational. The following scene in which the
Brookenhams speculate on the Duchess's relationship with Petherton typifies this
usage:
'What is it that's between them?' [Brookenham] demanded.
'What's between any woman and the man she's making up to?'
'Why, there may often be nothing, I didn't know she even particularly
knew him,' Brookenham added.
'It's exactly what she would like to prevent any one's knowing, and
her coming here to be with him when she knows I know she knows—don't
you see?—that he's to be here, is just one of those calculations that are subtle
enough to put off the scent a woman who has but half a nose.' (53-4)
We move from the conjectural nature of Brookenham's musings to Mrs
Brookenham's astute interpretation of interpersonal relations, the intricacies of which
are articulated through and reflected in the syntactically complex 'she knows I know
she knows.' We move, that is, from knowledge in the concrete to 'knowing' as a
form of interaction. A similar usage occurs later in the novel, where Mitchy,
discussing Nanda with Longdon, informs him that 'I know you know what I've
known' (276). In this instance, the circle of mutual 'knowing' becomes an
affirmation of a social bond, an acknowledging of each person's standing vis-a-vis
the other. There is a similar shift in emphasis in Mitchy's desire, voiced to Nanda, of
'the establishment of something between us. I mean your arranging somehow that we
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shall be drawn more together—know together something nobody else knows' (206-
7). It is the complicitous sharing of knowledge to which Mitchy appeals, the
significance lying less in the 'something' shared than in the fact that 'nobody else
knows.' Other instances also highlight the intersubjective significance of the act of
knowing: the Duchess, in a confidential gesture, refers to herself and Longdon as
'you and me who know life,' while Harold suggests that his mother, Tishy, and the
Duchess are 'of the school that knew' (234).
These complexities have consequences for our understanding of censorship.
The Duchess's censorial measures are predicated on knowledge in the first sense, as
a concrete entity to be excised from a questionable historical text, as corrupting talk
to be filtered from the young girl's ears. In this usage, the focus is on the content of
the offending work and words, and the means of its segregation and expurgation. But
with the shift in emphasis to knowledge as process, the focus of censorship moves
away from its putative target to its negotiatory capacity and its efficacy in creating
and cementing interpersonal bonds. What becomes apparent again is the symbiotic
relationship between the exclusionary and the inclusionary thrusts of censorship.
More importantly perhaps, this movement towards a broader understanding of
censorship as a productive rather than repressive force that enables communication
and social interaction does not sidestep the issue of culpability, an issue at the crux of
much recent theorisation of censorship. Singling out the Holquist essay discussed in
Chapter One, Simon Wortham takes issue with the strand of criticism that theorises
the omnipresence of censorship. Such critiques of traditional models of censorship,
informed by a post-structuralist scepticism of the autonomous subject, emphasise the
ways in which language exceeds the control of the individual (the censor) and these
critiques seem, according to Wortham, 'rather to skirt around the issue of
responsibility,' which is itself an abdication of responsibility on the critic's part.71 I
would argue that The AwkwardAge does not shirk this task. David Kurnick speaks of
a 'group subjectivity,' the 'corporate consciousness' of the Brookenham circle that
takes precedence over the individual.72 So too, might we say that knowledge in The
AwkwardAge is a 'corporate' entity: on the one hand, knowledge is given currency
71 Simon Wortham, 'Multiple Submissions and Little Scrolls of Parchment: Censorship Knowledge,
and the Academy,' New Literary History 28.3 (1997): 502.
72 Kurnick 117.
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through consensus; on the other, the networks of knowing are the channels for
fostering communality. The complicity of mutuality, articulated through a reciprocal
knowing, implies that responsibility for this knowledge and the determining of who
has access to it also becomes a 'corporate' or shared burden. In her discussion of
censorship and the performative, Butler warns against imputing a sovereign power to
the figure of the censor in the singular, as this attribution both falsely absolves social
and historical institutions from blame and overlooks the more tacit and constitutive
operations of censorship.73 Here, the idea of a 'corporate' responsibility avoids both
these errors by implicating the Brookenham circle in its entirety and by suggesting
that exclusionary processes are constitutively intrinsic to these knowledge networks.
Knowledge is as important in The Turn ofthe Screw, but where The Awkward
Age examines the consequences ofNanda's claim to 'know everything,' The Turn of
the Screw questions the possibility of knowing anything. In its simplest form, the
governess's post as educator involves the imparting of suitable or permissible
knowledge. This primary educative function suggests a complementary and
inseparable role as censoring buffer, as, in the governess's own words, 'a screen'
whose duty is 'to protect and defend,' to 'fence about and absolutely save' her
charges (179, 176). Successful fulfillment of her duties involves the rigorous filtering
of illicit knowledge and conversely, the failure of censorship is figured as a fall into
knowledge. The governess becomes certain of the children's corruption after the
encounter with Miss Jessel by the lake, and voices confirmation of her failure to Mrs
Grose in lapsarian terms: '[t]hey know—it's too monstrous: they know, they know!'
(182). There is an urgency and assurance in such assertions that belie the way in
which knowledge is shown to be radically unstable in the novella, an instability
heightened by a vertiginous oscillation in the governess's narrative between
confident pronouncements—the moments of 'clear assurance' and 'full coherency,'
her 'fierce rigour of confidence' (170, 183, 196)—and instances when knowledge is
revealed to be entirely subjective—when meaning is 'extracted' or 'read into' (253,
178). Where knowledge in The AwkwardAge is socially produced, here, it is
suggested to be solipsistic fabrication. Describing her first encounter with Quint, the
governess writes, '[s]o I saw him as I see the letters I form on this page' (165). She
73 See Chapter One.
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proffers this analogy as assurance of Quint's presence, the materiality of the letters
on the page intended to affirm the empiricist value of her observations, yet in so
doing, positions herself as possible author of both text and ghostly form. We are
offered no objective proof ofQuint's appearance and the ambiguity of the
governess's words suggests a more subjective provenance.74
Such a radical undermining of epistemological grounds necessitates a
reconsideration of the governess's acts of censorship. From the Biblical lapsarian
narrative onwards, the connection between knowledge and corruption has resonated
throughout western tradition, a connection that also underwrites the tutelary rationale
behind literary censorship of the nineteenth century. Yet here, no longer an objective
entity to categorise and regulate, knowledge, it is intimated, emerges from the
individual herself. To speak of censorship as the regulation of knowledge
presupposes a distinct and recognisable substance to be thus manipulated, precisely
what the novella withholds from its readers. At issue, therefore, is not the mastery
and control of an illicit knowledge, nor even the assessing of its legitimacy or
permissibility, but the status of knowledge itself. The more assiduous the censor's
attempts to suppress forms of evil knowledge, the more pervasive evil becomes, to
the point of its omnipresence. For Mrs Grose, Flora's fallenness is confirmed by the
'horrors' issuing from her mouth, the 'appalling language' directed at the governess
(246). For the governess, it is the absence of such tangible signifiers which signifies
evil: 'Not a word— that's the horror,' she exclaims (182). There comes a
corresponding uniformity of signification with the expanding realm of evil: all
signifiers, one might say, lead to evil. As the governess herself realises,' [t]he more I
go over it the more I see in it, and the more I see in it the more I fear. I don't know
what I don't see, what I don't fear' (183).
There is perhaps something of a Foucauldian cast to my reading here. Power,
Foucault argues, operates with the primary goal of extending its stronghold and it is
productive in the sense that it creates the subjects of its domain. A similar argument
might be made for the governess's acts of censorship: her goal is not the eradication
74 See Kiyoon Jang for a reading of the governess as a ghostwriter, a medium for the spectral figures
of the master, Quint, and Miss Jessel, who herself is in turn given a similar concretisation by Douglas
and the narrator ('Governess as Ghostwriter: Unauthorized Authority and Uncanny Authorship in
Henry James's "The Turn of the Screw",' Henry James Review 28 (2007)).
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of evil, but the expansion of her jurisdiction and the colonisation of her charges. By
this logic, her actions are less repressive than productive of evil, an evil that
mandates an ever increasing vigilance. But James does not offer a forthright
evaluation of the governess's acts, nor is the reader given a stable basis from which
to make such a critique, for these possibilities are hinted at without confirmation. If
Quint is indeed a malicious or delusional fabrication on the governess's part, then it
is only through the reader's own agency that this conclusion is arrived at. Faced with
suppositions and conjectures, the reader, like the governess, must 'extract' meaning
and 'read into' the text (253, 178). It is in this sense that the novella is a hermeneutic
trap, in James's words, 'an amusette to catch those not easily caught,' targeting less
the vulgar or obtuse reader than the sophisticated one.7" As Shoshana Felman argues
in a psychoanalytic interpretation, reading rationally, that is, reading sceptically,
means distrusting the governess's narrative, yet the process of reading sceptically
replicates the governess's own overdetermined reading practice.76 The relationship of
suspicion between the governess and her charges is mapped onto that between the
reader and the governess, and the denunciation of the governess is thus also a self-
denunciation. The distinction between a rational and a neurotic hermeneutic
collapses and like the narrator in 'The Figure in the Carpet,' the reader becomes a
paranoid one, seeking always the 'esoteric message,' the 'figure in the carpet.'77 The
distance between James's earlier justification for artistic licence on the basis of open
discourse and his radical questioning of discursive rationality in this novella becomes
most palpable.
Nevertheless, despite its undermining of stable epistemological grounds for
judgement, the novella still interrogates the ethics of reading. This is an ethics that is
not grounded in communicative reason though, nor in an ideal speech situation, but
one that emerges from the dissolution of these norms, from the failure of
communication. The reader is called upon to make a judgement, no less explicitly
than in 'The Author ofBeltraffio,' where the narrator confronts the reader with her
potential complicity. 'And, a propos of consciences,' he states towards the end of
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that narrative, 'the reader is now in a position to judge ofmy compunction for my
effort to convert Mrs Ambient.'78 In the framing narrative of The Turn ofthe Screw,
Douglas exhorts the narrator to a similar judgement, assuring him, '[yjou'll easily
7Q
judge ... you will.' In this latter case, however, these words act almost as a taunt to
the reader: judgement cannot be 'easily' made yet must be made. Unlike Mrs Grose,
the reader has no 'appalling language' to vindicate her suspicions, no satisfaction,
either, of the governess's 'It so justifies me' (246). In both 'Beltraffio' and The Turn
of the Screw, the stakes are equally high, for what the reader is implicated in is the
corruption and death of a child, the protection of whom is the traditional justification
of the censor's activities. The aim of censorship is to prevent the corruption of
innocence, yet the governess's role vis-a-vis this protective task cannot be
determined conclusively, for she can conceivably be agent either of corruption or of
protection. The reader, inadvertently yet unavoidably aligned with the governess,
occupies an equally tenuous position. There may be no superior hermeneutic ground
from which to carry out self-righteous censorial duties, nor yet to gauge these
activities, yet amidst this epistemological uncertainty, the reader is still forced to
make a judgement. This appeal,'a propos of consciences,' to borrow from the
narrator of 'Beltraffio,' is surely more challenging than any facile demand to align
oneself for or against censorship.
That the reader is stranded in this hermeneutic morass should direct us to
further examination of the interaction between text and reader. As discussed above,
in The AwkwardAge, the 'intellectual elbow-room' of the Brookenham salon and its
'freedom of talk' are bolstered, not by the principle of accessibility, but by the
effectiveness of its exclusionary measures (154). As a text that to some extent resists
reciprocation—and this is amply demonstrated by early reviewers who by and large
condemned its obliquity—the novel replicates this discursive isolation in the reading
process. One contemporary critic points to the rarefied conversation ofMrs
Brookenham's coterie which, while showcasing James's stylistic niceties, ultimately
obfuscates: 'These people undoubtedly perfectly understood each other as a rule, and
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Mr. Henry James understands them always; but the reader only by flashes.'80 For
another, James's stylistic idiosyncrasies infuse his characters' dialogue to the
detriment of a convincing portrayal, such that his style 'has become a barrier
between the reader and all the author's characters.'81 Yet another reviewer comments
on the difficulties in reading the text: the characters 'talk a great deal in a language of
their own that has grown out of their constant intercourse with each other. An
outsider must listen hard and guess a great deal.'82 Uniting these assessments is the
assumption that reading should be a collusive and reciprocal process, a collaborative
relationship between author and reader centred on a compliant text. What we see
then, is a tacit invocation of the sympathy that, as shown above, underwrote Besant's
defence of fiction even while eschewed by James. But in a text which withholds
explication—'[y]ou overhear and interpret as you can, but nothing is said for your
benefit,' claims the Athenaeum—the reader is less participant than eavesdropper.83
Like Longdon, the reader is a novitiate in Mrs Brookenham's salon, and it would
appear that entry into this communicative network requires a certain competency.
After all, even Vanderbank, now a veteran of the discursive sanctum, once 'had had
to learn to feel his way and had more or less mastered the trick' (174). To participate,
to converse intelligibly, is to '[play] the game,' to abide by the Tittle tacit rule[s]'
(237). 'Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech,' Habermas
claims.84 But in the seemingly endless and sometimes directionless proliferation of
dialogue in The AwkwardAge, the focus is less on understanding in Habermas's
sense of a 'communicatively achieved agreement' than on uncovering the exclusions
on which this communality and agreement are dialectically founded.
Jansen outlines a model of resistance to and regulation of censorship by
appealing to the Habermasian ideal speech situation. The normative ideals implicit in
every communicative act provide the procedural basis for holding the censor in its
various manifestations accountable and open to public scrutiny. Rational discourse is
set up against silence, 'the socially structured silences which make arbitrary forms of
80 'Mr. Henry James Exasperates,' Pall Mall Gazette 8 May 1899, repr. in Henry James: The
Contemporary Reviews, ed. Kevin J. Hayes (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 318, 319.
81 'Mr. James' AwkwardAge,' Chicago Evening Post 27 May 1899, repr. in Hayes 326.
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censorship possible.' By contrast, James imbues silence with a rich and devious
signifying power; silence thus need not be rescued by discourse, as in Jansen's
scenario, since it is itself a part of discourse. The safeguards for fair and rational
debate—the suspending of social difference, the inclusion of all rational subjects—
aim to facilitate communicative understanding; James, both in the communicative
circles depicted diagetically and in the extradiagetic exchanges between reader, text,
and author, appears to reject the principle of ease of access. The difficulty of James's
prose, as evidenced by the reviews cited above, suggests that he is less interested in
removing the barriers to communication than in exploring and exploiting them.86
Once again, we return to James's audience. Mill claimed that the most 'hostile and
dreaded censorship' was that enforced by a conformist nineteenth-century public.87
In the literary field, writers such as Moore, Gissing, and James registered a similar
anxiety over a debased reading public and its consumerist power in an industry
driven by economic imperatives. Market censorship is countered by a form of
aesthetic censorship, where superiority of taste is vaunted over the clout of numbers.
Yet the way in which texts like The AwkwardAge and The Turn of the Screw enact
the obfuscation and alienation of the reader suggests a different ploy. What has been
called James's 'problem of audience'88—a problem equally for Moore and Gissing—
has been transformed in this sleight into a problem for the audience. The burden of
the public on the author is here reversed and it is the public on whom demands are
made. In this reversal, the reader is forced into an active engagement with the text—-
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'[m]ake him think the evil, make him think it for himself,' as James puts it89—and
via this aptly circuitous route, James appears to have forged the participatory public
valorised by Mill, Jansen, Habermas, and others. The censorious public in On Liberty
is here reconfigured as a particular reading public, not through idealised
communicative procedures but through difficulty and circumlocution.
Having in Part One examined censorship in its less overt forms, in Part Two, I turn to
more conventionally recognised mechanisms of censorship: obscenity law and
censorship trials. Part Two deals with the public as a generic group of susceptible
readers, a demographic amalgam of Aggies and Nandas, but also with the idea of
publicity. Carried out on a public stage, trials become in some senses a performance
of censorship with a function beyond that of excision and suppression.
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89
Chapter 3
The Degenerate Obscene and the Obscene
Degenerate: Zola, the Law, and Medical Science
There is a very popular cant-phrase, that you cannot make men good or sober
by Act of Parliament. It is false to say so. It is a libel on the power of the law.
You can, and do, keep men sober simply by Act of Parliament; you can, and
do, chain the devil of impurity in a large number ofmen and women by the
fear of the law.1
William Coote's emphatic words bespeak a supreme confidence in legislative clout,
as befitting the Secretary of the National Vigilance Association, an organisation that
advocated legal reform in the extirpation of vice. Within its moralistic purview was
the issue of'pernicious literature,' and the National Vigilance Association
vigorously endorsed the use of powers sanctioned by the 1857 Obscene Publications
Act to combat this problem.2 Yet it is with lesser assurance that one can gauge the
extent to which this confidence was justified. The 1857 Act granted the police
powers to search for, seize, and destroy material deemed to be of an obscene nature
while the 1868 Hicklin judgement provided the terms by which 'obscenity' might be
defined. Obscenity law, as one twentieth-century commentator opines, enabled
Victorian prosecutors 'to destroy many examples of fine literature and scientific
' William Coote, 'Law and Morality,' Public Morals, ed. James Marchant (London: Morgan and
Scott, [1902]) 69-70.
2 The National Vigilance Association was involved in a range of other activities, including national
crusades, the white slavery campaign, rescue work, and the regulation of popular entertainment. See
Alan Hunt, GoverningMorals: A Social History ofMoral Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1999). The assiduousness with which it pursued these activities has led one critic to call it 'an
organization of unofficial censors ... act[ing] as England's moral watchdog' (Samuel Hynes, The
Edwardian Turn ofMind (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1968) 257).
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speculation.'3 Such unequivocally condemnatory views of obscenity law have been
challenged in more recent years. Moreover, in the wake of Foucault, there has been a
tendency to overlook the role of legislative mechanisms in social regulation: the
juridical functioning of the law, Foucault argues, has been superseded by the
technologies of biopower and implicit in this movement is a shift from the legal to
the medical field as the primary domain for the governance of life. In an attempt to
unsettle binaries of censorship and critique, silencing and speech, Foucauldian-
influenced critics such as Richard Burt and Judith Butler posit a model which
situates explicit and implicit forms of censorship along a continuum, in which, in
Butler's words, 'the middle region consists of forms of censorship that are not
rigorously distinguishable.'4 According to this new scholarship, rational criticism
and arbitrary repression exist not as antithetic entities but along a continuum of
censorships, to which the medicalising impulse Foucault finds in modern society also
belongs. This formulation effectively describes the difficult task of segregating
categories of activity as censorship, but the shift to a more fluid concept of
censorship which entails a heavier theoretical emphasis, has sometimes been at the
expense of considering material practices; nor do these concepts deal adequately
with the potential collision of the different forms of censorship in Butler's 'middle
region.' The ascendancy ofmedical discourse was not a straightforward eclipsing of
the legal, and it is at the site of this struggle that new discourses and new forms of
censorship arise.
Part Two revisits two obscenity trials that form the buttress of extant studies
ofVictorian censorship, situating them at this contestatory nexus not as examples of
the alleged philistinism and caprice ofVictorian obscenity law, but as one amongst
several measures to combat transgressive articulations. Chapter Three examines the
prosecution ofHenry Vizetelly for publishing translations of French novels in
conjunction with the pathologising assault on French naturalism by Max Nordau.
Chapter Four looks at the prosecution of Havelock Ellis's Sexual Inversion in the
context ofmedical science and disciplinary contestations. Placing the cases in
cultural and social contexts, Part Two revaluates the different ways of
3
Geoffrey Robertson, Obscenity: an Account ofCensorship Laws and Their Enforcement in England
and Wales (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979) 30).
4 Judith Butler, 'Ruled Out: Vocabularies of the Censor,' Post 249-50.
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controlling/constituting discourse and how these modes of control/constitution work
in tandem with, or compete against, each other.
I set up my discussion of obscenity trials by first looking at how law operates
and its implications for understanding censorship. David Saunders provides a
critique of obscenity law as an instrument of censorship, and while I have some
reservations about parts of his argument, I take from him the useful concept of
'variable obscenity.' The rest of the chapter focuses on Zola and the censorships to
which his works were subjected. I first look at Vizetelly's prosecution for publishing
translations of French novels. I then argue in the next section that these works were
subject to another censorious force, the pathologising discourses of medical science,
specifically, Nordau's Degeneration. I also compare the two forms of censorship in
this section: censorship by law and censorship by delegitimating discourse. In the
following section, I look at counterattacks on Nordau to show that the censor's
power can only be provisional. I conclude by looking at the use of 'Zola' as a
pictorial signifier of vice in Aubrey Beardsley's illustrations to argue that censorship
inadvertently participates in new systems of signification. Vizetelly was prosecuted
to withdraw Zola's works from public circulation, but the trials, together with
Nordau's condemnation, invested 'Zola' with a dissident notoriety that allowed
Beardsley to suggest the taboo in a circuitous and elusive way.
Censorship and Obscenity Law
In Foucault's examination of the 'polymorphous techniques of power' that
characterise modern society, a society to which the spectacular displays of
'murderous splendour' associated with feudal sovereignty no longer pertain,
censorship, 'a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception,' is relegated to the
arsenal of repressive state mechanisms.5 Foucault's claim is valid if censorship is
seen in one of its most visible forms, bookburning.6 Just as the torture and execution
ofDamiens the regicide, an account of which is given in the opening chapter of
5
Foucault, History ofSexuality 11, 144; 'Truth and Power,' Foucault, Power/Knowledge 119.
6 Foucault does not discuss or name specific acts of censorship, giving merely a generalised definition
as 'the interplay of prohibitions,' 'instances ofmuteness,' and 'imposed silence' (History ofSexuality
17). I find the absence of definitional specificity inadequate and this in part leads me to question his
comments on censorship.
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Discipline and Punish, were intended as a demonstration of sovereign might, so too
can bookburning be seen as a public show of strength rather than an effectual means
of disposal.7 The starting point ofmy discussion, late nineteenth-century literary
prosecutions, is not bookburning per se, but its courtroom incarnation, the
metaphorical incendiarism of the obscenity trial: the performance of the spectacle
has reconvened at an alternative site.8 This shift in location is analogous to that
identified by Foucault in the eighteenth century. No longer effective deterrents,
executions and other sanctioned displays of public violence gradually fell into disuse,
undermined by erratic application and the threat of an unruly and unpredictable
audience. By the end of the century, the spectacle of public punishment was rejected
for the certainty of less visibly impressive but more evenly implemented measures;
the body was no longer subject to spectacular violence but to disciplinary
incarceration, the punishment dispensed not at the scaffold but in the court of law.9
Foucault traces a further shift in the operation of the law. For Foucault, law has
historically been an adjunct to monarchical regimes; thus a juridical notion of power
inheres in a model of sovereignty and is therefore inescapably repressive and
prohibitive. Since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the law has
operated not so much under the aegis of 'the sword,' but increasingly as a norm,
assimilated into a corpus of regulatory mechanisms heavily invested in the
propagation of life.10
British obscenity law was not exempt from this normalising impulse. Of great
significance to obscenity trials and debates since the nineteenth century has been the
concept of the 'normal reader,' and invocations of the 'casual reader' by the
Solicitor-General in the Vizetelly case, of the 'vast majority of those who read
7
As Georges Van Den Abbeele asserts, with the invention of the printing press, the original purpose
of bookburning as the literal obliteration of ideas contained within a book's covers was made
obsolete, for 'no longer could a single bonfire extinguish all versions of a single manuscript' ('The
Persecution ofWriting: Revisiting Strauss and Censorship,' Diacritics 27.2 (1997): 3).
8
Bookburning retained powerful associations as a symbolic gesture. Bishop How of Wakefield
famously staged his own bonfire with Hardy's Jude the Obscure. This symbolic act had more serious
repercussions though, with the novel's removal from W. H. Smith's circulating library at the behest of
How (Michael Millgate, Thomas Hardy: a Biography (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982) 372-3).
9 Foucault writes, '[njow the scandal and the light are to be distributed differently; it is the conviction
itself that marks the offender with the unequivocally negative sign: the publicity has shifted to the
trial, and to the sentence' (Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (1977;
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991)9).
10 Foucault, History ofSexuality 144.
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[Zola's novels] for their filth alone' by The Times, or of the 'man in the street' in the
Bedborough affair, were all prototypes of this figure." For Foucault, the normal is
set up against the abnormal or the pathological; here, in a semantic twist, the
'normal' reader refers not to an idealising fiction, but to its opposite, a no less
fictional figure constituted in legal and medical discourse as the object of tutelary
surveillance. The normal reader in its various guises was a conveniently broad
category to which those deemed morally vulnerable were consigned, to some degree
regardless of gender, age, class, or race: its effect was thus homogenising rather than
individuating. Yet this 'visible' functioning of the Victorian tutelary state—Adam
Parkes sees obscenity trials as 'visible sites for staging debates'12—masks a more
implicit normalising regulation outside of the courtroom directed at the hegemonic
subject, who, according to Lynda Nead, was resolutely male and bourgeois, the
'[w]ealthy gentlemen of taste and education.'13 Commenting on the artistic nude,
Nead asserts that the measure ofmiddle-class resilience was its implacability in the
encounter with the undraped figure, the triumph of a disinterested contemplation
against the somatic disturbance potentially incited by this confrontation.14 The
superior reading subject must likewise be immune to corrupting influences and in
this sense, the normal reader functioned as a standard in opposition to which the
individual could measure, compare, and assess himself. As Foucault argues, the
sublimation of the sexual leads paradoxically to an 'intensification of the body,' and
this awareness of the body as a sexual and dangerous entity requires concomitantly
an 'urgent need to keep it under close watch.'15 There is therefore a dual constitutive
" Cited in William Coote, Pernicious Literature. Debate in the House ofCommons. Trial and
Convictionfor Sale ofZola's Novels. With Opinions ofthe Press (London, 1889) 17; Times 1 Nov.
1888; 'The Question of Indecent Literature,' Lancet (19 Nov. 1898): 1344. Other manifestations of
the 'normal reader' include the 'average householder' by which social acceptability was gauged in
Australian Obscenity Law, Woolsey's homme sensual moyen, according to whom he judged Ulysses
not obscene, or the 'reasonable reader' of the authoritarian South African censorship regime (Brian
Lloyd and George Gilbert, The Censorship and Public Morality: An Australian Conspectus (Sydney:
Angus and Robertson, 1930) 11; Paul Vanderham, James Joyce and Censorship (Washington Square,
New York: New York UP, 1998) 124-5; J. M. Coetzee, Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship
(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996) 187).
12 Adam Parkes, Modernism and the Theater ofCensorship (New York: Oxford UP, 1996) 5.
13
Lynda Nead, 'Bodies of Judgment: Art, Obscenity, and the Connoisseur,' Law and the Image: The
Authority ofArt and the Aesthetics ofLaw, ed. Coustas Douzinas and Nead (Chicago: U of Chicago P,
1999)204.
141 will return to the issues of the nude, the opposition between a somatic and a cerebral response, and
the sensibility of the viewer in Chapter Six.
15 Foucault, History ofSexuality 123, 120.
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process at work: the ostensible protection of the vulnerable which in fact entailed the
production of the category of the vulnerable; and the affirmation of the hegemonic
subject, on the grounds of a superior moral, aesthetic, or intellectual sensibility. From
this perspective, the danger of obscene publications (or artworks) was as much a
testing ground for bourgeois male subjectivity as a platform for high-handed
paternalistic intervention.16
This normalising function of the law challenges accounts of censorship in
which obscenity trials are adduced as evidence of a repressive Victorian regime.
Such accounts centring on 'books in the dock,' to use C. H. Rolph's phrase, tend to
focus with myopic indignation on the legal in isolation from social, intellectual,
political, and economic contexts.17 These accounts have been soundly criticised by
David Saunders in a three-pronged attack. First, he takes issue with the
1 O
# t
methodological laxity of these claims. These trials were isolated incidences—he
identifies the 1877 prosecution of Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant for
publishing Charles Knowlton's birth control tract, The Fruits ofPhilosophy, the
Vizetelly trials, and the Bedborough case, all charged under the 1857 Obscene
Publications Act—erroneously and repetitively cited as evidence of bourgeois
Philistinism.19 To construct a theory of censorship on the basis of the exceptional
rather than the exemplary presents a skewed narrative of suppression: Saunders
maintains that there is in fact little evidence to back the claim that obscenity law was
directed against serious literature. Second, he argues that allegations that 'serious'
literature was targeted by the perverse use of legislative power reveal more about the
critic's assumptions about aesthetic worth than the operation of nineteenth-century
censorship. Lastly, and most significantly for Saunders, to conceive of obscenity law
16 It is perhaps more accurate to say the rhetoric of intervention on the part of the state. Despite
legislative authorisation, the state was reluctant to intervene, due partly to the lack of administrative
infrastructure and partly to its liberal laissez-faire heritage, relying instead on private prosecutions by
bodies like the National Vigilance Association (Frank Mort, Dangerous Sexualities: Medico-Moral
Politics in England since 1850, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000) 102-4).
17 C. H. Rolph, Books in the Dock (London: Deutsch, 1969).
18 David Saunders, 'Victorian Obscenity Law: Negative Censorship or Positive Administration?'
Writing and Censorship in Britain, ed. Paul Hyland and Neil Sammells (London: Routledge, 1992).
191 discuss the Vizetelly and Bedborough cases in this chapter and in Chapter Four. For an account of
the Bradlaugh case, see Sripati Chandrasekhar, 'A Dirty Filthy Bookthe Writings ofCharles
Knowlton andAnnie Besant on Reproductive Physiology and Birth Control and an Account of the
Bradlaugh-Besant Trial (Berkeley: U of California P, 1981). For a discussion that focuses on the
Darwinian sympathies of Bradlaugh and Besant, see Chapter Four of Dawson.
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as a mechanism of censorship is a misreading of its purpose and uses. The 1857 Act
was a response to the specific problem of the Holywell Street trade in pornographic
materials, obscene pictures and the 'periodical papers of the most licentious and
disgusting description,' all ofwhich, in the words of Lord Campbell, were a 'poison
more deadly than prussic acid, strichnine [sic], or arsenic.'20 Echoing the
Foucauldian notion of the administration of life, Saunders contends that obscenity
law should be understood as the administration of vice, a 'sophisticated
administration of a social problem—street pornography.'21 Its aim was regulatory
rather than punitive, its operation more appropriately understood in the context of
policing strategies, in relation to, though not necessarily within an overarching
coordinated program with, such initiatives as urban infrastructure, public health, and
education policies.
Elsewhere, Saunders, with Ian Hunter and Dugald Williamson, contend that
the liberal-humanist account of obscenity law, 'the "censorship" story,' as they term
it, 'returns to a fundamental and unchanging dichotomy between literary subjectivity
and the generalised repressive agency of obscenity law depicted as blanket
censorship.'22 For them, censorship invoked as an explicatory model for obscenity
law promulgates a fable of heroic struggle between the author and the law, one that
presupposes an emancipatory telos with the triumph of creativity. In forging an
opposition between a generalised and ahistorical literary subject and a 'blanket
censorship,' such narratives obscure the contextual specificities of regulation. Thus,
for example, the co-option of the adjudication of moral matters by the secular courts
from the ecclesiastical in the eighteenth century must be understood as a control
2 -i
strategy for the newly established distribution networks of print. By contrast, it was
the medicalising discourses of stratified moral susceptibility—the idea of 'variable
obscenity,' in Saunders's words—which formed the context ofVictorian
regulation.24 Cultural competence was unevenly distributed amongst the population
20 HansardParliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. 145(11 May 1857): col. 103.
21 Saunders, 'Victorian'154.
22 Ian Hunter, David Saunders, and Dugald Williamson, On Pornography: Literature, Sexuality and
Obscenity Law (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993)76.
23 Saunders, 'Copyright' 436. The 1727 case ofDominus Rex v. Curl was the first time that the
publication of an obscene libel was deemed a misdemeanour in the English common-law court (Craig
32; Saunders, 'Copyright' 236).
24 Saunders, 'Victorian' 157.
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and moral vitality, stemming from this competence, was likewise variable, hence the
concept of'variable obscenity.' Obscenity law was thus directed not at some
abstract, universal subject but at a particular demographic and for Saunders,
obscenity law, if narrowly construed as a mechanism of censorship fails to account
for these historical, political, and cultural variations.
These are cogent arguments but they are based on a narrow understanding of
censorship as repressive legislation, a rigid definition shared with the censorship
proponents criticised in their work. Saunders, Hunter, and Williamson do not dispute
the definition of censorship as legal assault informing extant accounts, merely the
assertion of its prevalence. Like Foucault, Saunders, Hunter, and Williamson
historicise the operation of power yet retain an essentially ahistorical conception of
censorship: they remain immured in an extirpative model of censorship, that is,
censorship as excision, destruction, and suppression. By contrast, this chapter
proposes to rethink the concept of censorship itself. Censorship more broadly
conceived departs from this rigid view of it as a self-validating construct framed by
the parameters of Foucault's repressive hypothesis.
A second qualification must be made with respect to Saunders's argument, to
his insistence that the distinction between pornography and 'fine literature' was
never under dispute, that, at least at the time of the Obscene Publications Act,
'aesthetic value and the criminal harms attributed to obscenity did not come into
conflict.'25 Obscene publications, Hunter, Saunders and Williamson maintain, were
26
readily identifiable by their contents, distributive channels, and sites of sales. Yet
as Barbara Leckie convincingly argues, that there was such heated debate
surrounding the passage of the Act is an indication that these aesthetic categories
were not as stable and obvious as Saunders would have us believe. In fact, it was this
attempt to regulate obscenity that placed the term under scrutiny and what had
hitherto been indisputable—obscenity as a distinct and self-evident category—was
revealed to be a convenient, but now, problematic, assumption. The Hicklin
judgement, Leckie goes on to argue, led to a definition of obscenity based on the
25
Saunders, 'Victorian' 163.
26 Hunter et. al., 92-3. The Hicklin definition, they argue, emerged not as an attempt to clarify and
secure the definition of obscenity, but from certainty, from a confidence in being able to recognise
obscenity unequivocally: 'There was no doubt because obscene publication was defined not in the
abstract but concretely and circumstantially by its mode and place of dissemination' (71).
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concept of the vulnerable reader, but this merely a 'provisionally stabilized' one.27
Leckie's discussion focuses on print culture. Ifwe look at other media, Saunders's
contention that there was a clear-cut boundary between art and pornography becomes
even more tenuous. This will become apparent in Chapter Six when I look at the
nineteenth-century nude, the morality of which was the subject of much contestation
even before the passing of the 1857 Act.
Hunter, Saunders and Williamson further claim that the overemphasis on
legal mechanisms of control underplays the regulatory roles of other civic and
governmental organisations, the 'equally powerful but more organic and diverse
regulatory currents flowing through the capillaries of the social body,' comprising
both public and private, as well as religious, administrative, and commercial
interests.28 While they are correct in drawing attention to the panoply of
heterogeneous extra-legal agencies, I would go further to locate regulatory
mechanisms not just in identifiable institutional bodies as such, but in discourses
which delimit the terms in which texts and their authors are discussed, in a way akin
to Bourdieu's theory of a deeper or 'structural' censorship. As will become evident
in my discussions of Nordau (and Ellis in Chapter Four), censorship occurs as much
within as between particular discursive fields.
At the same time, I am hesitant of relegating law and its technologies of
control to a position of secondary importance. Saunders dismisses obscenity trials as
aberrant incidences, his briefmention of the cases listed above merely serving to
29
back his claim that the '"censorship" story' is unsupported by empirical evidence.
Yet infrequent occurrence does not necessarily imply atypical phenomena. If instead
of Foucault's (and Saunders's) understanding of censorship as 'one great central
mechanism destined to say no,' if censorship is conceived not as the suppression of
dissent but as the regulation of discourse, then censorship can be seen as the attempt
to control the terms in which issues are discussed and the forms in which they are
articulated.30 In this context, the significance of the trials rests not quantitatively in
the volume ofmaterial destroyed or the number of persons prosecuted, but in their
27 Leckie 39.
28 Hunter et. al., 85.
29 Hunter et. al., 76.
30 Foucault, History ofSexuality 12.
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efficacy as a public platform for disseminative purposes. M. J. D. Roberts argues that
these 'show-trials,' despite their erratic occurrence, were largely representative and
can be considered 'the crests of large waves of social anxiety.'31 Echoing Foucault
but perhaps more willing to concede a use for spectacle, Roberts claims that such
trials functioned symbolically, exploiting 'the shaming methods of selective publicity
to set limits to public tolerance.'32 Thus, law functionally defines obscenity; court
cases are the visible demonstrations and working out of these definitions.
Obscenity trials were thus sites of discursive production, generating a
discourse ofcensorship (the enforcement of the boundaries of the acceptable); a
discourse on censorship (the provision of a discursive space and the vocabulary with
which prohibition itselfmight be discussed); and, paradoxically, a discourse
circumventing censorship. By a discourse circumventing censorship, I go beyond the
idea that censorship negates itself through citational repetition in the courtroom.
Stemming from a definition of censorship as silencing, this argument suggests that
censorship is a futile exercise, given that obscene utterances are cited in court as
accusation or as evidence, thus repeating the offence, if only in citation. Moreover,
the notoriety of prosecution brings the text in question to wider attention and is thus
unintentionally complicit in publicising and marketing this text.34 My contention is
31 M. J. D. Roberts, 'Blasphemy, Obscenity and the Courts,' Writing and Censorship in Britain, ed.
Paul Hyland and Neil Sammells (London: Routledge, 1992) 144.
32 Roberts, 'Blasphemy' 145.
'3 The 1888 Law of Libel Amendment forbade the repetition of offensive words by the press when
reporting court proceedings, and stipulated that indictments and court records need only include
'particulars showing precisely, by reference to pages, columns, and lines, in what part of the book,
newspaper, or other document, the alleged libel is to be found' (cited in Marsh 237-8), thereby
circumventing procedural re-offending.
34 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein notes that in the early stages of print censorship, the Catholic Index of
proscribed books provided clandestine publishers with a ready catalogue of 'profit-making titles and
free advertising,' while alerting potential customers 'to the existence of forbidden fruit' (The Printing
Press as an Agent ofChange: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979) 145). Commenting on modernist trials, Joyce Wexler
claims that '[c]ensorship advertised the work of Joyce and Lawrence far beyond the avant-garde
audience' ('Selling Sex as Art,' Marketing Modernism: Self-Promotion, Canonization, Rereading, ed.
Kevin Dettmar and Stephen Watt (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1996) 91). Catherine A. MacKinnon
argues that obscenity law 'helps keep pornography sexy by putting state power—force, hierarchy—
behind its purported prohibition on what men can have sexual access to' (Feminism Unmodified:
Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1987) 162).
Both Zola and Vizetelly were accused of exploiting notoriety for commercial ends. Samuel
Hynes claims that the subtitling of The Soil as A Realistic Novel was a 'mistake' on the part of
Vizetelly, given that 'in 1888 "realistic" was almost an obscenity in itself, and certainly in many
minds it was a promise of obscenity to follow' (259-60). Read less ingenuously though, the term
becomes a strategic appellation that markets the book precisely as 'a promise of obscenity.' As such,
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that obscenity trials generate a set of proscribed texts and authors, investing in them
a sense of criminality that has signifying purchase in itself. Beyond the substantive
contents of the book or the author's words, these texts and authors come to signify
obscenity metonymically, offering ways of denoting obscenity without articulating it.
This guileful and circuitous rendering of the taboo enables the obscene to be
suggested without fear of censorious interference in a process of co-option and
resignification. The manner in which the target of censorship exceeds the censor's
reach will become clear when I discuss the use of the signifier 'Zola' in the aftermath
of the trials at the end of this chapter. Thus, censorship, which purports to control
discourse, whether through material suppression or less tangibly, through
delegitimation, not only cannot contain dissident articulations, but further, may be
appropriated for subversive purposes.
In this chapter and the next, I revisit two of the cases dismissed by Saunders, the first
being the prosecutions of Vizetelly. For Vizetelly's defenders, the case epitomises
the illogical nature of censorship. Such critiques typically focus on several issues—
the philistinism in the failure to recognise what have since become French 'classics';
the irrationality of the exercise, since the original French texts were freely available;
and the class hypocrisy attendant on the process, the translations' greatest offence
being their accessibility in terms of price and language. Alec Craig asserts that the
'outcome of the battle between Henry Vizetelly and Victorian prudery showed that
[obscenity law was an] ... effective menace to creative writing.' For Donald
Thomas, the case exemplifies the capricious nature of nineteenth-century censorship,
the 'illiberality' with which the law was interpreted.36 Thomas posits, on the one
hand, Vizetelly, who 'published respectable literature, as he thought, and went to
prison,' and on the other, James Camden Hotten, who 'published pornography as a
• • • • -37 .
sideline and died in 1873 still a free man.' In a manoeuvre that conveniently
overlooks the market imperatives informing the business practices of any astute
commercial publisher, Vizetelly is frequently appropriated as a champion of free
this is not a failure to understand the full implications of'realistic' but an exploitation of these






speech, a 'martyr in the cause of freedom to publish and be damned.'38 Such
eulogising still persists, with a recent critic lauding Vizetelly as a 'much wronged
man ... who fought incessantly against literary censorship and was eventually so
battered by the judicial system that he died as the result of a most monstrous prison
,39
sentence.
The above have in common the perception that law sought unequivocally to
extinguish literature. Yet the interaction between the two fields has a more nuanced
and productive history.40 The novel in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth
centuries drew on legal models of truth-telling, borrowing juridical conventions for
asserting the authority and gauging the credibility of truth claims. At the same time,
with the Tawyerisation' of the criminal trial, the court became 'a newly complex
storytelling forum,' the courtroom dialogism of competing narratives rendering it a
novelistic space in a Bakhtinian sense.41 The relationship was at once symbiotic and
antagonistic though, for both novelistic and legal discourses were modes of
representation vying for authority, each claiming epistemological supremacy for its
narrative of events 42 The point of this brief overview is to show that the allegation of
law as extirpative force is merely one part of a much richer narrative. This chapter
supplements these narrower readings to show that censorship involved a more
complex exchange, not just between literature and the law, but with other discursive
fields as well. Jan-Melissa Schramm argues that by the end of the century, literary
realism, in large part because of a greater willingness to experiment with ambiguity
38 Ronald Pearsall, Public Purity, Private Shame: Victorian Sexual Hypocrisy Exposed (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976) 121. Peter Keating is one exception to this general failure to consider
the relationship between censorship, commerce, and transgressive art. Keating argues that given his
largely profit-driven activities, Vizetelly 'was not a particularly attractive candidate for literary
martyrdom' (The Haunted Study: A Social History ofthe English Novel 1875-1914 (London: Seeker
and Warburg, 1989) 245).
39 Alison Hennegan, 'Personalities and Principles: Aspects of Literature and Life in Fin-de-Siecle
England,' Fin-de-siecle and its Legacy, ed. Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 1990) 184.
40 The relationship between narrative fiction and legal processes is a topic of much discussion. See,
for instance, Ian Watt, The Rise ofthe Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (1957;
London: Pimlico, 2000); Kieran Dolin, Fiction and the Law: Legal Discourse in Victorian and
Modernist Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999); Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations:
Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1992).
41 Jonathan H. Grossman, The Art ofAlibi: English Law Courts and the Novel (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UP, 2002) 20.
42 See also Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature and
Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000). From the perspective of reception, Ian Watt claims a
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and instability, had moved beyond the conventions of'evidentiary proof.'43 But
while this shift may denote a widening gap between the two disciplines in terms of
the inner logics of the novel, the prosecution's injunctions against Zolaesque
naturalism suggest that the law had not fully relinquished its interest in a particular
form of realism: the trials were a public vilification of one representation of reality,
one that was figured as debasing and obscene.
Zola and the Law: The Vizetelly Prosecutions
'It is the shame of Zola that he has put an end to reticence.' Thus pronounces The
Western Morning News in the wake of Henry Vizetelly's prosecution in 1888 by the
National Vigilance Association for publishing the works of this 'filthy' writer.44 It is
a reticence that is discarded in Zola's adherence to his naturalist credo, in his
uncompromising depictions of bucolic life in La Terre, the Parisian demi-monde in
Nana, and the petty machinations in the bourgeois apartment building in Pot Bouille.
This lack of reticence on Zola's part is equally matched by that of the press in its
excoriating outbursts. The imprecations on Zola and Vizetelly, the calamitous
prognostications for nation and culture, the calls for extirpative vigilance, the
fetishistic dwelling on the text's criminality, would indicate a larger circle of
culpability in this 'end to reticence': ifZola offends by his want of discretion, the
press is no less blameless in that regard.
That censorship risks undermining its own operation in this manner was a
conundrum ofwhich nineteenth-century commentators were certainly aware. The
Secretary of State for the Home Department warns against 'directing] public
attention to certain obscure publications of a filthy character known only to the few
similar analogy between the novel reader and the jury member: 'both want to know "all the
particulars" of a given case ... [and] expect the witnesses to tell the story "in his own words'" (31).
4j Schramm 186.1 would add that in the case of naturalism, it was towards science that fiction turned
for its legitimating paradigms.
44 Cited in Coote, Pernicious 25. The summons taken out by the National Vigilance Association
against Vizetelly named the following works: Zola's The Soil (La Terre), Piping Hot (Pot-Bouille),
and Nana; Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary, Alphonse Daudet's Sappho; Guy de Maupassant's
Bel Ami', and Theophile Gautier's Mademoiselle de Maupin (Craig 57); only the Zola translations
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by instituting a State prosecution, and thus give that wide advertisement which those
who brought them out would desire more than anything else.'45 The Western
Morning News explicitly refrains from offering proof of Zola's obscenity to avoid
'do[ing] the evil which we deprecate.'46 To look at legislative directives as merely
draconian measures that are ultimately self-defeating ignores the way in which
obscenity trials are situated in complex intersections of both discursive and non-
discursive networks. Instead of sterile Manichaean narratives of struggle between the
censor and the censored, obscenity law might alternatively be conceived as an
administration of vice, a form of social policing47 or the channelling of obscenity 48
A prominent figure in the publishing world, Vizetelly had played an integral
role in mid-century developments in the English press and is credited with
introducing a number of significant writers to the British reading public.49 By 1884,
when Vizetelly & Co. first took interest in translating his work, Zola was already a
figure of considerable notoriety, both in his native France and across the channel.50
The public outcry and allegations of pornographic intent following the publication of
Therese Raquin in 1867—it had appeared earlier that year in serial form as Un
mariage d'amour to similar controversy—led Zola to preface his 1868 edition with a
counterattack on the 'maidenly susceptibilities' of his detractors and a defence of his
mode of naturalism.51 '[M]y object,' he avers, 'has been first and foremost a
were committed for trial (Ernest Alfred Vizetelly, Emile Zola: Novelist and Reformer. An Account of
his Life and Work (London: Bodley Head, 1904) 268).
45
Hansard, vol. 325 (8 May 1888): col. 1720.
46 Cited in Coote, Pernicious 25.
47
Beverley Brown, 'Troubled Vision: Legal Understandings of Obscenity,' Perversity, spec, issue of
New Formations 19 (1993): 35.
48 Hunter et. al.
49
Vizetelly was involved in the agitation for the repeal of the paper duty and founded several
newspapers, including The Illustrated London News, The Pictorial News, and The Illustrated Times.
In his later career as publisher, he brought to Britain the works of Russian writers, such as Gogol,
Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy, American writers, such as Harriet Beecher Stowe, Poe and Longfellow, and
of course, French writers. (Biographical material on Vizetelly relating to the trials is taken primarily
from his son Ernest Vizetelly's 1904 biography of Zola. Vizetelly's two-volume autobiography,
though published in 1893, does not deal with these events. To my knowledge, there are no official
transcripts of the Central Criminal Court trials. My main sources are newspaper reports and the report
in the publication by the National Vigilance Association, Pernicious Literature).
50 See Clarence R. Decker, 'Zola's Literary Reputation in England,' PMLA 49.4 (1934) for an
overview of Zola's reputation in England.
51 Emile Zola, preface, Therese Raquin, trans. Leonard Tancock (1868; Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1962) 21. Zola's biographer, Frederick Brown, claims that the novel's 'infamous success' was due in
large part to its denunciation in Le Figaro as '/a litteratureputride' by influential critic 'Ferragus,'
pseudonym of Louis Ulbach {Zola: A Life, (New York: Farrar, 1995) 160). For Ferragus, Therese
Raquin epitomises the worst of the 'monstrous school of novelists' which, with its 'eloquence of the
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scientific one.'52 Thus motivated purely by 'scientific curiosity,' the depiction of the
adulterous, murderous, and ultimately self-destructive affair 'meant nothing immoral
to me, nothing calculated to provoke indulgence in evil passions.'53 Zola's plea of
scientific disinterest was to no avail however, and in subsequent years, his
increasingly provocative output elicited further execration, not only from the 'British
Pharisees,' an epithet coined by Vizetelly's son Ernest, but also from his literary
contemporaries, amongst whom were Anatole France and Algernon Swinburne.54
The energy with which Vizetelly was pursued must be placed in the context
of 'the "moral panic" of the mid-1880s,' caught up as he was in the momentum of
the repeal movement, W. T. Stead's 'Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon' expose,
and the passing of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.55 While the repealers' goal
was the enforcing of a single standard ofmorality, Stead's sensationalist 'New
Journalism' exploited the scandal of child prostitution, invoking traditional class
antipathies with his anti-libertarian rhetoric. This concern over the vulnerability of
youth and concomitantly, the iniquity of those who would exploit them, permeates
discussions of the trials. In the 1888 trial, Vizetelly pleaded guilty, undertook to
withdraw three Zola novels from circulation, was fined, and entered into
recognisances. Financial exigencies forced him to turn once again to his translations,
charnel house,' depraves and 'fills our minds with pus' ('Putrid Literature,' trans. Barbara Gough,
Critical Essays on Emile Zola, ed. David Baguley (Boston: Hall, 1986) 25).
52 Zola, preface 22. Zola's prose reflects this 'scientific' intent. Descriptive passages, as for instance,
of the Raquins through the windows of their home in the opening chapter, position the narrator and
interpellate the reader as detached observers, while the narrative voice takes on the objective tone of
the scientist. Commenting on the effects of their murder of Camille on Therese and Laurent, the
narrator opines that' [i]t would be interesting to study the modifications that sometimes take place in
certain organisms as results of predetermined circumstances' (170), at once casting the protagonists as
experimental subjects and denoting an impersonal intellectual curiosity with the casually speculative
'it would be interesting.' Gilbert D. Chaitin argues that Zola's use of free indirect discourse in
I'Assommoir signals a move away from this objectifying impulse, allowing his characters a distinct
voice in narration and thus a degree of autonomy, but as is evident here, the earlier work asserts an
objectifying distance between narrator and character ('Listening Power: Flaubert, Zola, and the
Politics of style indirect libre,' The French Review 72.6 (1999)).
53 Zola, 'Preface' 24, 23.
54 E. Vizetelly 242. Given his own literary reputation, Swinburne seems a surprising critic, but he was
vociferous in disavowing any connection with Zola. He asserts in the Athenaeum that although his
name was erroneously listed as contributor to the volumes of La Republique des Lettres in which
Zola's I'Assommoir was serialised, he had in fact 'all the weeks and all the months of its long and
loathsome progress kept out of the desecrated pages' ('Note on a Question of the Hour,' Critical
Essays on Emile Zola, ed. David Baguley (Boston: Hall, 1986) 32-3).
55 M. D. J. Roberts, 'Making Victorian Morals? The Society for the Suppression of Vice and Its
Critics, 1802-1886,' Historical Studies 21.83 (1984): 171. See also Judith Walkowitz, City of
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subjecting them to further excision. Vizetelly, 'in all good faith, believed that he was
entitled to sell Zola's books if he rendered them unobjectionable by further
expurgation,' justified his son, yet once again was subject to prosecution and was
jailed for three months on this occasion.56 While it is true that Vizetelly did not
receive much support from the literary establishment, George Moore, one of the
company's authors, did speak out for him, and some thirty years later and no less
polemically, accused the state not only of a miscarriage ofjustice, but of the 'judicial
murder' of his late friend (who had died in 1894).57
The Pathologisation of Zola: Nordau and Degeneration
Zola's works were subject not only to explicit legal strictures, but to discursive
regulatory mechanisms as well. In the context of late nineteenth-century literary
censorship, one such discourse was that of degeneration, which, while deriving from
evolutionary biology, was readily adapted into the popular vocabulary as a mode of
cultural critique. In the face of the unprecedented scope of change characterising the
advent ofmodernity—industrialisation, urbanisation, and the concomitant social and
political upheavals—the concept of degeneration proved a conveniently versatile and
more importantly, an authoritative designation, versatile because the concept was
theoretically loose, but authoritative nonetheless, from its status as scientific
discourse. The language of biological decline was deployed effectively to
characterise national and aesthetic concerns, although the extent to which these
concerns were believed to implicate each other or alternatively, conflated in the
popular mind renders them difficult to separate. Critics attribute the discursive
Dreadful Delight: Narratives ofSexual Danger in Late-Victorian London (London: Virago, 1992);
Donald Thomas, The Victorian Underworld (1998; London: John Murray, 2003).
56 E. Vizetelly 282. The texts committed to trial were Zola's Abbe Mouret's Transgression, The Rush
for the Spoil {La Curee), Fat and Thin {La Ventre de Paris), His Excellency Eugene Rougon, and How
Jolly Life Is {La Joie de Vivre)\ Paul Bourget's A Love Crime; and Guy de Maupassant's A Ladies'
Man {Bel Ami). The National Vigilance Association's summons had included in addition,
I'Assommoir, Nana, and The Fortune ofthe Rougons; Flaubert's Madame Bovary, and Maupassant's
A Woman's Life (E. Vizetelly 285-6).
57 Edward de Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere: The Law ofObscenity and the Assault on Genius
(London: Constable, 1992) 704; Keating 249; Moore, 'Literature and Morals,' Century (May 19,
1919): 52. At the time of the trials, Moore attempted to publish a defence of Vizetelly coupled with an
attack on moral vigilantism, but his piece was rejected by Fortnightly Review.
58
Stephen Arata, Fictions ofLoss in the Victorian Fin de Siecle (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 2-
3. The seamless movement from the aesthetic to the moral to the physiological is evident in the typical
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ubiquity of degeneration to both its aptness as an expression offin de siecle anxieties
and its efficacy as an explicatory concept.59 J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L.
Gilman, for instance, see it as a powerful ordering principle, 'part of a convenient
dialectic for the organization of contemporary thought and feeling.'60 Others focus
on degeneration as a discursive mechanism of class legitimation. According to
William Greenslade, it offered 'the conventional and respectable classes' the means
to 'justify and articulate their hostility to the deviant, the diseased and the
subversive.'61 This flexibility in usage suggests the power of the concept and
explains its tenacity in late-century society.
Perhaps the most notorious attack on French naturalism was Max Nordau's
Degeneration, first published in Germany in 1892 and in translation in England in
1895, a text which might be seen as an extreme codification of general anxieties in
medico-psychiatric terminology.62 Susan Sontag, referring to tuberculosis and
injunctions against the 'moral epidemic' of pernicious publications as a 'loathsome contagious
disorder of soul and body' (cited in Coote, Pernicious 26).
59 For discussion of fin de siecle cultural anxieties, see Lyn Pykett ed., Reading Fin de Siecle
Fictions (London: Longman, 1996); Sally Ledger and Scott McCracken ed., Cultural Politics at the
Fin de Siecle, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995); John Stokes ed., Fin de Siecle/Fin du Globe: Fears
and Fantasies ofthe Late Nineteenth Century (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1992).
For an alternative view, see MikulaS Teich and Roy Porter, who challenge the negative
conception offin de siecle as cultural malaise, arguing instead that this period was a 'watershed' in
areas as diverse as commerce, science, culture, and philosophy (Introduction, Fin-de-siecle and its
Legacy, ed. Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990) 2).
60 J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman, 'Degeneration,' introduction, Degeneration: The
Dark Side ofProgress, ed. Chamberlin and Gilman (New York: Columbia UP, 1985) x.
61 William Greenslade, Degeneration, Culture and the Novel 1880-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1994)2.
62 It might reasonably be argued that Lombroso's work on genius would be as apposite as Nordau's
for framing a discussion of discourses on degenerate authorship. Certainly by the end of the century,
both were familiar names not only in professional communities but also in popular culture, as is
evident in Bram Stoker's casual reference to both authorities in his 1897 Dracula. Here, he
significantly has Mina Harker, and not her professional companions, proclaim, 'The Count is a
criminal and of criminal type. Nordau and Lombroso would so classify him, and qua criminal he is of
imperfectly formed mind' (Bram Stoker, Dracula (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983) 342). While Nordau's
Degeneration is dedicated to Lombroso, his 'dear and honoured master' (Max Nordau, Degeneration,
(1895; Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1993) vii), they diverge on one significant point. Lombroso is
willing to concede some value in insanity: genius, as the exceptional, is an aberration, and thus a form
of degeneration, while Nordau, as Lombroso himself points out, comes to the opposite conclusion that
'They are insane; therefore they are not gew/z«es,'('Nordau's "Degeneration": Its Value and Its
Errors,' Century Magazine 28 (1895): 938, emphases in original). Nordau counters that there is a
difference between a healthy anomaly that is productive—'true evolutionary genius'—and the
atavism of 'degenerate pseudo-genius' ('A Reply to My Critics. By the Author of "Degeneration",'
Century Magazine 28 (1895): 546-51, 551). The role of the diagnostician-critic is to make this
distinction explicit and as I discuss below, this is where Nordau's task converges with that of the
censor. See also Nordau's and Lombroso's exchange of letters published in the same issue of Century
Magazine. Additionally, in the context of literary censorship, Nordau's examination of the literary
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cancer, argues that 'it is diseases thought to be multi-determined (that is, mysterious)
that have the widest possibilities as metaphors for what is felt to be socially or
morally wrong.'63 Nordau's concept of degeneration has wide applicability, due, not
to its mysteriousness, but conversely, to his meticulous taxonomic drive. Moreover,
what is presented is no metaphor for decline, but an actual description of a
pathological condition. Nordau attributes what he perceives as the increase in the
occurrence of nervous pathologies to the physical and psychological pressures
brought on by modernity, the 'vertigo and whirl of our frenzied life, the vastly
increased number of sense impressions and organic reactions, and therefore of
perceptions, judgments, and motor impulses, which at present are forced into a given
unity of time.' 4 One manifestation of this 'general hysteria' is the prevalence of new
aesthetic schools, amongst them, Symbolism, Decadents and Aesthetes, 'the Richard
Wagner Cult,' and for my purposes here, most significantly, 'Zola and his School'
(40). Supplementing Lombroso's work on the criminal type and its distinguishing
physical characteristics or stigmata, Nordau claims that the degenerate might
additionally be identified from 'intellectual stigmata,' the irregularities of 'mental
physiognomy' common to these categories of deviancy (18-9). Because of his
'unbounded egoism' and impulsiveness, the degenerate typically lacks any sense of
morality (18). Other identifying features include emotionalism, an excessive and
irrational sensibility, and pessimism. Tellingly, despite the painstaking elaboration
on each of his subjects, Nordau on numerous occasions conflates these 'aesthetic
schools,' as evident, for instance, in his explanation of their 'natural history':
Under the influence of an obsession, a degenerate mind promulgates some
doctrine or other—realism, pornography, mysticism, symbolism, diabolism.
He does this with vehement penetrating eloquence, with eagerness and fiery
heedlessness. (31)
Whereas pornographic purpose or effect are frequently adduced as justification for
censorship, Nordau perfunctorily merges pornography with other 'doctrines' under
the single rubric of degeneration. The locus of legitimation, it would seem, has
output of his patients makes him a particularly apt subject for my purposes. As Arata has astutely
observed, Degeneration is primarily a 'work of literary criticism' (27).
63 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983) 65.
64 Nordau, Degeneration 42. Further references will be in-text.
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shifted from the field of aesthetic judgement, the province of the mid-century man of
letters, to that ofmedical diagnosis.65
This interaction between putatively distinct fields of knowledge deserves
further consideration. Daniel Pick places the controversies surrounding Zola's
fictional explorations of degeneration in the broader context of disciplinary dispute,
in the uneasy, if not antipathetic relationship between the scientific and the literary:
Science in general, it appeared, was threatened by fictions which were
themselves prurient and degenerate. The 'obscenity' of a Zola or an Ibsen
was in part the refusal to respect the 'proper' spheres and borders of art.
Science, it was insisted, had to be jealously defended against the
encroachment of naturalist authors and the laconic proclamations of self-
styled 'decadents.'66
At stake then was not simply the issue of degeneration and the concomitant anxieties
over cultural and moral decline, but that of disciplinary authority: the question of
who can legitimately pronounce on and judge such matters. Even while
pathologising Zola's literary output—'Zola's novels do not prove that things are
badly managed in this world, but merely that Zola's nervous system is out of
order'—Nordau still vigorously criticises the 'optical illusion' of Zola's 'false
science,' dismissing it as a mere assemblage of sordid detail masquerading as
legitimate scientific observation. What is missing in Pick's account is consideration
ofNordau's own cross-disciplinary manoeuvres. Pick characterises the disciplinary
skirmishes as a jealous defence of boundaries on the part of 'Science' against the
impudence of the unauthorised diagnostician. I would argue that Nordau's forays
into literary criticism were not just defensive strategies but deliberate acts of
65 For a discussion of the man of letters and his later incarnation as the professional intellectual, see T.
W. Heyck, 'From Men of Letters to Intellectuals: The Transformation of Intellectual Life in
Nineteenth-Century England,' Journal ofBritish Studies 20.1 (1980).
66 Daniel Pick, Faces ofDegeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848-c. 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 1989) 74. That Nordau was not alone in this pathologising endeavour is evident in other
excoriating commentaries on Zola and the age. The Methodist Times, for example, asserts with finality
that 'Zolaism is a disease. It is a study of the putrid ... No one can read Zola without moral
contamination' (cited in Coote, Pernicious 27). Walter Lecky, in his tellingly titled 'Downfall of
Zolaism,' likewise couches his appraisal in jargonistic terms, the references to Zola's 'ego' and the
'morbid sciolists' who form his 'converts' reminiscent ofNordau's vocabulary ('Downfall of
Zolaism,' Catholic World 61 (1895) 359). Significantly, Lecky's article was published in the same
year as the appearance in English of Nordau's Degeneration.
67 Nordau 489, 488. For all the vehemence of his attack, Nordau is not entirely without reason in his
claims about Zola's 'science.' See Christopher Rivers, Face Value: Physiognomical Thought and the
Legible Body in Marivaux, Lavater, Balzac, Gautier, and Zola (Wisconsin: U of Wisconsin P, 1994)
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disciplinary imperialism. As Stephen Arata points out, Nordau's work, comprising
'almost exclusively of extended analyses of literary texts,' was akin to that of the
68
literary critic. More generally, his diagnostic technique necessitated a hermeneutic
engagement with the stigmata of degeneracy, an overdetermined reading of textual
elements as pathological signifiers.69 This interpretative process is also a
narrativising exercise, moreover, one modelled on realist fiction, for the positivist
logic by which the patient's history and character are (re)constructed is, for Arata,
analogous to that at work in nineteenth-century realism.70 We must thus take with
suspicion Nordau's statement that '[i]n the past a confusion between art and science
was possible; in the future it is unimaginable' (548), for this 'confusion' is
perpetuated by his own appropriation of a recognisable literary form and attempted
colonisation of that literary field.71
In what sense might degenerationist discourse be considered censorship?
Censorship, if understood as the control of discourse, is a term equally applicable to
both legal prosecution and Nordau's cultural critique. Leaving aside the issue of its
efficacy for the moment, Degeneration censors by attempting to confine to the
medical field the terms in which the aesthetic is articulated and indeed, in its claim
even, that the aesthetic is a function of the medical. More specifically, Nordau
himself expresses an affinity with the literary censor whose interpretative acuity he
observes with approval.72 The aesthetic vagaries and moral lassitude of the
for a critique of Zola's 'scientific' methodology. As I will show in Chapter Five, a similar contest for
authority was being fought in the visual arts in Whistler v. Ruskin.
68
Arata, Fictions ofLoss 27.
69 Arata argues further that this kind of close reading or 'overreading' was characteristic ofmany late
nineteenth-century professional disciplines, including, for example, psychiatry, criminology and
anthropology {Fictions ofLoss 19, 4).
70
Arata, Fictions ofLoss 22.
71 The relationship between literature and science was not uniformly hostile. It was for the greater part
a productive interaction, with much 'cross-fertilization' between the two fields (John Kucich,
'Scientific Ascendency,' A Companion to the Victorian Novel, ed. Patrick Brantlinger and William B.
Thesing (Maiden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002) 121). There were, for example, affinities between
realist fiction and positivist science, in epistemology and in methodology, and both catered to a
common educated lay public.
72 For another way in which censorship is articulated in a scientific language, see Blanche Leppington,
who appropriates evolutionary discourse to legitimate the activities of the censor while simultaneously
reinstating mid-century notions of agency. She demands ofman, who 'is now the living witness of his
own evolution: must he not be henceforth a conscious agent in directing it? He must follow [Nature's]
methods then. He must elect, reject, conserve, suppress' ('The Debrutalisation ofMan,'
Contemporary Review 67 (1895): 727). Censorship is here naturalised—literally—as the function and
end ofNature: Leppington's call for the suppression of books 'which sell for a shilling on every stall
as mere indecency' is rationalised as 'natural selection by a process of ethical elimination' (733, 728).
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degenerate, he confidently asserts, should be evident to 'every healthy censor who
does not allow himself to be prejudiced by the noisy admiration of critics, themselves
degenerates' (24). Insofar as Nordau's project is to disabuse his public of any
misconception regarding these self-proclaimed geniuses, he is surely the 'healthy
censor' par excellence. Conversely, the lack ofjudgement on the part of the
appreciative critic is construed not as misplaced enthusiasm but as an indication of
the critic's own degeneracy. Nordau's solution is given in three succinct steps:
'Characterization of the leading degenerates as mentally diseased; unmasking and
stigmatizing of their imitators as enemies to society; cautioning the public against the
lies of these parasites' (560) While abjuring the aid of state-sponsored censorship—
'[t]he public prosecutor and criminal judge are not the proper protectors of society
against crime committed with pen and crayon'—Nordau nevertheless appeals to a
'critical police' and the ultimate end of his project as envisaged is uncompromisingly
suppressive (557-8, 535):
.. .work and man would be annihilated. No respectable bookseller would keep
the condemned book; no respectable paper would mention it, or give the
author access to its columns; no respectable family would permit the branded
work to be in their house. (559)
Nordau combines a medicalising discourse with a rhetoric of violence, calling into
question Foucault's distinction between the brutality of sovereign power and the life-
fostering individuation ofmedicalisation. On the one hand, the 'lusting beast of prey'
is warned that 'we will pitilessly beat you to death with clubs' (557), yet on the
other, the call for annihilation is articulated in terms of revelation and unmasking,
rather than concealment and coercion: 'All the seductive masks must be torn from
these tendencies [of mysticism, ego-mania, and pessimism],' Nordau insists, 'and
their real aspect be shown in its grinning nakedness' (533). This is censorship in
The shift in justificatory framework from the paradigms of traditional Christian morality to those of
biological and evolutionary is clearly observable. Degenerative forces 'are so many malarial and
lethal germs feeding upon the social organism' and the censor is by implication figured as physician,
purging the body politic of parasitic infestation (734). Like Nordau, Leppington aligns the censor with
the professional diagnostician, but further enforces the censor's legitimacy by aligning the censor's
task to that ofNature.
It should be noted that while Leppington's facile co-option of a scientific vocabulary
indicates a shift away from religious faith, other members of the purity movement amalgamated
evolutionary science with Christian morality. Ellice Hopkins, for example, re-articulated the Christian
narrative of the struggle with sin as a Darwinian evolutionary tale, enlisting the authority of science in
110
Burt's sense of delegitimation, censorship not through material suppression, but
through the denial of these books as legitimate aesthetic expressions or valid social
commentary.
There is nonetheless some overlap between Nordau's censorship of
delegitimation and the explicit objectives of legal operations, despite his scepticism
towards the latter. Of the authors of the works targeted by the National Vigilance
Association, Zola merits a whole chapter, with Nordau elaborating exhaustively on
his 'undeveloped or mystically confused thought, which is found among savages in a
natural form, and among the whole category of degenerates in an atavistic form of
mental activity' (494). The 'egomaniac' Gautier is accused of Tacking all sympathy
and joy with the external world,' his only emotions 'apart from his arrogance and
vanity, are those connected with sex' (285). Flaubert is labelled an obsessive
'worshipper of words,' this 'puerile pursuit of words' likewise symptomatic of a
degenerate disposition (267, 270). Of Nordau's other subjects, a considerable
number were also the target of censorship procedures, both official and unofficial,
•ji
for example, Tolstoy, Swinburne, Ibsen and Baudelaire.
I am not suggesting that Nordau's text was some sort of unofficial blueprint
for censors. After all, in chronological sequence, the publication of Degeneration
postdated the Vizetelly trials. I am, however, pointing to the difficulty in delimiting a
category of activity as censorship by separating general societal pressures and the
power of normalising constructions from more explicit shows of force. In this way,
the Vizetelly case is not so much an isolated incident as Saunders claims, but one
expression of cultural anxiety of which Nordau's dissertation is another. Moreover,
the prosecutor drew on a similar degenerationist vocabulary, for while the focus of
the trials, unlike that ofDegeneration, was not the degeneracy of author or translator
per se, concern over the moral susceptibility of youth stems from a similar
her reformist programme (Sue Morgan, 'Faith, Sex and Purity: the Religio-Feminist Theory of Ellice
Hopkins,' Women's History Review 9.1 (2000)).
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According to Daniel Balmuth, Tolstoy maintained a precarious relationship with the official
censors, and some of his works were banned or expurgated (Censorship in Russia, 1865-1905
(Washington D.C.: UP of America, 1979) 103, 124). In 1866, the designated publisher of Swinburne's
Poems and Ballads reneged in fear of potential prosecution although the project was later taken up by
John Hotten (Thomas, Long Time Burning 252-3). The Lord Chamberlain's Office refused to grant a
licence to Ibsen's Ghosts, which was subsequently performed in a private theatre (Stephens 142-3).
Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mai was successfully prosecuted for obscenity in France in 1857 (E. S.
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framework of evolutionary thought. As undeveloped man, the child's relation to the
normative bourgeois subject is analogous to that of the degenerate races to their
civilised or more advanced counterparts. This homology between the ontogenic and
the phylogenic suggests a common conceptual grounding which in turn implies that
cases such as the Vizetelly trial are not anomalous but continuous with other
discursive and regulatory trends.
Just as significant are the differences in these separate attacks on French
naturalism, both ofwhich I have called censorship. Conceptual differences were
already evident in the respective approaches of law and ofNordau's medico-
psychological analysis to the most elemental and most concrete unit of censorship
concern, the problem book. Discussion of the problem of obscene publications was
pervaded by the discourse of disease and contagion. It is a 'moral epidemic,' writes
Lord Mount-Temple to The Times, a 'loathsome contagious disorder of soul and
body.'74 The Sentinel intones against the 'leprous character' of Zola's work,75 while
Samuel Smith M.P, in a speech delivered to the House of Commons inl887, rants
against the 'malarious fog' cast by the 'moral pestilence' of divorce court
journalism.76 This was a potent metaphor, familiar from mid-century debates on
obscenity law.77 In his 1868 Hicklin judgement, for example, Lord Cockburn
compared the unfettered circulation of dangerous books to the carrying of a diseased
child through a public space, both actions endangering public health regardless of
intention.78 The book is figured as the metaphorical carrier of heterodox germs, the
textual conveyor of dangerous and infectious ideas. This familiar trope of reading as
disease was literalised by the Lancet, which, in 1890, issued a warning against 'the
possibility of conveying infection by means of books lent out by circulating
Burt, '"An Immoderate Taste for Truth": Censoring History in Baudelaire's "Les bijoux",' Diacritics
27.2(1997)).
74 Cited in Coote, Pernicious 25, 26.
75 Cited in Hansard, vol. 325 (8 May 1888): col. 1710.
76 Cited in Coote, Pernicious 30.
77 See Kelly J. May for how the rhetoric of disease was a powerful weapon in debates on the dangers
of reading. Within this metaphor, the cultural arbiter—here, the journalist, as Mays looks at the debate
as conducted in contemporary periodicals—is figured as doctor, in charge of the 'literary health' of
the reading public ('The Disease of Reading and Victorian Periodicals,' Literature in the
Marketplace: Nineteenth-century British publishing and reading practices, ed. John O. Jordan and
Robert L. Patten (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995) 183).
78 Law Reports, 3 Q.B.D., 1867-8, 371.
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libraries.' The book is transformed into a physical carrier of disease, and the library
patron is exhorted to greater vigilance, 'to guarantee the freedom of his household
from infection at the time being, to report immediately the appearance of infectious
disease, and to arrange for disinfection of books on loan to him.' The householder is
drawn into this surveillance network, the channel also, by which power infiltrates the
domestic realm. In Nordau's attack on Zola's output, there is a further collapse: the
book is no longer the vessel of transmission, metaphorical or literal, but is conflated
with disease. The book itself is pathologised, becoming both symptom and product
of the diseased or degenerate mind.
Concomitantly, both instances of censorship had a different target. In the
Vizetelly trials, the salient factor judging by the media furore was Vizetelly's role in
rendering corrupting material accessible to the morally vulnerable segments of
British society. Certainly, denunciations of the works as 'mere and sheer obscenity,
naked, shameless, and unutterably vile,' here by The Times, representative, as one
critic puts it, of nineteenth-century 'establishment attitudes,' are unavoidably an
indictment of their French author.80 However, it was Vizetelly's infringement of the
de facto censorship of the language barrier that was more directly under attack than
Zola. Within the logics of Saunders's variable obscenity, this seeming arbitrariness
of response was not caprice nor hypocrisy, but a pragmatic form of social policing.
In their original French, Zola's novels did not pose a problem as access was confined
to a bilingual minority, but in translation, their potential readership expanded
dramatically and fuelled anxiety over the iniquity of, in the Solicitor-General's
O 1
words, 'ministering to the depraved tastes of causal readers.'
In addition to the exclusionary function of the French language, the concept
of 'the French' also had ideological utility as a repository for national anxieties.
French fiction, 'properly styled "literature of prostitution,"' according to one mid-
century commentator, provided a permissible, because ideologically and
82
geographically displaced, site for the channelling of prurient interests. The national
79 'Public Libraries and Contagion,' Lancet 24 May 1890: 1 135.
80 Michael Diamond, Victorian Sensation: Or, the Spectacular, the Shocking and the Scandalous in
Nineteenth-Century Britain (London: Anthem, 2003) 2.
81 Cited in Coote, Pernicious 17.
82
George Brimley, 'The Angel in the House,' Essays, ed. William George Clark (Cambridge, 1858)
233.
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prejudices expressed by W. R. Greg, although some twenty years prior to the
Vizetelly affair, still resonated at the end of the century. Success in the French
literary field belongs to those who 'pander to the worst passions and the worst taste;
till, without exaggeration, it is as rare to find a successful French novel that is not
scandalous as an English that is.'8j Differences in national literatures are attributed to
differences in national temperament: the French psyche, brutalised by centuries of
political turmoil and violence, increasingly and insatiably craves sensation, while
English moral rectitude informs its decorous literary tradition. Greg attacks examples
of licentious French fiction, ostentatiously refraining from citational infractions,
since 'quotations are of course impossible,' yet describing second-hand and at length
'stories of a lover torturing his devoted and sensitive mistress to death by a series of
ingenious insults, outrageous suspicions, cruel and exacting caprices, [and] refined
brutality.'84 For those who would condemn as for those with more subversive intent
(as I will demonstrate below in my discussion of Beardsley), the channelling of
obscenity into national or linguistic bounds offers an acceptable way of engaging
or
with the obscene.
If the ostensible issue was the problem of accessibility, underlying this
concern were certain assumptions about the process of reading and the power of the
text. The Times asserts unreservedly that 'assuredly most people will agree that the
publication of cheap translations of the worst of Zola's novels is a grave offence
against public morals, and that it is a good thing that the law should be invoked to
restrain it.'86 Yet this warning against their pernicious effect on the unsuspecting and
the susceptible might also be read as a recognition of and even a concession to the
corrupting power of books. The text, and by extension, the author and translator, are
imputed an agency of sorts: the power to effect degeneration. A similar
aggrandisement of 'immoral literature' is evident in its demonisation as 'a menace to
our religious, social, and national life' by the National Vigilance Association in the





Thus, for instance, it has been argued that Oscar Wilde's decision to write Salome in French, the
Beardsley illustrations of which I discuss below, was in part an attempt to circumvent the censorious
prohibition against the presentation of biblical subjects on stage, albeit an attempt that, 'against
reasonable expectation ... misfired' (Kerry Powell, Oscar Wilde and the theatre ofthe 1890s
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990) 37).
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attempt to galvanise an apathetic public.87 But by far the most extreme articulation of
these fears and the corresponding empowerment of the written word were expressed
in the 1888 Parliamentary Debate on Corrupt Literature, an indiscriminate collection
of disparate forms, including 'French romantic literature,' penny dreadfuls, immoral
advertisements, and divorce court journalism, if undealt with, would render
invincible the 'threatening clouds of revolution.'88 The image of impending deluge
emphasises the urgency of the combative task, but also invokes familiar fears of
Jacobinism in line with the Continental provenance of transgressive fiction.
By contrast, Nordau viewed these works not as instigators but as indicators of
depravity and his aim was not punitive but pathologising. Degenerate authors are
construed as 'necessary subjects for medical treatment' (27), a construal that at once
emphasises their passivity and impotence while reinforcing Nordau's authority as
medical practitioner. Their works are therefore merely 'confessions' (476) of a
morbid sensibility and as such, are co-opted into Nordau's all-encompassing
medicalising framework. Whereas in the context of corruptible youth, the offending
books were placed within a framework of causality as origin of or impetus for
corruption, for Nordau, causality inheres in the very conditions of modernity. The
problem book and the problem author lose the revolutionary power imputed them in
the Parliamentary Debate and become merely symptoms of a greater social ill.
This reversal provides a significant counterpoint to Foucault's emphasis on
the inextricable relation between authorship and censorship. In his account, the
emergence of authorship as 'a privileged moment of individualization in the history
of ideas, knowledge, and literature' was a response to the problem of transgressive
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The association between political radicalism and obscenity was not entirely spurious scare-
mongering. In the early part of the century, pornography and incendiary politics overlapped in the
publishing underground. According to Iain McCalman, the 'trade crisis' in radical publishing in the
1820s, together with the increased demand for pornography, saw many radical pressmen move into
this lucrative industry, for which they were eminently suited, having developed sophisticated evasive
tactics in their publishing practices (214-5). There were also continuities between pornography and
the bawdy satire of the radical booktrade, as for example, the underlying populism in pornography
and the depictions of upper-class vice (221).
The connections between the literary and the political were still present if only in the rhetoric
of late-century cultural polemics. Hugh E. M. Stutfield, for example, asserts that the 'unbridled
licentiousness of your literary decadent has its counterpart in the violence of the political anarchist.
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writing, to the need to trace culpability of offending words to a locatable, and
importantly, prosecutable, source.89 He thus states:
It is important to notice, as well, that [the text's] status as property is
historically secondary to the penal code controlling its appropriation.
Speeches and books were assigned real authors, other than mythical or
important religious figures, only when the author became subject to
punishment and to the extent that his discourse was considered
90
transgressive.
In contrast to standard accounts locating authorship within the narrative of copyright
and intellectual property, Foucault places it historically in the context of censorship,
a contention that has been much challenged.91 Roger Chartier argues that it was as
much the publisher, the distributor, the bookseller, and the reader, as the author who
were held responsible for the perpetuation of heterodox views, with the consequence
that the material production, dissemination and consumption of offending material
were conflated with its expression on the matter of culpability.92 Robert J. Griffin,
examining the history of regulatory practices in England, questions the accuracy of
placing such centrality on the name of the author in censorship procedures. For the
greater part of that history, he claims, the law did not require the inclusion of the
Q-l #
author's name on publications. Specific examples also show that the notion of
Each is the alter ego-maniac of the other. The one works with the quill, the other with the bomb'
('Tommyrotics,' Blackwood's Magazine 157 (1895): 841).
89 Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author?' Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and
Interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. Donald Bouchard, trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977) 115. It is interesting to note that what Foucault observes here as historical
phenomenon—the designation of culpability in a single source to facilitate prosecution—Butler
critiques as current practice, as discussed in Chapter One.
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Foucault, 'Author' 124.
91 See for instance, Mark Rose, for whom the emergence of the author is inseparable from the
commodification of print {Authors and Owners: The Invention ofCopyright (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1993). In her studies of early modern censorship, Clegg argues that while
the licensing system was sometimes used to counter dissent, the Stationers' Company's primary
function was to protect its trade monopoly by ensuring property rights (14-25).
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Roger Chartier, The Order ofBooks: Readers, Authors, and Libraries in Europe between the
Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Cambridge: Polity, 1994) 50.
Chartier's study refers to France, but his argument is equally relevant across the channel. For
example, in the 1579 case of the seditious The Discovery ofA Gaping Gulf, both author and
distributor met with identical reprisals—the loss of their right hands (Clegg 123). Indeed, even in the
two cases I discuss, it was Vizetelly the translator and publisher, and Bedborough the vendor, who
were charged with obscene libel.
9'
Referring to the period between the Star Chamber Decree of 1637 until the Licensing Act of 1662,
he maintains that '[sjince the sixteenth century when the regulation of printing began, there has been
only a brief period of roughly twenty years when the laws of England required the name of the author
to be printed on the title page of a book or pamphlet' (Robert J. Griffin, 'Anonymity and Authorship,'
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authorial authority, rather than being the third-party designations of guilt and reprisal
in Foucault's schema, was also pursued by the writer himself. Authorship in this
context forges a privileged space as bastion against economic, political and social
pressures. Ben Jonson, for example, in response to the constraints of the patronage
system and the entertainment demands of the commercial theatregoer, repeatedly
asserted his superiority as author and critic.94 At the same time this perception of
authorship as empowerment points to the ambivalent existence of the writer: that
which confers or constitutes agency also enables regulation. Authorship, predicated
on public recognition, is inextricably bound up with pre-existing institutional and
social structures, and the author, inserted into these relations, is to some extent
dependent on and subordinate to these structures.
In Nordau, there is an inversion of the process described by Foucault. The
early modern censor attributes sovereignty to the author in the process of
apportioning responsibility and blame. By contrast, the discourse of degeneration
censors, or attempts to censor, by depriving the author of agency. By constructing the
author as a passive carrier of disease, any protestation by the author is designated a
priori the ravings of a madman, the mere symptoms of a pathological disorder.
Nordau's treatment of the degenerate's following is equally ruthless. Where the
author is degenerate, his acolytes are hysterics whose 'irresistible passion for
imitation' condemns them to a blind and slavish adherence to fashion (26). As far as
the genuinely afflicted are concerned, they are oblivious to their condition and hence
cannot be accused of intentional transgression. '[A]ll the participants are sincere,'
Nordau proclaims, 'the founder as well as the disciples. They act as, in consequence
of the diseased constitution of their brain and nervous system, they are compelled to
act' (31). For the same reason, Nordau is somewhat hesitant of adopting the
Morelian term 'stigmata,' for him, 'an unfortunate term derived from a false idea, as
if degeneracy were necessarily the consequence of a fault, and the indication of it a
New Literary History 30.4 (1999): 887). Foucault, Griffin further alleges, 'provides no evidence [for
his claim that 'literary' texts were largely anonymous in the Middle Ages] but his own authority'
(877).
94
Joseph Loewenstein claims that in the latter part of his career, Jonson rejected the literary
marketplace in favour of 'a neoconservative patronage market' but one that preserved the autonomy
and rights of the writer ('The Script in the Marketplace,' Representations 12 (1985): 108). See also
Loewenstein, Ben Jonson and Possessive Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002); and Richard
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punishment' (17). Thus, Zola's predilection for olfactory description—the 'unhealthy
predominance of the sensations of smell in his consciousness' (502)—is presented,
not as novelistic technique nor as deliberate recalcitrance, but as an unwitting but no
less unequivocal manifestation of degeneracy. This is a hierarchy of sensation for
which Nordau offers physiological explanations. In the normal subject, he claims, the
olfactory lobe is anatomically subordinate to the frontal lobe, the site of 'higher and
complex mental activity' (503). In the degenerate subject, the olfactory
disproportionately dominates the frontal lobe, incapacitating his ability to engage
with abstract ideas, an intellectual ability that is necessary for apprehending 'moral
beauty' (503). This condition is an atavism, a retrogression 'not only to the primeval
period ofman, but infinitely more remote still, to an epoch anterior to man,' to the
bestial (503). Degeneration abounds with such examples: a textual feature (here,
Zola's olfactory descriptions) is conflated with a personal trait (an excessive
sensitivity to smell), while the aetiology of this condition is traced to a physiological
syndrome (the asymmetric development of the lobes), and in a further extrapolation,
disordered physiology perverts the moral sense. Nordau's literary diagnostics thus
extend beyond textual criticism to include in its analytic compass the writer/patient,
his social milieu, and the temporal scope of the evolutionary spectrum.
Nordau's Degeneration and the Vizetelly trials are thus two forms of
censorship, in effect, two totalising discourses, that of obscenity in the one and
degeneration in the other. Both forms of censorship stem from similar cultural
anxieties and both take Zola's novels as their central problem. Yet despite this
apparent consonance, they differed in operation, rationale, and immediate target, the
former focusing on Vizetelly the publisher, the latter on Zola the author. On the one
hand, there is a legal discourse of acts, backed by legislative firepower and
constabulary manpower. The chief concern is what the book does, and within the
disease metaphor, it transmits, it infects, and it contaminates. On the other hand, the
pathologising discourses of medicine are less interested in the repertoire of acts than
in the ontology of text. The book is disease, is infection; it does not just contaminate,
Burt, Licensed by Authority: Ben Jonson and the Discourses ofCensorship (Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1993).
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it is contamination.95 This constitutive disparity was an undercurrent to the more
visible conflicts between literature and the law, and science and literature, erupting
only at the point where Nordau openly questions the policing autonomy of the law.
'[T]he pornographist must be branded with infamy,' he asserts unequivocally, 'But
the punitive sentence of a judge does not with certainty have this effect' (558). The
efficacy of legal prohibition is compromised when its enforcers are governed by the
'insupportable arrogance of administrations' (558). However, for the most part,
Nordau is less involved in overt medico-legal territorial disputes than in promoting
the superiority and duties of 'cultivated and moral men' (558).
In legal discourse then, obscenity precedes degeneration as its cause. In
Nordau's account, obscenity is subsumed under degeneration, a symptomatic subset
alongside, for example, amoralism or synaesthesia. This difference was more than an
idiosyncratic rearrangement of terms. These syntactical permutations express
fundamental differences in the ways in which the problem of offensive literature was
conceptualised and solutions were proffered. Legislative measures put in place a
system of quarantine, separating book from the morally vulnerable. In medicalising
discourse, obscene literature is disabled by refusing it status as legitimate and
coherent articulation. It becomes meaningful only within the logicising narrative of
disease and diagnosis. In fact, obscenity as a discursive category is virtually
eradicated, insofar as it is itself pathologised, as corprolalia, morbid eroticism, or
sexual psychopathy, for instance. The problematic category of obscenity, the
definition of which had been so elusive and much disputed, was now transformed
into a host of medical disorders, a move which, in theory, enthroned the medical
professional as medico-cultural arbiter supreme. Yet as I will show in the next
section, this supremacy was a tenuous one, suggesting that the agency of the censor,
however powerful in a particular denunciatory moment, can only be provisional.
The Censor Censored
Responses to Degeneration and counterattacks on Nordau show that Nordau's
position within the discourse of degeneration is equivocal at best and bring out the
95 This medicalising turn is akin to the shift Foucault observes in the transformation of sodomy as
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complexities of censorship not adequately accounted for by conventional models.
Nordau has been variously described as spokesman for the bourgeoisie and quack,
Victorian positivist and madman, and even today, there is still no critical consensus
on his position.96 Despite being lauded in some circles as 'a new prophet' of
degeneration, because of his investment in this discursive economy, Nordau is as
much implicated in the discourse of degeneration as the objects of his pathologising
Q7 • . • t • ... ••
gaze. Even while he mobilises degenerationist discourse in his assault on the
literary vagaries of pseudo-genius, he is himself subject to a similarly pathologising
attack. Such refutations were particularly vigorous in professional circles in Britain
and the United States which were generally less receptive to degeneration theory in
comparison to their Continental peers.98
Thus, Bernard Shaw condemns Nordau as 'a doctor who had written manifest
nonsense,' his magnum opus a collection of 'all the exploded bogey-criticisms of the
last half-century.'99 William James offers a similarly damning assessment, labelling
Degeneration a 'pathological book on a pathological subject' and its author 'a victim
transgressive act to the homosexual as species (History ofSexuality 43).
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George L. Mosse, for example, sees Nordau as an exemplar of his age, his pronouncements
representing 'the beliefs and hopes which characterized so many of his class, profession and
generation,' albeit that his expressions of foreboding are a somewhat extreme articulation of the then
current social anxieties ('Max Nordau, Liberalism and the New Jew,' Journal ofContemporary
History 21A (1992): 565). Steven E. Aschheim seeks to retrieve Nordau from summary dismissal as a
historical oddity, contextualising his thought within the framework of Enlightenment rationalism,
even while conceding Nordau's myopic and uncompromising adherence to positivistic conventions
('Max Nordau, Friedrich Nietzsche and Degeneration,' Journal ofContemporary History 28.4 (2003):
652). Mosse and Aschheim, however, are the exception amongst modern critics, the majority of whom
are more dismissive. Echoing Nordau's nineteenth-century detractors, such critics typically point to
the ways in which Nordau's own polemical practice exhibits the pathological traits he so vigorously
condemns. Sandra Siegel identifies in Nordau a 'phobia about chaos that quickly became a mania for
ordering' (207), while for Greenslade, Degeneration may be seen as 'the last positivistic epic—or to
put it less charitably—as positivism run mad' ('Literature and Decadence: The Representation of
"Decadence," Degeneration: The Dark Side ofProgress, ed. J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L.
Gilman (New York: Columbia UP, 1985) 121).
97 Stutfield 833.
98 This ambivalence has been attributed to the strong British liberal tradition of individual rights, the
consequence of which was a noticeable reluctance on the part of the medical profession and the
administration to adopt more controversial ideas into official policy-making (Pick 177). This is not to
deny the pervasive presence of the concept of degeneration in cultural conversation. The key issue
here is that degenerationist discourse informed much discussion but had limited official status. As
Pick points out, several experts and commentators, Havelock Ellis amongst them, deplored the lack of
familiarity with the work of say, Lombroso, on the part of their colleagues, as well as what they saw
more generally as the complacency of their compatriots (178).
99 Bernard Shaw, The Sanity ofArt: An Exposure ofthe Current Nonsense about Artists being
Degenerate (London: Constable, 1911) 7, 18.
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of insane delusions.'100 Another critic denounces Nordau's work as 'pseudo-
scientific humbug,' offending both in its misappropriation and sensationalising of a
properly biological term.101 These thrusts and counter-thrusts are another instance of
censorship as delegitimation. Nevertheless, that Nordau's publication had a tenacious
hold on the public imagination is undeniable, as is attested by the fact that it ran to
seven impressions in Britain alone by the end of 1895.102 As Pick points out, Nordau
might be charged with charlatanism, but 'nonetheless charlatanism deemed
significant enough to merit refutation.'103
That discourse exceeds the control of the individual, even one retrospectively
crowned the 'high priest of the creed of degeneration,' is evident in counter-
appropriations of the concept.104 Grant Allen, 'leading luminary of English cultural
anarchism,' as a nineteenth-century detractor describes him, dislodges simplistic
binaries of censor and censored, conservative and radical, in his exploitation of the
politically and culturally charged term.105 If degenerationist discourse is appropriated
by reactionary commentators as cultural jeremiad against transgressive figures (see
examples in note 66), Allen uses an identical critical discourse to describe these
conservative ascetics and prudes. It is not the Swinburnes or the Hardys who are
regressive, according to Allen, but those who would accuse them of being so.
Christianity is an atavistic cult, 'a religion of Oriental fanatics, at a lower grade of
civilisation,' and in a blasphemous reversal, the term 'decadence' is used to describe
not hedonism, but orthodox Christianity.106 That degenerationist discourse can be co-
opted into vastly different agendas is not surprising, given the protean ease with
which it permeates disciplinary borders.
But perhaps as inimical to Nordau's censoring project is the instability of
language itself. It is in this respect that Nordau's interpretive practice bears striking
resemblance to courtroom textual interrogations. Both invoke conservative readings,
not just in their indictment of offensive subject matter, but in the allegiance to
univocal meaning. For the diagnostician Nordau, text becomes legible only as
100 William James, 'Degeneration and Genius,' Psychological Review 2 (1895): 289.




104 Greenslade, Degeneration 120.
105 Stutfield 839; Grant Allen, 'The New Hedonism,' Fortnightly Review 55 (1894).
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symptoms of degeneration. For the prosecutor, text becomes indictable only as
obscenity. The precision involved in the isolating of symptoms and the proving of
textual obscenity are equally antithetical to indeterminacy.107 Hans Robert Jauss'
comments on the 1857 Madame Bovary trial in France, supplemented by Dominick
LaCapra's later study, are instructive. Jauss claims that Madame Bovary was a
transgressive text, 'breaking] through the familiar horizon of literary expectations'
not only in its thematic flouting of social and religious mores, but more significantly,
in its challenge to the interpretative conventions ofjudicial hermeneutics.108 The
prosecution claimed that the novel was immoral in its depiction of Emma Bovary's
extramarital vagaries yet the novel operates to undermine the foundations on which
such judgements can be made. Its narratological irregularities, the use of free indirect
style and multiple shifting perspectives, for instance, preclude the fixing of a stable
position from which to judge the characters and narrative.109 The novel is in fact
highly unsettling in its refusal to provide any moral guidance insofar as its narrative
indeterminacy can be read neither as denunciation nor as endorsement.
While Zola's novels were not on trial in the same manner as Flaubert's—the
obscenity of the texts was not in dispute, given Vizetelly's guilty plea—a similar
equivocality in Zola's narration is discernible.110 The shifts from extradiegetic to
diagetic commentary are frequently obscure and difficult to delineate and the use of
free indirect discourse, like that identified by Jauss and LaCapra in Flaubert, renders
the attribution of narrative agency almost impossible at times.111 This was troubling
106 Allen, 'New Hedonism' 390.
107 In the 1888 Parliamentary Debate on Corrupt Literature, the Home Secretary noted that the issue at
hand was how best to define 'the strait and narrow line which divided what was punishable, criminal,
and obscene within the meaning of the law, and what was merely indelicate and coarse' (Hansard,
vol. 325 (8 May 1888): col. 1719).
108 Hans Robert Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic ofReception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Brighton, Sussex:
Harvester, 1982)26,42-4.
109 As LaCapra suggests, Flaubert's writing is particularly radical in that it is 'language writing or
speaking itself but not emanating from a secure or fixed source and not communicating a precise
message or evaluative position with relation to characters and events' (Dominick LaCapra, Madame
Bovary on Trial (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982) 147).
110 For a discussion of the use of free indirect discourse in TAssommoir, see Chaitin.
111 The subtle shifts in narration in the following passage from Nana are typical of this disconcerting
instability:
The poor ladies were complaining that they didn't know more than fifty of the guests. Where
had all these people come from? There were girls in low-cut dresses flaunting their bare
shoulders. One woman had stuck a gold dagger into her chignon, while her jet-bead
embroidery made her look as if she was wearing a coat of mail. Another woman was in such
a shameless skin-tight skirt that people were following her progress with amused smiles. In
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to the nineteenth-century reader, for the absence of explicit authorial condemnation
was perceived as a dereliction ofmoral duty. For one critic, it is the 'gloat[ing] on ...
secret and nameless iniquities' that offends, while for another, it is the glorification
of impassivity, the belief that 'the author must completely efface himself, become a
112
mere phonograph or photographic plate.' Such critics share Nordau's commitment
to univocality, and Nordau's hostility is nowhere more evident than in his virulent
condemnation of the pun. George Mosse suggests that for Nordau, 'meaning, not
sound, determines the nature of words,' but as Jonathan Culler observes, puns, as the
play of phonemes, underscore the radical instability and mutability ofmeaning.113
For Nordau, the 'unbridled association of ideas' characteristic of the mystic
degenerate is replicated at a linguistic level, in the 'unbridled' homonymic
associations of punning, a 'peculiarity of graphomaniacs and imbeciles'
(.Degeneration 481, 65, 182). Within Nordau's degenerationist paradigms, such
linguistic abuse is a degenerate use of language, a violation or distortion of its
governing conventions that constitutes degeneracy in the Morelian sense of a
'morbid deviation from an original type.' Read alternatively, the pun subverts
linguistic transparency by disrupting the correspondence between language and its
referent: its phonic quality exceeds the control of the utterer, just as Nordau's
authority is challenged at the point where 'degeneration' exceeds his discursive
control. The sovereign confidence with which Nordau presents his project is thus
proved illusory, both at the level of praxis and of language.
this smart, permissive society dedicated purely to pleasure, full of people whom a society
hostess would pick up in the course of some short-lived intimacy, where a duke rubbed
• shoulders with a crook, the opulence of this last ball of the season was blatant; people wanted
one thing only: to have fun. And as the dancers performed the symmetrical figures of the
quadrille in time to the music, the overcrowded rooms were becoming hotter and hotter.
(Emile Zola, Nana, trans. Douglas Parmee (1880; Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992) 360).
The cavilling observations through the perspective and voices ofMadame Du Joncquoy and Madame
Chantereau give way to perceptive commentary and a succinct assessment that suggest a narratorial
distancing, before a shift at the end of the paragraph to pure description.
112 A. Lang, 'Emile Zola,' Fortnightly Review 31 (1882): 439-52, 452; Lecky 359.
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George L. Mosse, 'Max Nordau and his Degeneration,' introduction, Degeneration, by Max
Nordau, (1895; Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1993) xxiv.
Puns, Culler writes, 'present the disquieting spectacle of a functioning of language where
boundaries—between sound and letter, between meanings—count for less than one might imagine
and where supposedly discrete meanings threaten to sink into fluid subterranean signifieds too
undefinable to call concept' ('The Call of the Phoneme,' introduction, On Puns: The Foundation of
Letters, ed. Culler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988) 3).
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Judith Butler warns against imputing sovereign subjectivity to a figure
designated 'censor,' but as is evident from the counterattacks on Nordau, his
authority was not unshakable nor his theory unassailable. Nordau's aim was to
unmask the aesthetic pretensions of his degenerate subjects, to which revelation the
response of a healthy and 'respectable' public would be aversion, which in turn leads
to the debarring of such delirium from the public domain. Censorship at the level of
subject constitution thus entails censorship in more material terms in the form of
rejection and exclusion; however, this sequence is merely Nordau's optimistic
delineation. While Nordau recognises the role of the market in fuelling the imitative
frenzy of the degenerate's following, he does not foresee the extent to which his
medical revelations are themselves complicit in this excitatory network. In the final
section of this chapter, I turn to Aubrey Beardsley's graphic art and the significance
of his pictorial use of French novels, including those of Zola, to show that censorship
paradoxically provides the discursive context through which proscribed topics might
be broached.
The Post-Trial Circulation of 'Zola'
Earlier in this chapter, I claimed that censorship in its various forms becomes a site
of discursive production. Pernicious Literature, a propagandistic pamphlet published
after the Vizetelly trial by the National Vigilance Association, had the professed aim
of'rous[ing] the manhood of England to action,' of counteracting the 'dreadful
havoc which is being caused by the dissemination of this vile stuff.'114 The inclusion
of the parliamentary debate on corrupt literature, an account of the trial proceedings,
and selections from press reports and correspondence, while strategically intended to
incite public indignation, is also proof of the censoring body's own role in this
discursive escalation. As discussed above, Nordau's Degeneration likewise spawned
its own spiralling polemical exchanges. But censorship is also productive in the new




discourse, generating a distinctive vocabulary with its own signifiers of
transgression.
The denunciations of Zola have an interesting if indirect symbolic afterlife in
illustrations by the graphic artist Aubrey Beardsley, in which the name 'Zola'
becomes a signifier whose meaning is overdetermined by these events. Beardsley's
drawings make frequent use of the trope of the reader as does the one under
consideration, The Toilet ofSalome. This illustration for the 1894 publication in
English ofOscar Wilde's controversial Salome features a portrayal of the protagonist
in modern attire attended by a barber, with, in the foreground, a collection of books,
including Abbe Provost's Manon Lescaut, Verlaine's Les Fetes galantes, Apuleius'
The Golden Ass, one simply entitled Marquis de Sade, and Zola's Nana. This was in
fact, a second version of the illustration, the original having been rejected by
publisher John Lane and 'his unofficial censorship board.'115 The offending features
of the first attempt are easily discernible, for in addition to the explicit depiction of
both Salome and a page in the act ofmasturbation, the illustration is replete with less
overt but for the nineteenth-century viewer, no less decipherable, signifiers of
depravity. Both the viol and the mirror, for instance, are symbols of masturbation, as
is the bent spine of the seated page.116 Like the second version, there is on display a
selection of controversial volumes, amongst which are Zola's La Terre and
Baudelaire's Les Fleurs du Mai, both the subject of obscenity prosecutions, the
former in England and the latter in France.
Despite compliance with Lane's censorious precautions in the later picture,
the proscribed representations of the original have been expunged only in their most
overt articulations. Beardsley retains the more permissible tropes of transgressive
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Stephen Calloway, Aubrey Beardsley (London: V & A, 1998) 76. In addition to this problematic
design, two other pictures in Salome underwent similar negotiation (Linda Gertner Zatlin, Beardsley,
Japonisme, and the Perversion ofthe Victorian Ideal (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997) 109). On
another occasion, the cover design for the first number of The Savoy was expurgated at the behest of
the litigiously alert Leonard Smithers, who was, not surprisingly, wary of the depiction of the figure
of a putto urinating on a copy of The Yellow Book (Calloway 153). On Beardsley's part, this was
presumably a defiant if somewhat puerile gesture in response to his dismissal from The Yellow Book
following the Wilde debacle in 1895. Beardsley's fictional work also met with unofficial censorious
opposition. The Story of Venus and Tannhauser, published in expurgated form as Under the Hill in the
Savoy and later by Lane, was not available unexpurgated until the 1907 Smithers' edition for private
circulation (R. K. R. Thornton, The Decadent Dilemma (London: Arnold, 1983) 179).
116 Allison Pease, Modernism, Mass Culture, and the Aesthetics ofObscenity (Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 2000) 102; Calloway 77.
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behaviour, in particular, the largely Gallic and wholly lascivious collection of books.
The languid narcissism of Salome's posture before the mirror and the blatantly
positioned hand might have been purged to the wary publisher's satisfaction, but the
viewer is still left with the suggestive solipsism of the decadent reader, her hedonistic
self-absorption heightened by the hovering, servile hands of the attendant.117 Zola's
prominence on the bookshelf is significant. For while the material circulation of
Zola's books has been curtailed by judicial force, the symbolic circulation of'Zola'
and his transgressive oeuvre persists in a manner that exceeds legal prohibition.118 As
is evident in the two versions of The Toilet, the titles of the books, including those of
Zola's, are themselves symbols of vice and suggest in a less direct manner the
mechanistic acts of solitary pleasure. Zola, despite his works not being accessible to
the English-speaking public, or perhaps because of his works' inaccessibility, has
come to signify debauchery and corruption, and the irony of Beardsley's devious and
suggestive use of 'Zola' shows how censorship participates in complex exchanges.
The name of an author whose works are censored at one time is adroitly manipulated
on a subsequent occasion into a coded expression of a social taboo, thus evading the
117 Thomas Laqueur argues that masturbation was perceived as a social problem in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries not because of any belief in inherent physical or moral harm, but because it was a
solitary and therefore asocial practice ('The Social Evil, the Solitary Vice and Pouring Tea,'
Fragments for a History ofthe Human Body, part three, ed. Michel Feher, Ramona Naddaff, and
Nadia Tazi (New York: Urzone, 1989) 336). The introversion of solitary reading might also be
construed as a withdrawal from the social. Commenting on the shift from the respectable popularity of
the three-decker to the new slim-line, Beardsley-illustratedfin de siecle volume, Elaine Showalter
writes: 'Unsuitable for family consumption, these books were more likely to be read alone and
perhaps even under the covers. Sex and the single book became the order of the day' (Sexual
Anarchy: Gender and Cidture in the Fin de Siecle (London: Bloomsbury, 1990) 16). Beardsley's
association with the newly popular 'single book' thus places him at the nexus of concerns over
(female) sexuality, solitary reading, and the economic transactions of the book industry. For Foucault,
the masturbation panic was the channel through which power reached into the family unit, producing
this childhood 'vice' not so much as 'the evil to be eliminated' for this task was bound to failure, but
as the means ofmultiplying and advancing its hold (History ofSexuality 42).
Pease also suggests that Salome's modern dress is a deliberate invocation of the decadent
New Woman, its topicality and propinquity heightening the irony of sanctioning a drawing that is
arguably as inflammatory as the one replaced (93). For discussion of the gender and sexual dynamics
in Beardsley's work, see Linda Gertner Zatlin, Aubrey Beardsley and Victorian Sexual Politics
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).
118 David Baguley notes that this mythologising of Zola as social and political dissident was contrary
to his own (and his associates') conception of himself, contradicting 'the reality of the retiring,
sedentary, kindly, sensitive, and nervous bourgeois writer' ('Zola and His Critics,' introduction,
Critical Essays on Emile Zola, ed. Baguley (Boston: Hall, 1986) 2). On the other hand, Dorothy
Speirs claims that Zola was adept at manipulating the opportunities for self-publicising in the press.
('Zola Meets the Press,' Emile Zola Centenary Colloquium 1893-1993 (London: Emile Zola Society,
1995)15). These multiple perceptions of Zola underline the highly unstable and appropriable nature of
the author's name for all parties, including the author himself.
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censor's blue pencil in a metonymic sleight-of-hand. Not only are efforts to dismiss
the works of Zola as depraved articulations not disputed, they are embraced by
Beardsley in a new signifying system.
Both Vizetelly's prosecution and Nordau's pathologisation of Zola were
attempts to suppress specific authors and texts, but at the same time, both
participated in a greater cultural field in which their denunciations were open to
appropriation and re-inscription.119 These acts of censorship, whether explicit or
implicit, were also embroiled in the dynamics of the marketplace and thus complicit
with the transformative process by which transgression is converted into economic
capital. If censorship is the control ofmeaning, then the significance of the
condemned text as marketable transgression reveals that censoring technologies,
whether legislative measures or medicalising strategies, cannot retain sole control
over discursive production. Such discursive struggle brings to mind a verbal
exchange during the first Vizetelly trial, in which the defence counsel, Mr. Williams,
referring to the novels as 'works of a great French author,' elicited the following
nomenclatural dispute:
The Solicitor-General.—A voluminous French author.
The Recorder.—A popular French author.
Mr. Williams.—Of an author who ranks high among the literary men of
France. 120
119 A comparable use ofDegeneration as an evasive signifying system can be seen in the reporting of
the 1885 Wilde trials, in which references to degeneration, and to a lesser degree, to Nordau, were
frequent. The editor of Reynolds', for instance, condemned Wilde's work as 'the most diseased
products of a diseased time,' intoning against 'its morbidity, its cold heartless brilliance, its insolent
cynicism, its hatred of all rational restraint, its suggestiveness,' while directly referring to Nordau's
'dissectfion of] Wilde's absurdities' (cited in Ed Cohen, Talk on the Wilde Side: Toward a Genealogy
ofa Discourse on Male Sexualities (New York: Routledge, 1993) 255). On one level, Nordau's theory
of degeneration provided the narrative touchstones by which the events in court could be emplotted
as, and explained by, the familiar account of a morbid modernity. On another, the physiological
hermeneutics popularised by Nordau allowed the literally unspeakable acts of which Wilde was
accused—the Marquess's allegation was represented in print as a textual gap: 'posing as —'—to be
verbalised within the bounds of permissible articulation. Cohen argues that 'somatic descriptions' of
Wilde—his pose, attire, and physical appearance—metonymically suggested acts of sexual
transgression (190). In the charting of the ravaging effects of the trial on Wilde, for example, physical
decrepitude 'becomes both a metaphor for and the proof of the charges made against him' (193). The
logic and vocabulary of degeneration theory thus provided a legitimate means by which the strictures
of press decency might be circumvented and a sensitive topic brought to public discussion.
For further discussion of the Wilde trials, see Michael S. Foldy, The Trials ofOscar Wilde:
Deviance, Morality, and Late-Victorian Society (New Haven: Yale UP, 1997); Alan Sinfield, The
Wilde Century: Effeminacy, Oscar Wilde and the Queer Movement (New York: Columbia UP, 1994).
120 Cited in Coote, Pernicious 18.
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Censorship is a process by which the terms of discussion are negotiated and given
provisional authority, but even for those who exercise state-sanctioned power, the
associations and meanings generated by their activities exceed the constraints of such
decrees. Here, the site of contestation is Zola himself. 'Zola' is variously a 'great,' a
'voluminous,' and a 'popular' author, these being only a few of his discursive
designations. W. H. Gleadell, lauding Zola's tenacity, if not his 'literature of
despair,' proclaims, 'Zola! Why the very name sounds like a challenge, a cry of
attack, a shout of victory—clear and resonant like the notes of a clarion.'121 For this
critic, the two syllables evoke the combative air of a victorious aggressor. Yet to
another, 'Zola' could unequivocally signify corruption and degeneration, the
'obscene to the point of bestiality.'122 In the end, these censorships and counter-
censorships serve not to cement meaning but to dislodge further the orderly linguistic
regime of univocality.
The instability of signification and the volatility of meaning set adrift are also central
to the subject of the next chapter, Havelock Ellis's Sexual Inversion. There, I will
argue that censorship is the negotiation of meaning, not just in terms of the contents
of Ellis's work, but also in terms of its disciplinary affiliations. At issue, at least for
Ellis and his supporters, was whether medical science should be immune from
prosecution, and if so, which defining qualities of science should ensure this
immunity.
121 W. H. Gleadell, W. H. 'Zola and His Work,' Westminster Review 140 (1893): 615.
122 Cited in Coote, Pernicious 25.
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Chapter 4
Sexual Inversion and the Question of Science
If in the case of Zola, medicine and the law appeared largely to operate tangentially
in their targeting of the author's works, any latent conflict was brought to the fore in
the trial ofGeorge Bedborough for selling Havelock Ellis's Sexual Inversion. The
tension between the legal and the medical was already evident in the Zola case where
there was a more abstruse struggle beneath the overt contests between literature and
the law, and literature and medical science. In the case of Sexual Inversion, Ellis's
work was publicly and explicitly branded as 'lewd, wicked, bawdy, scandalous, and
obscene,' accused by the Recorder Sir Charles Hill of being pornography
masquerading as science.1 The affair has been overwhelmingly presented, by those
involved and by subsequent commentators, as a travesty against knowledge, a
misapplication of law thwarting the progress of science. 'Are we going to tolerate
this bureaucratic censorship over our scientific and reform literature?' asks Henry
Seymour, taking over Bedborough's editorship of the Adult in the wake of the latter's
legal travails.2 Robert Buchanan, in a letter to the London Star, argues that 'to insult
a man of science and to punish the unfortunate publisher for carrying out what is in
point of fact a noble bit of work, done in the interests of suffering humanity, is more
worthy of savages than of sane men living in the nineteenth century.' More recently,
Geoffrey Robertson highlights the misuses of obscenity law against science,
claiming that the fate of Sexual Inversion 'completed the legal edifice ofVictorian
' Cited in George Astor Singer [pseud.], Judicial Scandals andErrors (Watford, 1899) 34.
2
Henry Seymour, 'Editorial Memoranda,' Adult 2.10 (1898): 286.
3 Cited in Singer 285.
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moral hypocrisy,' while Alec Craig berates the legal perversions which 'proved a
fruitful source of injustice to individuals and of damage to science, literature and
society.'4 Science, presented in terms of the open exchange and pursuit of
knowledge, is pitted against the intractability of law, with Ellis the unwitting victim
of an overzealous police force.
Censorship as a collision between law and science constructs a superficially
simple model of attack and counter-attack: Sexual Inversion was conceived in part to
counter legal injunctions against homosexuality; the law in turn publicly retaliated by
labelling the study obscene and effecting its immediate suppression. However, this
truncated account of censorship can be challenged on at least two counts. First, the
presentation of Bedborough's capitulation as an incontestable victory for censorial
forces forecloses any discussion of the consequences of the trial. The outcome of the
confrontation between science and law is figured as resounding defeat—Ellis is the
'most distinguished victim' of obscenity law5—a defeat accorded a triumphal dignity
in service of a greater emancipatory telos. Yet it was at the site of this struggle that
discourses of legitimation were produced that had implications for how knowledge
was formulated as a particular science and how it might address its audience.
Second, this dichotomous model suggests a unidirectional censor-victim relationship
that simplifies the cross-currents of censorship in its various forms. Ellis was not
merely the target of punitive manoeuvres but was situated in a complex network of
forces not easily contained by rigid binary delineations.
Just as the relationship between literature and the law had a more complex
history, so too does that of law and medicine. In the first section below, I give a brief
account of this uneasy relationship. In the second section, I look at the circumstances
of Sexual Inversion's creation and the plans for its defence to argue that the
particular understanding of science thus generated had unforeseen implications for its
autonomy. In the final section, I turn to the case-histories of Sexual Inversion to
suggest that Ellis was himself complicit in a form of constitutive censorship by
providing the form and language that made the articulation of homosexual
subjectivity possible.




Law and Medicine: an Uneasy Association
One way of theorising the interdisciplinary dispute between law and medicine is
through Foucault's discussion of Pierre Riviere, whose 'dossier' depicts a 'rather
strange contest, a confrontation, a power relation, a battle among discourses and
through discourse.'6 The case centres on three conflicts: those between judiciary
power and popular opinion, executive and legislative powers, and science and the
... 7
judiciary. Most pertinent to my project is the last, for it is in the matter of criminal
insanity that psychiatric expertise first encroached onto the domain of law. The
concept of extenuating circumstances signalled the admission of alternative
authorities into the court of law, moreover, ones that were to take precedence over
legal adjudications. It was not a denial of criminality as such; indeed, criminality was
readily acknowledged. Rather, it was an issue of priority, with medico-psychiatric
assessment arrogating control over the subject's body. This was, in effect, the
opening by which other social sciences entered the judicial domain, a process
culminating in the pathologisation of criminality associated with Lombroso, ideas
that were taken up and disseminated in England by Havelock Ellis.
While of theoretical significance, Foucault's observations are grounded in a
different national context, and until the nineteenth century, substantial differences
between English and Continental legal codes were reflected in medico-legal issues.
Continental codes, deriving from Roman-canon law, adopted an inquisitorial
approach, predicated on the meticulous gathering and examination of evidence. The
legitimacy of the expert witness was assured in a system with statutory requirements
for expert knowledge, specifying the oath to be taken by, professional qualifications
of, and remuneration for, the witness.8 By contrast, the adversarial nature ofEnglish
law meant that cases were determined by juridical consensus rather than the
establishment of'truth' itself. There was no formal stipulation of the medical
witness's role in court and further, witnesses were at risk of hostile cross-
6 Michel Foucault, ed., I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughteredmy mother, my sister andmy brother ...
A Case ofParricide in the 19th Century (1975; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978) x.
7 Foucault, Riviere 216.
8 Catherine Crawford, 'Legalizing Medicine: Early Modern Legal Systems and the Growth of
Medico-Legal Knowledge,' Legal Medicine in History, ed. Michael Clark and Catherine Crawford
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994); Joel Peter Eigen, Witnessing Insanity: Madness andMad-Doctors
in the English Court (New Haven: Yale UP, 1995) 112.
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examination.9 Nonetheless, throughout the nineteenth century, the medical
professional increasingly became a fixture in court, as expert witness in criminal
trials, in matters of inheritance and legitimacy, and in the new fields of insurance and
compensation.10
The nature of the relations between the two professions is disputed. Joel Peter
Eigen claims that early in the century at least, there was 'no initial hostility from
either bench or the prosecuting counsel' and the growing importance ofmedical
testimony cannot thus be construed as a deliberate onslaught or a disciplinary
usurpation.11 Others, such as Tal Golan and Christopher Hamlin, argue that cross-
boundary encounters in forensic science more generally called into question the
nature of science itself even while pursuing its professionalising and expansionist
project.12 These divergent opinions suggest that law and medicine had a complex
relationship that is not easily unravelled.
The nature of confrontation is different in the contexts of forensic medicine
and the obscenity trial as well. In the former, the struggle can be understood as a
jurisdictional one: in Pierre Riviere, it is a territorial contest over the site of his body,
over precedence of definition. On the one hand, he is construed as juridical subject,
as a parricide, and answerable to criminal justice; on the other, he is psychiatric
subject within the pathologising logic of mental medicine. This model of definitional
conflict pertains to the differences in how Nordau and how the court dealt with
Zola's work. In the Bedborough trial, medicine stands in a different relation to the
law, no longer expert witness but prosecutable object. Although it was Bedborough
on trial for selling Sexual Inversion, the case rested on the a priori consensus, of the
court at least, that the book was obscene libel and not medical exposition. Medical
9
Angus McLaren, The Trials ofMasculinity: Policing Sexual Boundaries, 1870-1930 (Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1997) 134-5; Eigen 113.
10 M. A. Crowther and Brenda M. White, 'Medicine, Property and the Law in Britain 1800-1914,' The
Historical Journal 31.4 (1988).
"
Eigen 160. Eigen claims that there was in fact a 'near-perfect fit of the interests of a rapidly
evolving advocacy bar with the conceptually expanding realm of professed medical expertise' (133).
12 Tal Golan, 'The History of Scientific Expert Testimony in the English Courtroom,' Science in
Context 12.1 (1999); Christopher Hamlin, 'Scientific Method and Expert Witnessing: Victorian
Perspectives on a Modem Problem,' Social Studies ofScience 16.3 (1986). At issue was the
incompatibility between adversarial procedure and scientific modes of proof, although a minority at
the time claimed that rigorous cross-examination made the courtroom the ideal site for scientific
progress. Also of concern was the ethical question of whether paid testimony was a contravention of
scientific ideals.
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science, in the form of its textual representative, Sexual Inversion, was from the start
divested of the courtroom agency officially accorded the forensic witness, but this
instance was merely one instalment in a more complex history of interaction.
Sexual Inversion and the Scientific Style
In 1898, George Bedborough, secretary of the Legitimation League, an organisation
committed to legalising the position of illegitimate children, was arrested and
charged with eleven counts of selling an obscene libel, among which was Ellis's
Sexual Inversion. Ellis's supporters rallied to form the Free Press Defence
Committee to contest the charge, but their efforts were thwarted by Bedborough's
guilty plea. Arthur Calder-Marshall argues that the police were less concerned with
claims of scientific immunity than with the anarchistic elements taking advantage of
the open floor of League meetings. His contention is substantiated by detective John
Sweeney's revelation that the Public Prosecutor had been looking for a way to
combat 'Anarchistic proselytising' without violating civil liberties, since both the
League and its publication were 'free from anything approaching scandalous
11
behaviour.' The presence of Sexual Inversion in the League office was thus a
chance to 'at one blow kill a growing evil in the shape of a vigorous campaign of
free love and Anarchism, and at the same time, discover the means by which the
country was being flooded with books of the "Psychology" type.'14 If an anti-
aristocratic pornography had been harnessed by political radicals to attack the
establishment in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, almost a century
later, the establishment adopted a similar tactic by using the 'pornography' of Ellis's
work to target political radicalism.15
While of incidental importance to the police operation, the issue of the
autonomy of science—who has authority to define it, who has authority within its
13 John Sweeney, At Scotland Yard: Being the Experiences during Twenty-Seven Years' Service of
John Sweeney, Late Detective-Inspector Criminal Investigation Department New Scotland Yard, ed.
Francis Richards (London: Grant Richards, 1904) 178, 181.
14
Sweeney 186.
15 Calder-Marshall suggests that the decision to try the case in the Central Criminal Court rather than
in the High Court as requested by Bedborough's counsel was in fact a refusal to give the issue of
scientific value due consideration and the regard of a senior judgement (Havelock Ellis (London:
Hart-Davis, 1959) 165).
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boundaries, and its valency outside of its constitutive field—was nevertheless an
undercurrent to the affair at large. The court, with its concern over anarchism, was
interested only in the responsibility for the sale of the book, but its defenders
bypassed the issue of culpability to focus on the status of the book as science and its
consequent immunity, in their minds, to prosecution.16 While Bedborough's guilty
plea forestalled any legal debate over the status of the text, it is still illuminating to
look at the way in which those defending Sexual Inversion attempted to shift the
parameters of debate away from the legal discourse of acts and culpability to
conceptual and political ones of civil liberties and the demands of knowledge.
That authority was central to the case was evident from the inception of the
project. Sexual Inversion originated as a collaborative venture between Ellis and
John Addington Symonds, instigated by the latter, with the goal of decriminalising
homosexuality, specifically, to put an end to the miscarriages ofjustice wrought by
'Labby's inexpansible legislation.'17 The project as envisaged by Symonds was also
to serve as a corrective to the neuro-psychopathic hypotheses put forward by
Continental practitioners such as Tardieu and Krafft-Ebing. These, he argued in a
letter to Edward Carpenter, overwhelmingly ignore the evidence of history; the fact
that 'one of the foremost races in civilization not only tolerated passionate
comradeship, but also utilized it for high social and military purpose' disproves such
theories ofmorbidity.18 In earlier works, explicitly in essays published privately and
more circumspectly in his Studies in the Greek Poets (1873-76), Symonds had
explored the possibility of a Uranian morality—a new chivalry—modelled on
Hellenic paiderastia. However, he was also aware that for all the elucidatory power
of historical example, a serious challenge to authoritative accounts could not be
mounted outside of medical discourse. Conceding his 'own want of scientific
equipment,' he openly and pragmatically appealed to the medically trained Ellis to
16 There was no doubt on the prosecution's part that Sexual Inversion was obscene. Sweeney is
adamant that there was 'never any hesitation on the part of the authorities as to the illegality of the
sale of Ellis's book' and this is borne out by his avoidance of the book's topic—one 'which 1 cannot
possibly describe here ... dealing with certain abnormalities which the law of England has decided
wisely enough cannot be discussed in books sold to the general public' (185).
17 John Addington Symonds, letter to Havelock Ellis, July 1891, letter 1898 of The Letters ofJohn
Addington Symonds, ed. Herbert M. Schueller and Robert L. Peters, vol. 3, 1885-1893 (Detroit:
Wayne State UP, 1967) 587. 'Labby's' referred to the Labouchere Amendment of the 1885 Criminal
Amendment Act, which criminalised 'act[s] of gross indecency' between male persons in public or in
private.
18
Symonds, letter to Edward Carpenter, 29 December 1892, letter 2070, Schueller and Peters 798.
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furnish professional credibility to his own erudite speculations.19 As he confessed to
Carpenter, '[a]lone, I could make but little effect—the effect of an eccentric.'20
The failure of the partnership—failure insofar as the end product bore Ellis's
name alone—has been attributed to the irreconcilability of the two disciplines,
notwithstanding their shared reformist enthusiasm. The scientific legitimacy
Symonds sought was predicated on norms of objectivity and disinterest which were
precisely the criteria by which his introspective erudition was reduced to
• • 21
eccentricity. It was a contest between poetry and science, Wayne Koestenbaum
contends, with the latter eventually eclipsing or 'dismembering' the former. In a
hostile assessment ofEllis, Koestenbaum claims:
Sexual Inversion pretends to be a medical text, written by two professional
men comfortably living within a discourse of power; the book is, covertly, a
self-portrait of the disempowered Symonds turning to a medical collaborator
who finally deprived him of voice.22
In a reversal of hagiographic treatments, Koestenbaum imputes nebulous intentions
to Ellis, under whose 'censorious eye' Symonds was demoted from co-author to the
pseudonymous contributor 'Z' and Case XVIII.23 Ellis, far from being the target of
censorship, is figured as censor himself, and by statisticising Symonds's testimony,
effectively silences his erstwhile collaborator.24
It is misleading to posit so clear-cut and hostile a division between the
humanities and science. Ellis was after all something of a polymath, active in
political, literary, and scientific circles.25 Not only was his wife Edith a writer
herself, Ellis also formed close friendships with Olive Schreiner, Eleanor Marx, and
19
Symonds, letter to Havelock Ellis, 1 December 1892, letter 2062, Schueller and Peters 789.
20
Symonds, letter to Carpenter, 29 December 1892, letter 2070, Schueller and Peters 797.
21 In his autobiography, Ellis admits to having had misgivings about collaboration with someone with
such personal investment in the topic of study {My Life (1940; London: Neville Spearman, 1967) 295-
6).
22
Wayne Koestenbaum, Double Talk: The Erotics ofMale Literary Collaboration (New York:
Routledge, 1989) 44.
23 Koestenbaum 50. Symonds died in 1893 before the completion of the book. Symonds's literary
executor, Horatio Brown, at the request of Symonds's family, bought up the entire first English
edition which bore the names of both authors, and stipulated that Symonds's name be removed from
subsequent editions.
24 See Joseph Bristow, 'Symonds' History, Ellis's Heredity: Sexual Inversion,' Sexology in Culture:
Labelling Bodies and Desires, ed. Lucy Bland and Laura Doan (Cambridge: Polity, 1998) for an
analysis of the misunderstandings on which the collaboration was based.
25 Koestenbaum merely treats Ellis's literary affiliations as evidence of greater betrayal in his
suppression of the poetic, further proof of his censorious villainy (50).
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Arthur Symons, among others. As well as the prestigious Contemporary Science
Series, Ellis also edited the Mermaid Series of unexpurgated Elizabethan plays,
published by Vizetelly's company. Like Vizetelly, Ellis was an early champion of
Zola's works, lauding his attack on the 'exaggerated purism which has ruled the
French language for nearly three centuries' and thereby expanding the boundaries of
novelistic potential.26 Tom Gibbons suggests that this essay on Zola was 'almost
certainly intended as a rejoinder to Max Nordau,' which would place Ellis in
dialogue with Nordau the 'healthy censor,' but despite this direct rebuttal, the
relationship to Nordau was not as straightforwardly antagonistic as Gibbons
suggests.27 That Ellis and Nordau shared an intellectual provenance is evident in
their indebtedness to Lombroso. Not only was Ellis instrumental in importing and
popularising Lombroso's work, his own writing on genius and criminality was
clearly informed by Lombroso.28 This shared scientific genealogy should alert us to
the more complex power dynamics in place. The fissures in the collaboration
between Ellis and Symonds seem clear in retrospect: Lombroso is 'entirely
untrustworthy from the historico-critical point of view,' asserts Symonds, a
portentous comment, given Ellis's Lombrosian affiliation.29 As it transpired,
Symonds's strategic deployment of Ellis's expertise backfired and the hoped-for
immunity of borrowed credentials faltered in face of police prosecution. The tensions
in the interdisciplinary alliance only partly explain this failure; the internal dynamics
of the medical field provide a fuller elucidation of the situation.
To speak of a clash between law and medicine understates the extent to
which medicine was itself a heterogeneous and contested field. Until the nineteenth
century, it lacked the institutional structures, formalised standards, and the regulatory
26 Havelock Ellis, 'Zola: The Man and His Work,' Affirmations (London, 1898) 145. Ellis also
produced an unexpurgated translation of Germinal for private publication with wife Edith {My Life
274).
27 Tom Gibbons, 'The New Hellenism: Havelock Ellis as a Literary Critic,' Renaissance and Modern
Studies 17 (1973): 137; Nordau, Degeneration 24.
28 The Criminal is a study of the 'biology of crime,' the main purpose ofwhich is to render the
criminal identifiable by the systematic categorisation of the anatomical, physiological, and
psychological signs of criminality {The Criminal (London, 1890) 25). While Ellis repudiates
Lombroso's connection between genius and insanity, having translated his The Man ofGenius some
years earlier, his claim that 'the real affinity of genius is with congenital imbecility rather than with
insanity' is nonetheless indebted to Lombroso {A Study ofBritish Genius (London: Hurst and
Blackett, 1904)228).
29
Symonds, letter to Havelock Ellis, 20 June 1892, letter 1984, Schueller and Peters 694.
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mechanisms necessary to sustain professional cohesion and prestige.30 The Medical
Act of 1858 led to the formation of the General Medical Council ofGreat Britain and
its list of registered practitioners, registration being 'the new benchmark of
professionalism.'31 Yet the self-monitoring potential of the register masked the
extent to which medicine's traditional rivals prospered well into the nineteenth, and
indeed, into the twentieth centuries. Challenged by folk remedy, unscrupulous
quackery and the extravagant promises of patent medicines, medicine could not
afford an intimate association with a rogue subfield like sexology and hence
sexology's position in the hierarchy of medical sciences was far from assured.32
Where Ellis notes a 'peculiar amount of ignorance' of the topic of inversion
amongst medical men as much as the populace, his peers opted for the reticence
more consonant with nineteenth-century professional propriety.33 The ambivalent
response of the Lancet to the affair is instructive when examining the position of
sexology vis-a-vis mainstream medicine. While disputing Ellis's findings on the
congenital nature and extent of inversion, it absolves him ofmalicious intent.
Indignant on his behalf at the denigration of his work as 'obscene literature,' it
nevertheless chides his failure to publish 'through a house able to take proper means
for introducing [Sexual Inversion] as a scientific book to a scientific audience.'34 Yet
30 Even after the 1834 Select Committee on Medical Education, there was no standardised system of
training, with physicians alone receiving a university education, while surgeons and apothecaries
undertook apprenticeships (Joan Lane, A Social History ofMedicine: Health, Healing and Disease in
England, 1750-1950 (London: Routledge, 2001)29).
31
Penelope J. Corfield, Power and the Professions in Britain 1700-1850 (London: Routledge, 1995)
146.
'2 That the medical authorities were willing to discipline wayward members to preserve the integrity
of the profession was clearly demonstrated in the case ofDr Henry Allbutt. A secularist involved in
the neo-Malthusian movement, Allbutt was struck from the Register in 1887, having been found
guilty by the General Medical Council of publishing a marriage manual, including descriptions of
contraceptive methods, The Wife's Handbook 'at so low a price as to bring the work within the reach
of the youth of both sexes, to the detriment of public morals' (cited in Peter Fryer, The Birth
Controllers {London: Seeker and Warburg, 1965) 170).
"'3 Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology ofSex. Vol. 1. Sexual Inversion (London, 1897) xi. The
1897 edition will be cited as Sexual Inversion.
34 'The Question of Indecent Literature,' Lancet 19 Nov. 1898: 1344. The confining ofmedical
publications to a restricted audience was rigorously maintained. In 1863, Samuel La'mert was struck
from the Medical Register for his Self-Preservation, a treatise on the dangers of over-indulgence, his
offence being directing his pamphlet at a lay audience. By contrast, William Acton's The Functions
and Disorders ofthe Reproductive Organs, dealing with similar topics, was received favourably as a
'serious and scholarly' work for an elite professional readership (Lesley Hall, "'The English Have
Hot-Water Bottles": The Morganatic Marriage Between Sexology and Medicine in Britain Since
William Acton,' Sexual Knowledge, Sexual Science: The History ofAttitudes to Sexuality, ed. Roy
Porter and Mikulas Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) 351).
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for all its cavilling over unguarded distribution channels, it allows that the work is
written in a 'purely dispassionate and scientific style,' motivated 'solely [by] a spirit
of scientific inquiry.' The invocation of 'scientific style' is a familiar refrain in the
responses to the case. The New YorkMedical Journal argues that its 'attitude of
scientific research' permits impartial treatment. Medicine gauges its value by 'its
judicial tone, its clear style, its freedom alike from prurient prudery and sentimental
cant, and its scientific accuracy.' For Edward Carpenter, writing for the Saturday
Review, the book 'dealfs] decently, straightforwardly, and scientifically' with an
urgent subject. Ellis himself offers as proof against wrongdoing his 'English tone of
reticence,' his use of'bald and technical language,' and the overall 'scientific tone
and temper' of his work.33 Judicial impugnation is met with the counterclaim of
'pure science,' where science is defined not in terms of subject matter, nor according
to procedural or methodological norms, but primarily as a question of style. Gert
Hekma has argued that sexology was merely a 'social science with the pretension of
being a natural science, a status to which it could aspire only through analogic
thinking.' Lacking the requisite theoretical tools of analysis, it could only adopt and
apply those developed in other fields of study.37 Nevertheless, in face of attack, Ellis
and others, borrowing the language of literary criticism, reverted to the idea of a
scientific style. That is, the conventions by which science is recognised, it is implied,
are ones of presentation and expression, propelling us away from the exigencies of
social order implicit in the alleged breaching of 'the peace of our said Lady the
Queen' and back into the textual realm, into the domain of language.38
It becomes apparent that the scientific defence endorses what might be seen
as a reader-response theory of obscenity. Ellis's supporters called upon a scientific
style as a discursive bulwark against allegations of immorality. Yet the emphasis on
style, and hence, on the textual, deflected attention from the material at hand back to
its reader. The ability to recognise scientific value becomes a matter of literary
35 All excerpts cited in Singer 40-58.
36 Gert Hekma, 'A History of Sexology: Social and Historical Aspects of Sexuality,' From Sappho to
DeSade: Moments in the History ofSexuality, ed. Jan Bremmer (London: Routledge, 1989) 183.
37 Calder-Marshall further suggests that the entire Studies are an elaborate euphemism, 'moral and
educational books disguised as science.' The educative purpose could only be expressed 'in the form
of quotations from learned authorities, many of whom were engaged in the same sort of sex education,
building up their mutual authority by cross-quotation of one another' (Ellis 154). Sexology in this
view is an internally self-validating field, asserting its authority through self-referential repetition.
38 Cited in Singer 34.
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competence and that not every reader is similarly literate is a fact of which the
Lancet was fully cognisant. A scientific investigation such as Ellis's, though of an
unsavoury topic, cannot by any 'reasonable' means be 'included under the head of
indecent literature.'39 However, 'such a book may become indecent if offered for sale
to the general public with a wrong motive.' Indecency becomes a function of
intentions and demographics: obscenity in the nineteenth century, as Saunders
asserts, is variable. Calder-Marshall's anecdotal account of finding the book 'on sale
in rubber shops off the Charing Cross Road at £1 a dog-eared volume and "ten bob
back when you've used it'" has an apocryphal tenor to it, but nevertheless wryly
suggests that the distinction between pornography and science is spatially and
demographically determined.40 The implications of this variable definition of
obscenity are left unsaid though. For it becomes clear in the Lancet report that
science, or at least the concept of science appealed to here, figured as the opposite of
obscenity, must necessarily be variable as well. The book, warns the Lancet, risks
'fall[ing] into the hands of readers totally unable to derive benefit from it as a work
of science and very ready to draw evil lessons from its necessarily disgusting
passages.'41 Oscillating between obscenity and science according to the interpretative
ability of the reader, the ontological status of the work becomes radically unstable.
Yet, for all the righteous affront at the denunciation of the work as a
'pretence and a sham,' the avowals of stylistic propriety did not, in the end,
challenge the basis of the court's aspersions.42 'There is certainly nothing about the
book itself, either in its appearance or in the manner in which the subject is treated,
to pander to the prurient mind,' maintains the British Medical Journal;43 it is rather
the prurient mind that produces obscenity from inoffensively presented material, and
the British Medical Journal, the Lancet, and their professional constituency are
resolute in the task of curbing this transformative power of unruly reading.
Bedborough was indicted for
unlawfully and wickedly devising, contriving, and intending to vitiate and
corrupt the morals of the liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, to
debauch and poison the minds of divers of the liege subjects of our said Lady
39
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40 Calder-Marshall, Ellis 155.
41
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42 Cited in Singer 32.
43 British Medical Journal 1 1 (1898): 1466.
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the Queen, and to raise and create in them disordered and lustful desires, and
to bring the said liege subjects into a state of wickedness, lewdness, and
debauchery.44
The reverse would seem to be implied here: it is the dirty minds appended to the
'dirty hands' of such concern to the Lancet that would adulterate the 'pure science'
ofEllis's work.45 It is not that the Lancet dispenses with the tutelary discourse of the
interventionist state; indeed, it makes the standard references to the 'boy and girl in
the street.' Rather, it would seem that science also comes under its custodial purview.
In this instance, in arrogating to themselves the authority of science, journals such as
the Lancet render science dangerously vulnerable to alien forces beyond its
boundaries, but the classist assumptions underpinning obscenity law are still in place.
There is also an interesting contrast to the case of Zola. In Nordau's medicalising
framework, obscenity is transformed into science, into a signifying system of
pathologies, whereas here, incompetent reading effects a reverse transformation from
medical science to obscenity.
By contrast, the Free Press Defence Committee had a more overtly
oppositional stance. Headed by Henry Seymour, it comprised of, in Ellis's words,
'the most variegated assortment of secularists, anarchists, radicals, and
unconventional literary free-lances' including Bernard Shaw, Frank Harris, George
Moore, E. Belfort Bax, H. M. Hyndman, George Jacob Holyoake, and G. W. Foote.46
Rallying behind the cause of 'free and open discussion,' its manifesto was to 'oppose
the intrusion of force in the domain of inquiry and debate,' and the publicity of
courtroom battle was perceived as the best way of doing so.47 The venue, with its
public galleries and the press in attendance, had proved to be the ideal staging
ground for the heroics of eloquent defences. Holyoake and Foote, both members of
the Committee, were veterans of such virtuoso performances in separate blasphemy
trials, and even Oscar Wilde, despite his conviction, had a momentary courtroom
44 Cited in Singer 34.
45
'Question of Indecent Literature' 1345.
46 Ellis, My Life 307.
47 'The Bedborough Case.' [Extracted from the Manifesto of the Free Press Defence Committee],
Adult 2.11(1898): 339.
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triumph when applauded for his exposition on Platonic friendship.48 The forthcoming
trial was thus much anticipated and Bedborough's plea was condemned as treachery.
The censoring ofSexual Inversion thus involved more than its physical
suppression. It also entailed the struggle for control over the terms by which the
affair was apprehended and the site at which it would be staged. The Committee
sought to articulate its protests within a framework of philosophic debate;
significantly, Seymour inserted the debacle into a narrative of Inquisitorial atrocity, a
historical trajectory placing Ellis extravagantly in the company of Bruno, Galileo,
and Vanini.49 The police and court, however, unwaveringly pursued the case as an
infraction of obscenity law. Denied the arena of the Old Bailey, Committee members
sought other avenues to broadcast their views: Frank Harris' Saturday Review, H. M.
Thompson's Reynolds', and the Legitimation League's the Adult.
Ellis's ambivalent response reflects the difficulties in formulating an effective
legitimating defence. There is perhaps some offence in his allegation that 'there was
not a single doctor ofposition among [the Committee members] and the official men
of science deliberately stood aloof,' yet he himself abjures the 'martyr's crown,' such
activism, he contends, being inimical to the scientist's profession.D° Retreating
behind standard platitudes of scientific disinterest and academic immunity, he lauds
the worthiness of, yet refuses to participate in, the 'wrestl[ing] in the public arena for
freedom of speech,' for the pursuit of knowledge transcends matters of politics.51
The Committee argues that it is surely 'for science alone, not law, to determine the
limits of her province,' and here, the scientist does annex these boundary-setting
rights, but only to circumscribe its domain.52 The law is figured as a threat to the
autonomy of science and its constitutive principles of the open exchange of
information, yet the consolidation of this autonomy is itself predicated on exclusory
mechanisms that, while curtailing access for the uninitiated, also limits its clout
48 Marsh 116-7, 144; Linda Dowling, Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford (Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 1994) 1, 142.
49
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beyond its immediate province. The result, as I have suggested, was a science that
was defined by the sensibility of the layperson; debarred from the domain of science,
the layperson nonetheless provided definitional criteria for science itself.
To conclude this section, let me reiterate that 'science' was not a pre-existent
body of knowledge silenced by the law, as 'Justitia' in the Adult implies, in
castigating law's attempt to 'gag science.'53 Instead, a particular concept of science
was articulated at the point of attack, a concept strategically formed to fit into a
defensive agenda. This instrumental use of the rhetoric of science was not exclusive
to Ellis and his supporters. Throughout the century, the idea of science had been
harnessed by disaffected sections of the medical community to challenge a
professional hierarchy structured along patronage rather than meritocratic lines.54
Medical authority derived from social values and cultural accomplishments rather
than scientific expertise, and the ideal of the gentleman doctor, classically educated,
broadly experienced, and discreetly mannered, still had purchase. Science, less 'a
body of knowledge or technique in particular than ... a value system,' was invoked
both as a legitimating discourse for, and a constitutive element of, an alternative
professional identity with the formerly marginalised practitioner at its centre.55 In the
Bedborough affair, a concept of science was espoused that would guarantee
intellectual probity through stylistic nicety, one that was consonant with jurist James
Fitzjames Stephen's pronouncement on obscene publication:
A man ... might with perfect decency ofexpression, and in complete good
faith, maintain doctrines as to marriage, the relation of the sexes, etc., which
would be regarded as highly immoral by most people, and yet (I think)
commit no crime.56
5j Justitia. 'The Survival of the Inquisition,' Adult 2.11 (1898): 330.
54 The ostensible unity forged by the Medical Act merely replaced the trichotomous structure of
apothecaries, surgeons, and physicians with a dichotomous and no less antagonistic one, pitting
hospital consultant against general practitioner (Christopher Lawrence, 'Incommunicable Knowledge:
Science, Technology and the Clinical Art in Britain 1850-1914,' Journal ofContemporary History
20.4 (1985): 506; S. E. D. Shortt, 'Physicians, Science, and Status: Issues in the Professionalization of
Anglo-American Medicine in the Nineteenth Century,' Medical History 21A (1983): 62).
55 John Harley Warner, 'The History of Science and the Sciences of Medicine,' Constructing
Knowledge in the History ofScience, spec, issue of Osiris 2nd series, 10 (1995): 170. It was not that
clinical medicine rejected science, but that the reduction of medicine to scientific reasoning and the
myopic focus of specialisation were thought detrimental to the gentlemanly 'art' or practice of
medicine. Christopher Lawrence claims that this attitude was based on the longstanding distinction
between 'art as practice, and science as theory' (510). See also John Harley Warner, 'The Idea of
Science in English Medicine: the "Decline of Science" and the Rhetoric of Reform, 1815-45,' British
Medicine in an Age ofReform, ed. Roger French and Andrew Wear (London: Routledge, 1991)).
56 Cited in Singer 54, my emphasis.
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Although cited by Reynolds' as a sanctioning of obscenity in service of science,
Stephen's argument is more interesting for its focus on linguistic decorum. The
discussion of heterodox ideas is permitted, but significantly, with a stylistic caveat,
and as I have argued above, a similar concern informs the justifications ofSexual
Inversion as a legitimate work of science.57
Moreover, in exploiting the rhetorical utility of a particular concept of
science, a strategic collapse between the two fields ofmedicine and science was
effected, which in turn downplayed the extent to which sexology was liminal to both.
Disowned by—or at least judiciously distanced from—orthodox medicine, nor yet a
natural science: sexology and its practitioners were subject to forces both within and
without. At the same time though, as the 'father ofmodern sexology,' Ellis is
complicit in the medicalisation of sexuality that formed part of what Foucault
identifies as the newly emergent 'technology of sex' in the nineteenth century, one
that produced the sexual subject as the object of knowledge and regulation.58 In
Sexual Inversion, it is the figure of the invert that is produced in this nexus of power
and knowledge.
Censoring/Producing the Sexual Subject: Ellis's Cases-Histories
That Ellis is enmeshed in these structures of power is well documented in the
denunciations of his theories as expressions ofwestern male hegemony. Feminist
critics take issue with his theory of female sexual passivity which naturalises power
imbalances, as well as restrictive lesbian stereotypes which posit gender attributes
and lifestyle choices as signifiers of deviance. His models of female sexuality permit
desire, but only within a procreative framework.59 Others have pointed to the ways in
57 Marsh identifies a similar shift in emphasis in the prosecution of blasphemy, from 'the religious
"matter" to the stylistic "manner" of the crime', where transgression no longer resided in the
heterodox content of utterances, but in the way in which such utterances were made: this shift in effect
heralded the judicial proscription of plain speaking (158). In the Sexual Inversion case however, the
slippage from matter to manner was effected by the maligned party—Ellis and his scientific
colleagues. This divergence in approach is comparable to the disjuncture between the Free Press
Defence Committee's commitment to the ideals of free speech and Ellis's primary concern for the
integrity of his work as science.
58 Foucault, History ofSexuality 118.
59
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1930 (London: Pandora, 1985); Margaret Jackson '"Facts of Life" or the Eroticization ofWomen's
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which Ellis's theories draw on evolutionary discourse, at once invoking and
legitimating in the name of science racial prejudices underwriting Britain's late-
century imperialist ventures.60
However, I want to argue that Ellis's work censors in a less overt manner. If
we accept Butler's idea of censorship as processes of subject formation, then the
ways in which Sexual Inversion provides the space and the vocabulary to articulate
late-century inversion might also be seen as a form of censorship. The 1897 edition
of Sexual Inversion comprises of thirty-one anonymous case-histories, twenty-seven
male inverts and four female.61 About half of these were provided by Symonds, who
elaborated on his method of soliciting the histories in a letter to Ellis: 'I framed a set
of questions upon the points which seemed to me ofmost importance after a study of
Ulrichs and Krafft-Ebing.'62 While it is unclear which ones were provided by
Symonds, virtually all the cases follow a similar format.63
The scientific utility of Ellis's histories has been dismissed by critics who
point to omissions and alterations in the interests of confidentiality.64 Most
frequently adduced are the discrepancies between the history of 'Miss H,' identified
Oppression? Sexology and the Social Construction of Heterosexuality,' The Cultural Construction of
Sexuality, ed. Pat Caplan (London: Routledge, 1991). Lesley Hall rejects such uncompromising
assessments, for although informed by biological difference, Ellis was also critical of the extent to
which sexual difference had been overstated and distorted ('Hauling Down the Double Standard:
Feminism, Social Purity and Sexual Science in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain,' Gender and History
16.1 (2004): 49). Hall does concede that sexology effaced its 'matrilineal' heritage, refusing to
acknowledge its debt to feminist social purity movements which helped forge a social and political
environment more receptive to the serious discussion of sex (48).
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61 Ellis examined thirty-six cases in this first study, some ofwhich were 'somewhat fuller versions'
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as Ellis's wife Edith, and the account given in Ellis's autobiography.65 Ellis himself
admitted not only to have wielded the editor's shears, but also to have exercised
censorious discretion. In the preface of the 1936 Random House edition ofStudies,
Ellis defends his part in the Bedborough controversy, claiming that the alleged libels
consisted not in anything whatever that I had written, but merely in a few
details concerning early life from the Histories recorded, and in those
Histories, I may remark, I had really toned down certain crude details which
do not seem to me essential in a psychological study.66
Ellis was clearly sensitive to the tonal proprieties of science as well as the expressive
niceties dictating publishing practice. My intention is not to contest the
methodological flaws ofEllis's scientific practice, nor to dwell on these instances of
explicit censorious activity. Ellis validates his theoretical conclusions by asserting
their scientific legitimacy: 'I approach the matter as a psychologist who has
ascertained certain definite facts, and who is founding his conclusion on those
f\1 •
facts.' This section returns to the case-histories to argue that the 'facts' indelibly
bear the collator's mark, Ellis's avowal of objective empiricism notwithstanding.
Symonds's questions, based on Continental scholarship as interpreted by Symonds
himself, already suggest at least two mediatory agents in the quest to extract the
subject's life narrative. Purporting to be derived from the 'facts' of the invert's
experiences, Ellis's theorisations nonetheless reverse the process of influence by
setting out legitimate and intelligible forms of expressing these 'truths' about the
(sexual) self.
Ellis justifies his project as a necessary counterbalance to the ignorance and
prejudice perpetuated by Taw and public opinion [which] combine to place a heavy
penal burden and a severe social stigma on the manifestations of an instinct which to
z: o
those persons who possess it frequently appears natural and normal.' Ellis's
congenital explanation of same-sex passion challenges the religious-moral
injunctions against homosexuality as sin on the one hand and its pathologisation as
degenerate sexuality on the other. By showing inversion to be a physiological
anomaly, an inborn aberration rather than diseased state, Ellis hopes to revaluate the
65 See Arthur Calder-Marshall, Lewd, Blasphemous and Obscene (London: Hutchison, 1972) 201-2.
66 Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology ofSex, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1936) xvii.
67 Ellis, Sexual Inversion 129.
68
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invert's social and legal standing and to this purpose, he examines the occurrence of
inversion both in the natural world and in past human races. Equally crucial to the
legitimation process is the insistence that the invert not only is not defective in other
capacities, but is frequently an exceptional individual. There is therefore great
emphasis on the invert's integrity and intellectual and artistic accomplishments, with
historical examples of'men of exceptional intellect,' such as Michelangelo,
Winckelmann, Marlowe and Whitman.69 Concomitantly, the physical acts of same-
sex passion are downplayed and pejorative stereotypes of effeminacy repudiated.70
Ellis insists repeatedly that his subjects are obtained, not from the morbid exemplars
of a physician's patient list, nor from the criminal-forensic records of the penitentiary
or asylum, but from ordinary society.71
Such sublimation and recuperation were standard ploys of late-century
homosexual apologists. Edward Carpenter controversially promoted the non-
procreative nature of same-sex relationships as a social good, arguing that the energy
not expended in propagation of race could be directed at cultural regeneration,
79 •
channelled into aesthetic production rather than biological reproduction. Uranian
poets valorised a spiritual and asexual love, drawn from the legitimating discourses
of Oxford Hellenism. This new Hellenism, as Linda Dowling terms it, founded on
the ennobling qualities ofpaiderastia as opposed to the civic virtue central to the
older Hellenism of classical republicanism, provided 'a legitimating
counterdiscourse of social identity and erotic liberation,' with the martial origins of
69
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paiderastia expunging any taint of effeminacy.73 Symonds, his formative years
passed in this milieu of academic classicism, reserved his approbation only for that
which he called 'Greek Love,' and thus his 'plea for toleration was rigorously
selective.'74 A similar selectivity is also evident in Sexual Inversion.
Few would argue that Ellis's intentions were other than benign or his
treatment of the subject unsympathetic. Yet his congenital explanations inadvertently
consign the invert to deterministic structures that confine as much as exculpate. In
his attempt to counteract negative stereotypes and challenge restrictive sexual norms,
Ellis institutes an alternative model of normative homosexual behaviour. Invoking
the 'dignity, temperance, even chastity' ofpaiderastia or alternatively the
'wholesome and robust ideal' exemplified by Whitman's 'manly love,' Ellis
expounds a form of same-sex morality in familiar and conservative terms: 'it is the
ideal of chastity, rather than of normal sexuality, which the congenital invert should
hold before his eyes.'75 Inversion being a congenital aberration, the aim is not to seek
a cure, but to ensure the circumstances that would 'enable an invert to be healthy,
self-restrained, and self-respecting.'76 While Ellis appeals to classical culture and
poetic authority, the rhetoric of control and discipline is not so different from that of
say, mid-century 'muscular Christianity' or the social purity movement.77 While
challenging extant prejudices against homosexuality as vice or degenerative
condition, in the end, Ellis still adheres to hegemonic values within the framework of
• 70 .
what F. M. L. Thompson calls the 'rise of respectable society.' Claims such as
Phyllis Grosskurth's that Ellis's outlook was 'basically epater les bourgeois'' must
• 7Q
therefore be read with caution, for they impute too simplistic a radicalism to Ellis.
The confidence in his subjects' veracity expressed throughout is entirely in
keeping with Ellis's recuperative strategy, but the added urgency in avowals of their
73
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'unsparing sincerity' in a later edition bespeaks more pressing anxieties.80 Here too,
Ellis feels the need to assert his investigative superiority to that of rival discipline
psychoanalysis. In Three Essays on the Theory ofSexuality (1905), Freud had
directly challenged Ellis's congenital theory, claiming that the distinction between
congenital and acquired inversion could not be so easily established.81 Ellis's
counterattack sees him attempt to wrest back control by invoking the authority of
scientific objectivity:
Psycho-analysis reveals an immense mass of small details, any of which may
or may not possess significance, and in determining which are significant the
individuality of the psychoanalyst cannot fail to come into play. He will
&9
necessarily tend to arrange them according to a system.
Psychoanalysis is presented as the selective distillation of its subject's story to fit a
pre-determined narrative and thus a self-validating distortion on the practitioner's
part. By implication, Ellis's own practice purports to ensure the integrity of his
subject's history, a disingenuous claim, for the imprint ofEllis's editorial hand is
equally present.
The narrative variations of the cases, presented in the first person, the third,
or a combination of both, suggest deliberate selection and re-articulation by Ellis.
Case XII, for example, is in the third person, reverting to direct quotation only on the
Ol
subject's idiosyncratic predilection for 'intelligent teeth.' Writes Ellis, "'If
Alcibiades himself tried to woo me," he says, "and had bad teeth, his labour would
be in vain".' The phraseological quaintness presumably merits a direct transcription.
On the other hand, Ellis's comment on his subject's all-consuming passions—they
'obtrude themselves in season and out of season, seldom or never leaving him quiet,
and sometimes making his life a hell'—also has an idiomatic quality. The direct
speech above has shifted into free indirect discourse although the point of transfer
cannot easily be determined. More confusingly, when Ellis describes his subject—
'[h]is tastes are masculine in every respect ... The sexual instincts are abnormally
80 Havelock Ellis, Studies in the Psychology ofSex, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1936) 91.
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developed'—it is unclear to whom these assessorial standards can be attributed.84 By
contrast, Case XVII is predominantly in the first person, allowing the subject's
professions of sentiment a sense of immediacy.83 There is later a direct interjection
and forthright judgement by Ellis on the subject's views on morality, informing his
reader that '[tjhere are some obvious fallacies in this attitude but the subject
markedly lacks reasoning power,' thereby calling into question the subject's own
judgement, if not the entire testimony. A similar intrusion occurs in Case XV,
presented as first person narrative, with a single interruption denoted by square
brackets: '[It will be observed that the word "natural" is here used in a peculiar
O/C
sense.]' The assertiveness of expert opinion with the neutrality of the passive voice
give an indication ofwhat Ellis meant by the 'scientific tone and temper' of his
work.87 Narrative attribution is more ambiguous in Case XIV, narrated in the third
person. Ellis writes, 'He remarks that his father and mother were passionless, and
that this was possibly a cause of neuropathic disorder. (It may have been a symptom
OO
t
of it).' Here, it is not clear whether the parenthetical statement is a narratorial
interjection or speculation by the subject.
Moreover, the telling of one's life, whether verbatim or paraphrased, is a
form of confessional discourse, a technology of self, according to Foucault, that
OQ
always unfolds within a dynamic of power. Foucault explicitly names Ellis,
amongst others, as instrumental in resuscitating and secularising the religious
confessional as a 'confessional science.'90 In this schema, confession, as the
exhortation to speech, is the opposite of censorship, in the limited sense of silencing.
But if censorship refers not just to the suppression of dissent, but the stipulation of
articulable dissent, not just to the refutation of certain subjectivities, but the
specification of their conditions of emergence, then censorship functions at the level
of production as well as regulation of discourse. Dennis A. Foster, glossing Paul
Ricoeur, states that the act of confession is in effect a discursive re-enactment that
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85
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converts a transgressive act into sin.91 Here, it is a discursive ordering that converts
(and constructs) characteristics and events into signifiers en masse, and these
signifiers into a coherent narrative of inversion. The confessional is the technique by
which the sexual 'truth' about the self is produced while creating the illusion of
interiority; a further consideration then is the form in which this 'truth' is articulated.
As demonstrated, Ellis wields narratorial authority at the level of compilation and
contextualisation. On another level, Sexual Inversion also endorses a particular form
of personal narrative.
Vernon A. Rosario contends that 'the fin-de-siecle "homosexual" was a
fictional character (albeit culturally and politically real) spun from the pre-existing
figures of the sodomite, the hysterical male, and the degenerate.'92 If the invert was
indeed a 'fictional character,' then the question arises as to what narrative vehicle
was used to develop this figure. I want to suggest that the narratives presented by
Ellis are Bildungsromane in miniature: these histories chart the evolution of the
homosexual individual in a manner that recapitulates the formal and thematic
features of the novel of self-development popular in nineteenth-century England.
According to Marianne Hirsch, the Bildungsroman or 'novel of formation,' is 'the
story of a representative individual's growth and development within the context of a
defined social order.'93 The case-histories consist of genealogical details,
descriptions of formative school years, accounts of sexual encounters, before arrival
at the telos of self-hood accompanied by moral introspection: this sequential
progression equally applies to the Bildungsroman.94
91 Dennis A. Foster, Confession and Complicity in Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987) 16.
92 Vernon A. Rosario, 'Homosexual Bio-Histories: Genetic Nostalgias and the Quest for Paternity,'
Science andHomosexualities, introduction, ed. Rosario (New York: Routledge, 1997) 16. Rosario
plays on the word 'fictional' in terms of both the imaginary construct of the homosexual and the
literary sources which 'informed the very fictions science was dedicated to spinning' ('Inversion's
Histories | History's Inversions: Novelizing Fin-de-Siecle Homosexuality,' Science and
Homosexualities, ed. Rosario (New York: Routledge, 1997) 101). My interest lies in the narrativising
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collection of cases in number or length—there were over two hundred by the 1903 twelfth edition,
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The case-histories are likewise narratives of individuation and integration, but
significantly, with an added role inscribed for Ellis. Carpenter may envisage a
negotiatory function for the intermediate sex in his Utopian sexual politics, but here,
it is the sexological professional who is assigned mediating agent, whose role is to
effect rapprochement between individual and society.95 This movement towards
collective validation occurs on two fronts. First, the specification of physiological,
dispositional, and avocational indices of inversion does not just delimit the
parameters of self-definition. In its typological function, these specifications also
gesture towards a communal identity. Ellis collates the biographical material under
various headings, such as 'heredity,' 'physical sexual abnormalities,' and 'moral
attitudes,' summarising and synthesising individual cases into a larger collectivity by
drawing comparisons between them and conclusions from the data amassed.96
Second, the congenital theory seeks to dispel prejudices against inversion as vice or
as disease, thus easing the reintegration of the anomalous individual into society.
These narratives for the large part depict individuals who assert the naturalness and
morality of their inclinations. These might be narratives of acculturation, but in the
process they also seek to educate society at large as well. Following the Bedborough
trial, Ellis received unsolicited letters from readers testifying to epiphanic moments
of identification, many offering in turn their own life narrative to Ellis. These letters
can be seen as an epistolary equivalent of the hailed subject's response to the 'Fley,
you there' of Althusserian interpellation, and their use as histories in subsequent
editions confirms the significance and success of Sexual Inversion as a site fostering
Q7
subcultural solidarity.
There are ideological implications to this particular narrativisation. It has
been said that the Bildungsroman is 'the equivalent of the Renaissance conduct book,
for Nonspecialists: An Attempt at a Clarification,' Reflection andAction: Essays on the
Bildungsroman, ed. James Hardin (Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1991).
95 John Simons, 'Edward Carpenter, Whitman and the Radical Aesthetic,' Gender Roles andSexuality
in Victorian Literature, ed. Christopher Parker (Aldershot, Hants: Scholar, 1995).
96
Thus, for example, on the issue of the hereditary nature of inversion, he writes: T possess some
record of heredity in thirty-two ofmy cases. Of these not less than ten assert that they have reason to
believe that other cases of inversion have occurred in their families' (Sexual Inversion 105).
97 See the testimonies in Jeffrey Weeks and Kevin Porter's collection for how sexological works
provided the vocabulary and form for articulating a common homosexual experience (Between the
Acts: Lives ofHomosexual Men 1885-1967, 2nd ed. (London: Rivers Oram, 1998)).
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insofar as one of its recurrent themes is the making of a gentleman.'98 Given Ellis's
commitment to the social legitimacy of respectability, these narratives of
homosexual becoming might equally be seen as a conduct book for the making of a
homosexual gentleman. Moreover, according to Jeffrey L. Sammons, the
Bildungsroman embodies 'intensely bourgeois' values.99 'The idea of cultivation
(.Bildung) through a harmony of aesthetic, moral, rational, and scientific education,'
argues Fritz Martini, in his study of the genre's eighteenth-century German
provenance, 'had long been common property ofEnlightenment thought.'100 At heart
is a belief in the perfectibility of self, one shared with Nordau, arch-censor in
Chapter Three.101 Ellis's investment in the values of bourgeois culture thus extends
beyond his explicit delineation of the conditions of homosexual respectability. The
very form of the case histories he purports to present intact and objectively is itself
inscribed in a particular ideological tradition.
My aim has not been to detract from the radical elements of Ellis's career,
nor to belittle his humanitarian intentions by reclaiming Ellis into a repressive
Victorian regime. As Hall argues, the 'crucial revolution' was not in the content of
his work—Ellis did, at times, glibly reiterate contemporary truisms—but in the fact
that hitherto 'occluded topic[s]' were presented as legitimate subjects of scientific
investigation.102 Despite protestations to the contrary, Ellis eschewed excessive
scientific obfuscation and his prose is strikingly lucid in comparison to the 'awkward
circumlocutions, the passages of dry Latin prose, the strange, defunct, neologisms'
prevalent in the field.103 While Ellis and his work were subject to public censure and




100 Fritz Martini, 'Bildungsroman—Term and Theory,' trans. Claire Baldwin and James Hardin,
Reflection andAction: Essays on the Bildungsroman, ed. Hardin (Columbia: U of South Carolina P,
1991)5.
101 Recall Aschheim's characterization of Nordau's positivist outlook as an expression of the 'classical
humanizing axioms ofWestern morality, rationalist Enlightenment and liberal notion of progress'
(652).
102
Lesley Hall, 'Heroes or Villains? Reconsidering British fin de siecle Sexology,' New Sexual
Agendas, ed. Lynne Segal (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997) 15.
103 Rita Relski, introduction, Sexology in Culture: Labelling Bodies andDesires, ed. Lucy Bland and
Laura Doan (Cambridge: Polity, 1998) 1. Compare Ellis's relative frankness with Richard von Krafft-
Ebing's strategy, stated in the preface of the first edition of Psychopathia Sexualis, of deploying a
'scientific title,' 'technical terms' and Latin esotericisms 'in order to exclude the lay reader'
{Psychopathia Sexualis. With Especial Reference to the Antipathic Sexual Instinct. A Medico-Forensic
Study, 12th ed., trans. F. J. Rebmar (London: Heineman, [1903]) vii).
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exercised a censorial power that was more constitutive in nature. There were
certainly explicit instances of censorship where Ellis took on the bowdleriser's task
in manipulating his subjects' narratives and Symonds's contributions. But at a less
tangible level, Sexual Inversion, through enshrining a particular narrative of self-
discovery, set the parameters by which the experiences of the late-century invert
could be coherently articulated and received. It is in this sense that such discursive
constraints are productive, for they delimit the boundaries of the speakable and thus
produce the conditions and possibilities for a particular subjectivity, at once a project
objectification and subjectification. For while the censorious forces ofRespectability
and Order are named his nemeses, at the centre ofEllis's legitimating mission sat the
bourgeois behemoth of Respectability, and the creating of a science of sex, with its
cataloguing of anomalies, its classification of pleasures, and its specification of
types, is surely nothing less than a great ordering project.104
Thus, one way of conceptualising Ellis's complicity in a more constitutive
censorship is by looking at how sexology provided the form and justifications that
made the invert a recognisable and coherent figure. Similarly, trials mapped out a
space for the debating and elucidating of the boundaries of the permissible. In both
instances, censorship entailed more than a narrowly repressive function to take on
the more productive role of making public a discourse on censorship and making
visible a particular subjectivity. Part Three looks more closely at the idea of
censorship and the visible, with specific focus on the visual arts. The participants in
Whistler v. Ruskin defended their expressive rights in court, against the censorious
forces of libel law (for Ruskin) and critical attack (for Whistler), but at the same time
debated the definitions of art and authoritative theories of seeing. In controversies
over the nude, its supporters countered attacks by social purity activists by isolating
and elevating a purified visual aesthetic from a sensual, bodily consumption. If on
one level, censorship determines what can be exhibited in public, this stratification of
vision controls what is visible and how it is interpreted at a more constitutive level:
at the level of the viewer herself.
104
Ellis, My Life 311.
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Part III
Censorship and the Visual Field
154
Chapter 5
Whistler v. Ruskin: The Judgement of Law and the
Judgment of Taste
Subsequent to public outrage over the prospect of a nude sculpture exhibition at the
Crystal Palace in 1854, plaster fig leaves were appended to the offending parts,
leading a journalist from the Times to comment that 'it still remains somewhat
doubtful whether the requisite quantity of plaster foliage can be obtained before the
opening.'1 This incident conforms to popular conceptions of Victorian censorship,
what Foucault's repressive hypotheses postulates as a denial of the body to the
detriment of artistic expression. On another occasion, Swedish photographer Oscar
G. Rej lander was obliged to use the metaphorical fig leaf of strategic drapery when
showing his controversial The Two Ways ofLife (1856), featuring both nude and
clothed figures, in Scotland in 1858.2 But in a somewhat telling indictment of
libertarian fallacy, Queen Victoria, the doyenne of nineteenth-century propriety in
popular mythology, had herself purchased a copy of this photograph as a present for
Albert.3 This is surely an indication that facile accusations of prudery do not fully
account for the complexities of regulating the visual field. The proliferation of new
opportunities for looking throughout the nineteenth century irrevocably altered the
visual field, rendering it impractical and indeed, impossible, to deploy the 'requisite
1 Cited in Martin Myrone, 'Prudery, Pornography and the Victorian Nude (Or, What Do We Think the
Butler Saw?),' Smith, Exposed31.
2 William Vaughan, 'The Naked and the Nude,' The Artist's Model: From Etty to Spencer ed. Martin
Postle and Vaughan (London: Merrell Holberton, 1999) 113.
3 In fact, the royal couple had quite a sizable collection of nudes, for she customarily presented her
husband with such works as birthday gifts, which according to Alison Smith, were 'regarded as a pure
gesture that also fostered high art' ('Nude in Nineteenth-Century Britain,' Smith, Exposed 12).
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quantity of plaster foliage': the censorship of the visual realm involved more than
controlling that which is open to view. Instead, there was a growing concern over
what might constitute legitimate ways of looking and the methods by which these
practices could be inculcated and naturalised.
Social, economic, and technological changes in the nineteenth century
inaugurated new opportunities for, and new ways of, looking which in turn mandated
new forms of control. These measures had a dual focus: first, the regulation of the
visual environment, which might be considered a form of post-production
censorship; and second, the regulation of the viewer, which corresponds loosely to a
kind of pre-articulatory regulation in the realm of speech.
Jonathan Crary's seminal work on nineteenth-century visuality is a useful
starting point for understanding the exigencies of regulation. Crary challenges
traditional narratives ofmodernity that posit an epistemological rupture with the past
with the emergence of experimental modernist art in the late nineteenth century.
Instead, he argues that there was a more significant shift earlier in the century away
from the Enlightenment model of a rational, disembodied viewing subject to one that
acknowledged the physiological and the psychological, and thus the subjective,
nature of vision.4 The paradigmatic example of Enlightenment vision is the camera
obscura, which defines the viewing experience as a rational and disengaged one.
Mediated through the camera obscura's machinery, vision is decorporealised and
neutral, and the sovereign viewing subject is set in isolation from, but in mastery
over, his surrounds. With the shift to a subjective vision, the viewing subject is no
longer the objective guarantor of knowledge and, in recognition of the fallibility of
bodily optical functions, is itself subject to the investigations of science. Vision,
Crary argues, 'rather than a privileged form of knowing, becomes itself an object of
knowledge, of observation.'5 Optical devices such as the microscope, x-rays, and
photography were harnessed for medical and scientific use, both exposing and
supplementing the deficiencies of subjective vision even while providing powerful
tools for regulation and surveillance by allowing more sophisticated means of
measuring and recording the physiology and functioning of the human eye. These
4
Crary, Techniques ofthe Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge,




technologies produced ways of organising visual data into a new legibility, which,
while placing the object of study under a disciplinary scrutiny, also provided new
ways of looking for the observer. Just as the science of sexology and the discourse of
degeneration constituted particular sexual and normative subjects, these new optical
knowledges produced models of the perceiving subject, and in so doing, reconfigured
nineteenth-century understanding of the way in which the visual environment was
received. The complexity of visual censorship becomes apparent here: the human
and the mechanical eye are simultaneously agents of censorship and potentially
dangerous entities to be controlled, and once again, the line between censor and
censored becomes blurred.
In addition to this reconfiguration of the viewing subject, there were also
substantial changes to the visual environment. With the rise of commodity culture,
the urban landscape was irrevocably altered. The impact of advertising in the form of
billboards and posters reinforced the idea of the urban space as a visual space and the
consumer as a visual consumer. Department stores and shop windows displayed their
goods according to a logic of desire and visual enticement.6 At issue was the
unavoidable visibility of commerce and measures such as the 1889 Indecent
Advertisement Act can be seen as attempts to control the visual environment. Lynda
Nead goes further to suggest that the 1857 Obscene Publications Act was not so
much a response to the explicit nature of pornographic material but to their
increasing visibility and accessibility in the flagrant displays in Holywell Street.
Obscenity legislation, she argues, 'focuses on the problem of "seeing" ... [and] seeks
to enforce a regime of visibility and to control the casual and indiscriminate
possibilities ofmetropolitan sight.'7 Given the visual saturation of displays and
advertising, movement through the urban environment itself becomes a form of
6 For a discussion of Victorian commodity culture and the visual economy, see Rachel Bowlby, Just
Looking: Consumer Culture in Dreiser, Gissing and Zola (New York: Methuen, 1985), Andrew H.
Miller, Novels Behind Glass: Commodity Culture and Victorian Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 1995), and Thomas Richards, The Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and
Spectacle, 1851-1914 (London: Verso, 1991). For a discussion of the female visual consumer in an
urban environment, see Deborah Epstein Nord, Walking the Victorian Streets: Women,
Representation, and the City (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995).
7
Lynda Nead, 'Mapping the Self: Gender, Space and Modernity in Mid-Victorian London,' Rewriting
the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present, ed. Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997)
179.
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unsolicited consumption, and attempts to control these modes of consumption must
therefore also be measures of spatial control.
In the visual arts, the nineteenth century saw a shift from private ownership to
public display, with the opening of the National Gallery in 1824 in Pall Mall, moving
to the new location in Trafalgar Square in 1838, the Victoria and Albert (originally as
the South Kensington Museum) in 1852, and the National Portrait Gallery in 1856.8
Arising from a belief in the civilising potential of culture exemplified in Matthew
Arnold's Culture andAnarchy (1869), these institutions sought to instill appropriate
and productive modes of visual consumption. The space of the gallery became the
nexus of both the visual (as the exhibition of visual arts) and the bodily (as a physical
space negotiated by its patrons) and regulation of this space entailed attention to both
the relationship between the educative and the aesthetic functions of these
institutions, as well as the issue ofpublic order. The commercial exploitation of new
visual technologies, such as the kaleidoscope and the panorama in the early decades
of the century, and cinema in later years, led to similar regulatory anxieties over both
the contents of these displays and the convergence of a mass audience.9
One way of conceptualising censorship then is to see it as the regulation of
visibility. The publishing industry's power to determine what enters the literary
sphere discussed in Part One and the trials and discourses discussed in Part Two can
be seen in this context. Publishing in the most basic sense refers to the making
public, and thus making visible, in print, of certain ideas. Obscenity trials,
understood as staged proceedings, delimit a visible space for a regulated debate, even
while proscribing—that is, seeking to expunge from visibility—certain utterances or
texts. Scientific discourses produce recognisable subjectivities; for instance, the
figure of the invert becomes visible in the latter half of the century at the
concatenation ofmedical, psychological, and sociological knowledges.
Part Three deals specifically with the visual realm. Chapter Five looks at the
1877 Whistler v. Ruskin libel case in which Ruskin's criticism ofWhistler's paintings
8 Jonathan Conlin, The Nation's Mantelpiece: A History ofthe National Gallery (London: Pallas
Athene, 2006); Giles Waterfield, ed. Palaces ofArt: Art Galleries in Britain 1790-1990 (London:
Dulwich Picture Gallery, 1991); Paul Barlow and Colin Todd, ed. Governing Cultures: Art
Institutions in Victorian London (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2000).
9 For discussion of visual entertainments, see Richard D. Altick, The Shows ofLondon (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1978).
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were alleged to have overstepped the bounds of permissible criticism. In the first
section, I discuss the trial in the context of censorship. The second section is divided
into two parts: I first consider the charge of libel as a violation of privacy and the
implications of the distinction made between public and private in the context of the
late-century commercial art world. I then look at Ruskin's political economy of art,
to argue that the courtroom contest was also about the value and morality of
spending. Section Three examines the case as a contest between two aesthetic
philosophies, pitting artist against critic. Whistler propounded his art for art's sake
rationale against Ruskin's moral theory of art, both of which were articulated in
terms of a superior way of seeing. Thus, in this instance, libel law, which purports to
regulate the boundary between the public and the private, was also implicated in
more constitutive issues about art, its practice, its value, and its authoritative
positions. If both parties accused each other of an attempted censorship—that
Ruskin's review sought to suppress the painter's output and that Whistler had
exploited libel law to silence the critic—both were also involved in a legitimation
contest, vying with each other for superiority in the visual arts.
The Case: Whistler v. Ruskin
In the autumn of 1877, at the invitation ofproprietor Sir Coutts Lindsay, Whistler
exhibited eight paintings at the newly opened Grosvenor Gallery, amongst works by
Edward Burne-Jones, G. F. Watts, John Everett Millais, Edward J. Poynter, and
Lawrence Alma-Tadema.10 Ruskin, at this time already ensconced in his public
position of 'prophet and lawgiver,'11 reviewed the exhibition for his periodical, Fors
Clavigera, commenting unfavourably on the Gallery and modern art in general, but
reserving the most vitriolic criticism for Whistler's work, specifically, his Nocturne
12
in Black and Gold:
10 The works were: four 'nocturnes' -.Nocturne in Black andGold, two paintings both bearing the title
ofNocturne in Blue and Silver, and Nocturne in Blue andGold, and four portraits.
11 Donald M. Murray, 'James and Whistler at the Grosvenor Gallery,' American Quarterly 4.1 (1952):
51.
12 Ruskin takes issue with, amongst other features, the 'poor' upholstery and the grouping of the
exhibited works. He praises Burne-Jones, whose work 'is simply the only art-work at present
produced in England which will be received by the future as "classic" in its kind.' The efforts of his
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For Mr. Whistler's own sake, no less than for the protection of the purchaser,
Sir Coutts Lindsay ought not to have admitted works into the gallery in which
the ill-educated conceit of the artist so nearly approached the aspect ofwilful
imposture. I have seen, and heard, much ofCockney impudence before now;
but never expected to hear a coxcomb ask two hundred guineas for flinging a
pot of paint in the public's face.13
Whistler took offence, bringing a suit of libel against Ruskin that was heard in court
on 25 and 26 November 1878.14 The jury gave the verdict to Whistler, but awarded
him only nominal damages of a farthing.
Whistler v. Ruskin can be considered in light of controlling the visual field on
two counts: as a contest over the legitimacy of art criticism, the case was first and
foremost about controlling the nature of artistic discourse, about whose opinion
counts, and the terms in which such opinion is articulated. Second, this contest was
framed by the ways in which the participants theorised their positions by way of
visual perception, both in court and beyond. Central to each argument was the
premise that each possessed a more legitimate and more authoritative way of seeing,
setting the professional gaze of the practitioner against the erudite gaze of the critic.
The case, as Henry James suggests, was 'the talk of the moment,' and the outcome
had repercussions in the field of art and art criticism.15
Interest in the case stems from its controversial nature, a controversy
heightened not least because of the ambiguous judgement. Whistler considered the
case a triumph, writing to his solicitor that '[mjorally, and in the judgement of all the
world—all the world with whom high tone has weight—it is a complete victory.'16
Whistler is said to have worn the farthing with pride on his watch chain, although
some have contended that this was a defiant response to a pyrrhic victory: his
peers in comparison are merely 'forced' eccentricities, 'their imperfections gratuitously, if not
impertinently, indulged' (Works 19: 158-60).
13 Ruskin, Works 29: 160.
14 Whistler was represented by Serjeant-at-law, John Humffreys Parry, while Ruskin retained attorney
general Sir John Holker and his junior, Charles Synge Christopher Bowen. Ruskin was not present at
the trial, pleading ill health. The presiding judge was Sir John Walter Huddleston.
15
Henry James, The Painter's Eye: Notes and Essays on the Pictorial Arts (London: Rupert Hart-
Davis, 1956) 172. Nicholas Shrimpton calls it a 'landmark in the history of English Aestheticism,'
while Linda Merrill contends that the case was 'the most celebrated lawsuit in the history of art'
('Ruskin and the Aesthetes,' Ruskin and the Dawn ofthe Modern ed. Dinah Birch (Oxford: Oxford
UP, 1999) 132; A Pot ofPaint: Aesthetics on Trial in Whistler v. Ruskin (Washington: Smithsonian
Institution P, 1992) 1).
16 Cited in Merrill 205.
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financial circumstances suggested that he was in need of the two hundred guineas in
damages demanded in the original suit.17 At the same time, Whistler deftly
manipulated the events to his own advantage, transforming even the most acerbic
criticism into grist for his mythmaking mill.18 By contrast, others see the case as a
triumph for Ruskin and art criticism and a deterrent to potential litigants, insofar as
the outcome demonstrated the futility—in financial terms, at least—of such legal
action.19 Yet Whistler was not deterred from similar action in later years: The
Burlington Magazine claims suggestively that the witness box was Whistler's
'preferred pulpit.'20 George Du Maurier's Trilby, a satire of Aestheticism first
published serially in Harper's, featured the character of Joe Sibley, said to have been
modelled on the figure ofWhistler. This character was removed from the 1894
publication in book form after threat of legal action from Whistler.21 While it may
have been Whistler's 'reputation for all-round litigiousness,' as one critic puts it,22
that forced this excision, the very public nature of Whistler's outrage and the
subsequent apology from Harper's also consolidated Whistler's anti-establishment
image. Others have argued that in the long run, it was Whistler and his aesthetic
philosophy which triumphed over the Victorian values represented by Ruskin.23
17 Merrill 203-4.
18 Sarah Burns argues that the trial was 'the catalyst and turning point' in Whistler's career, allowing
him firstly to cement his reputation as an artist of note, and secondly, to open a dialogue with his
public through his astute manipulation of the press ('Old Maverick to Old Master: Whistler in the
Public Eye in Turn-of-the-Century America,' American Art Journal 22.1 (1990): 30).
19 Ruskin's biographer, John Batchelor sees the case as 'a victory for Ruskin to the extent that it had
protected freedom of speech for the critic' (John Ruskin: No Wealth but Life (London: Chatto and
Windus, 2000) 281). Kate Flint claims that '[although Whistler had emerged the legal victor from the
trial, Ruskin had won a moral victory.' Ruskin's reputation and aesthetic precepts were 'left undented
so far as the broad mass of the public was concerned' (The Victorians and the Visual Imagination
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 169).
20 'Whistler in Retrospective,' editorial, Burlington Magazine 136.1099 (1994): 663.
21 For an account of the Trilby incident, see Leonee Ormond's biography of the Du Maurier (George
Du Maurier (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
22 Burns 34.
23 Shearer West claims that Ruskinian precepts were found 'lacking' in the trial ('Tom Taylor,
William Powell Frith, and the British School ofArt,' Victorian Studies 33.2 (1990): 307). Peter
Stansky argues that '[t]wo of the Victorian conceptions of life and art were seriously weakened by the
trial: work and "finish"' (Rev. ofA Pot ofPaint: Aesthetics on Trial in Whistler v. Ruskin, by Linda
Merrill, Journal ofInterdisciplinary History 24.3 (1994): 537). Stuart Culver suggests that Whistler
successfully used libel law 'to limit the authority of the nation's leading art critic' ('Whistler v.
Ruskin: The Courts, the Public, and Modem Art,' Burt, Administration 151). Andrew Leng argues
that Ruskin's scurrilous attack on Whistler, 'an unequivocally ruthless attempt to terminate the artist's
career,' and the subsequent trial, signaled Ruskin's degeneration from Victorian sage to hack writer
('Letters to Workmen? Fors Clavigera, Whistler vs. Ruskin and Sage Criticism in Crisis,' Prose
Studies 24.1 (2001): 65).
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Ruskin himself saw the judgement as an affront, resigning from his post as Slade
professor in protest against the muzzling of his critical voice.24
My interest in Whistler v. Ruskin, regardless of who might be considered the
ultimate victor, lies in how it represents a contest between two key figures in the
visual arts and their respective aesthetic philosophies. This was a struggle over the
definition of art and aesthetic jurisdiction carried out, despite Ruskin's conspicuous
absence, over the two days of the trial. Indeed, the contest extended beyond the
period of the trial, firstly through Whistler's post-trial machinations, provocations
widely broadcast by the popular press to an avid readership, and secondly, because
the issues raised about the nature of art and ways of seeing tapped into extant debates
in late-century cultural life. In this sense, while recent readings view the case as a
presaging of twentieth-century art, seeing in Whistler's aestheticism an incipient
modernism, the case can equally be placed firmly within a nineteenth-century
context.25 As Elizabeth Prettejohn states, Whistler v. Ruskin emerged from and
referred back to debates on the place of professional criticism since the 1860s.261
will argue below that the trial saw the confluence of several issues of importance in
the visual arts: the outrage over the pricing of Whistler's nocturnes centred on the
question of value and the nature of the art market; Whistler's distinctive artistic
practice challenged prevalent ideas about the creative process and the constitutive
elements of art; and the contest over priority of opinion raised questions about
authority and sources of legitimation. Whistler accused Ruskin of a capricious abuse
of the critic's power to obstruct the sale of his works and to ridicule his status as
artist whilst Ruskin counter-argued that Whistler had harnessed the court of law as a
private censorial agent to silence legitimate criticism.
Henry James, in his capacity as art critic for the Nation, encapsulated the
public's ambivalence towards the situation. Ruskin's review 'quite transgresses the
decencies of criticism' yet Whistler's work was undeniably 'so very eccentric and
24 In a letter written to H. G. Liddell, Dean ofChrist Church, Oxford, Ruskin claimed that' [i]t is not
owing to ill-heath that I resign, but because the Professorship is a farce, if it has no right to condemn
as well as to praise' (Ruskin to H. G. Liddell, 28 November 1878, Works 29: xxv).
25 Merrill sees the case as 'a critical hour in the evolution of modern art' (6). Stuart Culver more
specifically locates in Whistler v. Ruskin the nascence of what he calls the 'modernist approach to
legitimating art,' that is, an approach which based the claims of artistic autonomy on formal
qualifications ('Whistler v. Ruskin' 151).
26 Elizabeth Prettejohn, 'Aesthetic Value and the Professionalization of Victorian Art Criticism 1837-
78,' Journal of Victorian Culture 2.1 (1997): 90.
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imperfect.'27 In any event, James was adamant that the courtroom was an
inappropriate setting for aesthetic discussion. The trial 'was a singular and most
regrettable exhibition,' with a 'crudity and levity [that] were decidedly painful.'28
Few things, he concluded, 'have lately done more to vulgarize the public sense of the
character of artistic production.' Questions of aesthetics are trivialised within the
confines of the courtroom, resulting in a shameful spectacle to the detriment of art.
During the trial itself, when the question of submitting Whistler's paintings as
evidence arose, Whistler's counsel Serjeant Parry disputed the suitability of the
courtroom as an exhibition space, voicing concern over physical conditions such as
appropriate lighting. James's and Parry's protests implicitly question the
compatibility of art and the law, and whether the courtroom is a suitable space—both
discursive and physical—for aesthetic displays. As I argued in Part Two, the issues
of compatibility and the limits of the law lie at the centre of nineteenth-century
censorship. Yet as Merrill astutely points out, the trial provided both parties with 'a
priceless opportunity' to expound their theories in public—Ruskin through the proxy
• • on
of his legal representatives—'uncensored by uncomprehending critics.' Thus,
although the defence's objection to what it perceived as an abuse of libel law
intimated a sense of the violence of law—the idea that law persecutes, represses, and
incarcerates—the law in this instance functioned in a more regulatory manner,
clearing a space for a public elucidation and dissemination of aesthetic ideas.
Nonetheless, the principles of freedom of expression and, conversely, the
dangers of censorship, were undercurrents to the case. The defence claimed that a
litigious climate leads to the silencing of the critic, who, once 'feared and respected,'
is now unable to 'express his opinion lest he have brought against him an action for
damages.'30 While the plaintiff, citing Ruskin's intemperate language and tone,
27
James, Painter's Eye 174. James's attitudes towards Whistler's art underwent significant changes.
In an 1877 review, the self-referential nature of the works merits a somewhat dismissive 'they do not
amuse me.' The following year, he concedes that they 'are pleasant things to have about' if considered
merely as items of decoration or ornament. Yet by 1897, James gives only effusive praise: Whistler's
works are 'one of the finest of all distillations of the artistic intelligence' {Painter's Eye 143, 165,
258)
28
James, Painter's Eye 173.
29 Merrill 217.
30 Merrill 167. As the official transcript of the case was not preserved, I will be referring to Linda
Merrill's reconstructed transcript, compiled through press accounts and court notes. References to the
court transcript will be given in-text.
163
alleged that his words transgressed the bounds of legitimate criticism, Ruskin's
counsel Bowen claimed that Ruskin's commentary was both 'fair and honest' (182).
The terms of 'fair and honest' criticism as set out by Bowen seemed clear enough.
Criticism is legitimate as long as it is not motivated by 'personal malice':
[The critic] may say what he likes and what he chooses, provided he does so
honestly, without traveling out of the subject matter before him, and provided
what he says is a fair and honest expression of opinion. (182)
As a 'public critic,' it is no less Ruskin's professional duty than it is his moral
obligation to the public, and to art itself, to express his views without acceding to
stylistic niceties, and the use of ridicule is sanctioned in fulfilling this task (182).
Thus, while Ruskin's review may be 'a severe and slashing criticism,' even 'ridicule
and contempt,' it is nonetheless 'his honest opinion' to which he is entitled (164).31
Whistler's suit was presented as an act of censorship, an attempt to 'control Mr.
Ruskin's pen through the medium of a jury' and thus to 'paralyze his hand' (171): a
spurious charge such as Whistler's, the defence argued, strikes at the very core of the
critic's duty. In Chapter One, I discussed the discursive purchase and polemical
utility of allegations of censorship and these processes are seen in operation here.
Against the defence's counter-accusations, Whistler presented his entire project as
one of liberation, his stylistic innovations a rupturing of archaic and stultified artistic
traditions of which Ruskin's assault was seen to exemplify.32 In this instance,
utilising a similar vocabulary of liberal principles as the defence, Ruskin, referred to
by Parry in court as 'the man who sits there as a despot,' is presented as a capricious
tyrant, silencing the artist by flagrantly depriving the artist of his livelihood (187).
31 The issue of what constitutes an actionable libel must be considered in two parts, as was further
explained by Lord Huddleston: 'As it stands by itself, the criticism is calculated to hold Mr. Whistler
up to ridicule and contempt, and so far it would be libelous. The question is whether it comes within
the license of privileged communication, and that is a matter for the jury. A critic ought to be wise
enough to form a right judgment and bold enough to express it' (161). It is then up to the defence to
prove that the defamatory material was fair and bona fide criticism rather than a malicious personal
attack.
j2 The image of Whistler as liberator has since been perpetuated by his supporters. In a hagiographic
treatment, for instance, Alfred Werner in the Introduction to Whistler's Gentle Art states that Whistler
'helped liberate English art not only from the literary predilections and sham medievalism of the Pre-
Raphaelites but also from the equally loathsome prosaic realism of the anecdotal pictures'
(Introduction, The Gentle Art ofMaking Enemies, by James Abbott McNeill Whistler (1892; New
York: Dover, 1967) xxii).
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Libel and the Regulation of Public Discourse
The charge of libel is predicated on the strict separation of public and private,
between the public status of the artwork and the private—and it was assumed, the
inviolable—region of the artist's life, as Huddleston explained to the jury. Yet
despite allegations by the plaintiff that Ruskin's words exceeded the limits of fair
criticism and protestations otherwise by the defence, both parties in fact traversed
these boundaries where expedient. The defence argued that the artist was a public
figure, and his entry into the public domain entailed a waiving of certain rights. 'If
Mr. Whistler disliked ridicule,' Holker reasoned, 'he should not have subjected
himself to it by publicly exhibiting such productions' (169). The approbation of
celebrity brings with it a set of obligations and while the artist is feted by his public,
he is also accountable to it.
Arguing that Ruskin's attack was motivated by malice and was thus an
actionable trespass, Parry turned Ruskin's moralism back onto Ruskin: where Ruskin
accused Whistler of 'Cockney impudence,' Parry countered by calling Ruskin's
words 'ungentlemanly' (140); where Ruskin berated Whistler's 'wilful imposture,'
Parry charged Ruskin with 'a pretended criticism of art, which is really a criticism
upon the man himself (185-6). In his summation, Parry exhorted the jurors 'to
consider the character of the great writer.' 'Mr. Ruskin is great as a writer,' he
conceded, 'but not as a man. As a man, he has degraded himself (185). The libellous
situation is here replicated in Parry's words: if Ruskin's review—the critic's work-
was at fault, in calling on the juror to consider the 'character' of the critic, in
impugning Ruskin's gentility, the plaintiff has infringed in like manner on the
personality of the accused. The distinction between the public writer and the private
man, between the critic's words and the critic's person, is blurred once again.
At a more fundamental level, Ruskin's art theory itself militated against the
separation of public and private: 'The art of any country is the exponent of its social
and political virtues,' Ruskin states in his inaugural lecture at Oxford, and the highest
and noblest arts 'relate to us the utmost ascertainable truth respecting visible things
and moral feelings.'33 For Ruskin, there is a contiguous relationship between art and
the artist, between the artist and society: moral art comes from a moral artist, who in
j3 John Ruskin, Lectures on Art (Oxford, 1870) 26, 36.
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turn represents a moral society. Ruskin thus sets in motion a synecdochical sequence
that traverses the boundaries of the private and the public. To speak of the artwork is
of necessity a comment on the artist and a comment on his society; conversely, an
attack on the work is also one on its producer. Thus, the sketchiness and absence of
detail in the Nocturnes were evidence of indolence and a want of care, lack of finish
was intimated as a lack of fortitude, while the ignoble subject of Cremorne Gardens
suggested an insalubrious character.
In his Lectures on Art, Ruskin extols the modesty of the greatest artists, those
who are 'unconscious of their superiority to others.'34 There was a conscious
performativity to Whistler's public persona which not only violated the norms of
appropriate behaviour according to Ruskin, but also deliberately confounded the
distinction between self and work.35 According to a recent critic, the 'trouble with
Whistler is that his personality ... is so colourful it overshadows his oeuvre,'36 but
this comment misses the point that Whistler's personality and Whistler's oeuvre are
entangled to such a degree that it is difficult to separate these categories: indeed,
Whistler's personality was in many ways part of Whistler's oeuvre. As G. K.
Chesterton suggests, citing Max Beerbohm, Whistler 'really regarded Whistler as his
greatest work of art.'37 Whistler adeptly exploited the new informational resources
such as press-clipping services and the tools ofNew Journalism for self-promotion,
creating and consolidating a public persona with the aid of interviews, celebrity
profiles, illustrations, and photographs. Just as the butterfly monogram on his
canvases became his pictorial signature, so too were other visual and theatrical
signifiers exploited—those of dress, gesture, mannerism, and verbal style—to create
the recognisable entity, the recognisable commodity even, of'Whistler.' First
published by Whistler in 1890, The Gentle Art ofMaking Enemies, comprising of his
34 Ruskin, Lectures 48.
35 Much has been written on Whistler's cultivation of image in the context of the late-century art
world. Andrew Stephenson examines Whistler's 'self-styling' and astute negotiation of tropes of
masculinity in the context of Aestheticism ('Refashioning Modern Masculinity: Whistler,
Aestheticism and National Identity,' English Art 1860-1914: Modern Artists and Identity, ed. David
Peters Corbett and Lara Petty (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000) 140); Robert Slifkin looks at how
Whistler's aesthetics were manifested in both his oeuvre and his deliberately constructed persona
('James Whistler as the Invisible Man: Anti-Aestheticism and Artistic Vision,' OxfordArt Journal
29.1 (2006)).
36 Muriel Julius, 'England at Last Honours Whistler's Art,' Contemporary Review 266.1548 (1995):
19.
37 Cited in Burns 47.
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version of the trial, his 'Ten O'Clock' lecture, and a collection of press cuttings, can
be seen in this context as a project of deliberate self-fashioning, transforming the
ambiguous result of the trial into an opportunity for self-advertisement. This is not to
trivialise Whistler's aesthetics nor his work, but to recognise that the two processes
of self-advertising and painting were mutually validating ones.38 Given the
commodification of the private, it is not surprising that there should be confusion
over Whistler's personality and oeuvre. Marketed on a mass scale, the intimacy that
characterises the realm of private interrelations is reified, proffered to every
periodical subscriber and every reader of the interview. The artist's private life
becomes a commodity that is endlessly reproduced and circulated among his public,
consumed voraciously by acolytes and detractors alike.
Whistler the consummate performer is reminiscent of that other flamboyant
figure of British Aestheticism, Oscar Wilde, and, read retrospectively, elements of
this trial seem to anticipate Wilde's later ones. In both instances, the courtroom
became a kind of performance space in which the participants consciously played to
the onlookers. In the 1895 trials, Wilde's person was attacked through his writings:
literary decadence was proffered as evidence ofmoral decrepitude. Queensberry's
counsel sought to indict Wilde by a metonymic logic that first determined that
unspecified acts and relations depicted in his works were 'sodomiticaT in nature,
then labelled the text itself 'sodomitical,' before extrapolating from this designation
to an allegation against its author, following the original slight on Queensberry's
visiting card, 'For Oscar Wilde posing somdomite [jfc].'39 Here, the reverse was
true, with Whistler's eccentricity used to diminish his works: frivolity of character
was presented as proof of inconsequentiality of oeuvre.40 Yet where Whistler's trial
resulted in something of a publicity coup, Wilde's was, of course, his downfall.
There is much speculation over why Wilde was pursued so relentlessly, but in the
context of a commercial self-fashioning, it would seem that Whistler more
38 As Burns suggests, '[h]is personality gave visibility to his art. Conversely, ... his art by its
perceived quality gave sanction to his eccentricities' (39).
39 Merlin Holland, Irish Peacock andScarlet Marquess: The Real Trial ofOscar Wilde (London:
Fourth Estate, 2003) xiv.
40 Shearer West argues that the way Whistler harnessed the strategic potential of laughter, both during
the trial and in his general 'comic style,' was characteristic of Aestheticism, citing as other exemplars,
Wilde and Beardsley ('Laughter and the Whistler/Ruskin Trial,' Journal of Victorian Culture 12.1
(2007): 47).
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successfully negotiated the tenuous distinction between marketable and actionable
transgression.41
This astuteness leads Sarah Burns to claim Whistler as 'the quintessential
nineteenth-century man,' possessed of the mercurial nervousness of the late-century
artist, yet successfully sidestepping the pathologising criticisms associated with these
eccentricities.42 This is not entirely true: although lacking Nordau's vitriol, for the
defence's strategy was a trivialising mockery rather than pathologising
condemnation, Holker's words in court presaged the degenerationist discourse that
was soon to pervade the public consciousness:
There is at present a mania for what is called Art. It has become a kind of
fashion among some people to admire the incomprehensible and to say of
something that cannot be understood, "It is exquisite." ... This is not a mania
that should be encouraged. (168)
Holker's terminology anticipates Degeneration's pathologisation of cultural forms,
their practitioners, and their followers. Nordau warns against the pseudo-Art
perpetuated by degenerate subjects and its posse of hysterical acolytes; Holker
dismisses as a 'mania' the feckless allegiance to unintelligible productions. Holker
mocks the elitist pretensions of Whistler's claim to a privileged artistic insight: 'He
sees things we cannot see and hears artistic voices we cannot hear' (168); for
Nordau, the mystic's degeneracy manifests in just such sensuous disorders: the
mystic 'hears and sees as real, things which for the sane man are non-existent.'43
While the mystic embraces the obscure and the inchoate, the rational mind strives for
clarity and differentiation, with the goal of 'imparting] the greatest sharpness and
clearness to all representations.'44 The objections to Whistler's renderings of night
might thus be understood in the context ofNordau's dichotomy between the
41 For possible reasons for Wilde's prosecution, see Foldy 21-30; Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987) 423-4. For more general discussion ofWilde's relationship with
the literary marketplace, see Regenia Gagnier, Idylls of the Marketplace: Oscar Wilde and the
Victorian Public {Stanford-. Stanford UP, 1986); Josephine M. Guy and Ian Small, Oscar Wilde's
Profession: Writing and the Culture Industry in the Late Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford UP,
2000).
42 Burns 42, 46-7.
43
Nordau, Degeneration 46. On the topic of the visual arts, Nordau attributes new trends such as
Impressionism to 'visual derangements' in the optical physiology of the degenerate and hysterical
painter {Degeneration 27). Thus, for instance, the absence of a firm outline is not affectation but a




pathological attraction of'a black heaving mass' and the 'wholly luminous' nature of
rational thought45 In his early championing of Turner, Ruskin had set up a similar
opposition, holding up Turner's ability to present shadows with exactitude and
sharpness of form against crepuscular tones and undifferentiated shapes of the Old
Masters. While Nordau's critique is articulated in medico-psychological terms,
Ruskin's is focused on socio-moral concerns, yet the binary of light and darkness
remains constant.46 Reading the trial in conjunction with Degeneration thus aligns
the role ofRuskin with that ofNordau as critic-censor, and conversely, also
reinforces the point made earlier about Nordau as literary-art critic.
With the ascendancy of the cult of celebrity, it is not surprising that attempts to
control the artist's profession should focus on the personality of the artist. Ruskin's
expostulation against Whistler's 'Cockney impudence' is one such comment on the
artist's person; the second part of the alleged libel referring to the Nocturne's, two
hundred guinea asking price points to differences in attitudes towards the value and
the valuing of art. According to Ruskin, in demanding this inflated price for his
creations, Whistler was perpetuating a fraud on the public. If the technical execution
ofWhistler's works contravened the precepts of Ruskin's early art theory and his
eccentricity derogated from the gravitas of the profession, then the two hundred
guineas demanded for the Nocturne offended Ruskin's labour theory of art. These
ideas are elaborated in his 1857 lectures on the Political Economy ofArt, later
published as 'A Joy Forever,' in which he expounds on the questions of value and
recompense. Ruskin argues that contemporary usage has misleadingly restricted the
term 'economy' to the narrow sense of parsimony—'merely sparing or saving'—thus
occluding its corollary meaning of spending.47 Economy is therefore redefined as the
'art ofmanaging labour,' which, in the context of artistic labour, refers to the
producing and employing of the labourer (the 'man of genius'), and how best to
• 48
optimise his artistic output through judicious preservation and distribution. This
45
Nordau, Degeneration 59.
46 Eileen Cleere places Ruskin's critique in the context ofmid-century sanitation reform ('Dirty
Pictures, John Ruskin, Modern Painters, and the Victorian Sanitation of Fine Art,' Representations 78
(2002)).
47
Ruskin, Works 16: 19.
48
Ruskin, Works 16: 18, 29.
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emphasis on ethical spending as well as saving brings the issue of 'fair price' to the
fore, an issue of primary importance in the libel trial as well.49 In his opening
statement, Holker stated that his client demands 'a laborious and perfect devotion to
art and holds that an artist ought to entertain a desire not simply to gain a large sum
for his work, but that he should struggle to give the purchaser something worth the
money paid' (164). The economic transactions that buttress the late-century art world
are here given a moral slant, recalling the ethical framework of Ruskin's discussion
ofpolitical economy. For Ruskin, good management leads to abundance while poor
management to profligacy and decline, and this binary ofwise and imprudent
spending aligns to a distinction between industrious endeavour and indolent
behaviour, between 'providence' and 'waste,' 'labour' and Tasciviousness,'
'subordination' and 'wilfulness.'50
Despite these stark oppositions, the terms of discussion on the issue of artistic
value are less straightforward, complicated by Ruskin's different approaches towards
old masterpieces and contemporary art, the promotion and preservation of each
requiring a separate strategy. The great works of the past are, 'in the true sense of the
word, priceless,' and in exhorting his audience of moneyed industrialists to their
custodial obligations, Ruskin argues that the 'proper price is simply that which it is
necessary to give to get and to save them.'51 Monetary value is not, indeed, cannot
be, conferred onto the work in and of itself; the naming of a price is merely a
pragmatic process to secure the work's preservation and Ruskin sanctions a virtually
limitless outlay in pursuit of this goal: 'If you can get them for fifty pounds, do; if
not for less than a hundred, do; if not for less than five thousand, do; if not for less
than twenty thousand, do.' For new works, by contrast, Ruskin advocates a more
49
Ruskin, Works 16: 86.
50
Ruskin, Works 16: 19. Christopher Bliss argues that Ruskin's moral focus, while providing a novel
approach to political economy, compromises the 'clearheadedness' of his essay. Political economy, he
argues, conceived as a moral problem, allows the critic to bypass conveniently the practicalities of
implementation and leads ultimately to a lack of conceptual coherence ('Ruskin's Political Economy
ofArt,' OxfordArt Journal 2 (1979): 38). Willie Henderson makes similar allegations of an overall
lack of cohesion, not just in this particular essay, but in Ruskin's political economy as a whole {John
Ruskin's Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2000)).
These comments are not without basis, but one should bear in mind that Ruskin's writings
were not intended as an overarching economic theory. Indeed, it was the mechanistic and, to him,
erroneous, models of classical political economy that he set out to replace with familiar domestic and
paternalistic models. It is thus not surprising that his writings do not conform to the paradigms and
idioms of political economy. See note 58 below.
51 Ruskin, Works 16: 77.
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cautious approach to pricing. On the one hand, a reasonable investment is required
for the production of good art.52 '[PJerfect work can't be hurried, and therefore it
can't be cheap beyond a certain point,' and conversely, 'art which is produced hastily
will also perish hastily.'53 On the other hand, the dangers of overpricing are equally
devastating: 'the bribe ofwealth and honour warps [the artist] from his honest labour
into efforts to attract attention; and he gradually loses both his power of mind and his
rectitude of purpose.'54 Given that the intrinsic value of art cannot be translated into
monetary terms and that the temptation of extravagant pecuniary rewards corrupts
the artist's endeavours, for living artists, a 'just' or 'fair' payment is the equitable
recompense for time expended. A true artist will work 'exquisitely' when provided
with an 'easy competence,' with 'bread and water and salt.'55
Whistler's suit recalls the terms ofGeorge Moore's attack on Mudie.
Resentful of the librarian's stranglehold on the literary field, Moore alleged a kind of
market censorship on Mudie's part. Similarly, counsel for the plaintiff here
contended that Ruskin's review impinged adversely on Whistler's livelihood.56 But
where Mudie's censorial powers came from an opportunistic harnessing of an
expanding market, the same market forces which later ousted Mudie from the literary
field, Ruskin's attack on Whistler is encompassed within a condemnation of late-
century capitalism as a whole. His ruminations on fair price are a critique of the
traffic in cultural capital in which the artwork itself becomes lost:
The price of a picture by a living artist never represents, never can represent,
the quantity of labour or value in it. Its price represents, for the most part, the
degree of desire which the rich people of the country have to possess it. Once
get the wealthy classes to imagine that the possession of pictures by a given
artist adds to their "gentility," and there is no price which his work may not
immediately reach, and for years maintain; and in buying at that price, you
are not getting value for your money, but merely disputing for victory in a
contest of ostentation.57
52 In line with other cultural commentators of his time, as say, George Gissing, Ruskin intones against
cheap and ephemeral literature as well as art.
5j Ruskin, Works 16: 42, 41.
54
Ruskin, Works 16: 83.
55 Ruskin, Works 16: 83, 84.
56 Whistler testified that he had not been able to sell a painting at a comparable price since the
publication of Ruskin's criticism, a point that was reiterated by Parry in his summation (Merrill 143,
184).
57
Ruskin, Works 16: 86.
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For Ruskin, the capitalist venture, predicated on the model of the selfish economic
man, is merely a 'game ofwealth,' and the escalating prices bolstered by supply and
demand are not a triumph for art but for the 'intelligent dealer' and the market.58
Ruskin's attempt to control the conditions of exchange is an attempt to shift the
market away from the imperative ofmonetary profit to his conception of good
management. As such, the struggle is as much about the terms of political economy
as art criticism and practice. Whistler doubly violates Ruskin's economic dicta: his
ability to 'knock one [painting] off in a couple of days, to use Holker's derisive
terms (147), is proof of hasty production; the outrageous price tag for these works
attests to the moral failings of avarice and vanity. The plaintiff disputed these
charges with Parry's claim that Whistler 'is a conscientious, hard-working, and
industrious artist' (187). These words are taken from Ruskin's moral vocabulary, but
Whistler himself challenged Ruskin's understanding of these key terms. When asked
by Holker if it was the labour of two days for which he charged two hundred guineas,
Whistler famously answered, 'No. I ask it for the knowledge I have gained in the
work of a lifetime' (148).59 Elsewhere, Ruskin focuses as much on the nature of
labour as on the quantity expended.60 Here, however, the 'laborious and perfect
devotion' Ruskin stipulates as fair exchange for purchase price gauges industry as a
function of time invested (164).61 Whistler offers an alternative understanding of
industry as intellectual input that is cumulatively amassed, the value ofwhich cannot
be calculated in direct temporal correlation.62
58
Ruskin, Works 16: 88. Ruskin challenges the assumption in Adam Smith's model that competition
results in a fortuitous harmony: 'All enmity, jealousy, opposition, and secrecy are wholly, and in all
circumstances, destructive in their nature—not productive; and all kindness, fellowship, fellowship,
and communicativeness are invariably productive in their operation,—not destructive' (Works 16: 95-
6).
59 Whistler's witness, Albert Moore, echoed this defence, claiming that 'money is paid for the skill of
the artist, not always for the amount of labor expended' (159).
60
See, for instance, The Stones of Venice in which Ruskin sets up an opposition between the creative
and revitalising work of the Gothic artist and the repetitive and dehumanising nature ofmechanical
labour.
61 In the Preface to Volume Three of Modern Painters, Ruskin claims that truth in art can be
ascertained through 'time and labour.' Already at this early stage, we can see that the two concepts are
yoked together for Ruskin (Works 5: 4). Caroline Levine goes further to call Ruskin's mode of realism
a 'laboring aesthetic,'' insofar as it demands a rigorous training of the eye and study of nature ('Visual
Labor: Ruskin's Radical Realism,' Victorian Literature and Culture 28 (2000): 75).
62 Robin Spencer directs attention to a passage from Joshua Reynolds's Discourses, a copy ofwhich
Whistler's father had given him early in his career: 'I wish you to be persuaded, that success in your
art depends almost entirely on your own industry; but the industry which I principally recommended,
is not the industry of the hands, but of the mind' (cited in Robin Spencer, 'Whistler's Early Relations
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The jury's task in determining the limits of criticism implied a judgement on
the issue of price and payment. Henry James makes joking reference to the trivial
value accorded Ruskin's words, speculating on Ruskin's displeasure at 'finding that
the fullest weight of his disapproval is thought to be represented by the sum of one
farthing.'63 Commentators since have remarked that this judgement reflects the jury's
refusal to assign a monetary value to the work of art. For Stuart Culver, the case was
a victory for Whistler to the extent that art established its independence from
'bourgeois notions ofmeaning and value, an independence so absolute that the
painter's work was dismissed as essentially without economic value.'64 Yet as is
evident from Ruskin's art economy, this refusal to assess the work of art in economic
terms is not far from Ruskin's own position. His argument with the market is not
with spending per se, but with spending in the form of an empty and unproductive
consumerism. The price of the work of a living artist such as Whistler adheres to
market forces pandering to a self-gratification which, in its solipsism, is just such an
inward-oriented consumerism. For Ruskin then, aesthetic and market value are not
commensurate.
The Question of Authority: The Artist v. the Critic
IfRuskin the art economist put forth an ideal of ethical consumption in the
marketplace, Ruskin the art critic sought to promote an ethical visual consumption in
the gallery. In his instructions to counsel, Ruskin explains and justifies his allegedly
libellous words according to his conception of the critic's function. The art critic's
task, like that of the literary critic, is 'to recommend authors of merit to public
attention, and to prevent authors of no merit from occupying it.'65 The critic's role is
thus a mediatory and discriminatory one, and as such, recalls Froude's exposition of
with Britain and the Significance of Industry and Commerce for His Art. Part I.' Burlington Magazine
136.1093 (1994): 223). Spencer cites the above in support of his claim that industry, both in the sense
of a character trait and that ofmanufacturing, played an important role in Whistler's career, but the
distinction between an industry of the mind and that of the hand is also salient in the context of
Whistler v. Ruskin.
63
James, Painter's Eye 174.
64
Culver, 'Whistler v. Ruskin' 152. Prettejohn takes a slightly different view, arguing that the
minimal compensation implies a refusal to translate Whistler's artistic reputation into financial terms
('Aesthetic Value' 90).
65
Ruskin, 'Ruskin's Instructions to Defense Counsel,' appendix, Pot ofPaint, by Merrill, 289.
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a constructive censorship that filters and crystallises the best of the (literary) arts for
posterity. Ruskin draws a surprising analogy between the functioning of law and the
functioning of the critic, claiming that 'the Bench of honourable Criticism is as truly
a Seat of Judgment as that of Law itself, and its verdicts, though usually kinder, must
sometimes be no less stern.'66 There is a placatory tone in these words, with Ruskin
conceding that the law might appropriately be used to suppress malicious criticism:
such impugnation if 'repressed by the care and acumen of British Law, ... would be
well alike for the dignity of Literature and the interests ofArt.' The alignment of the
two also serves to claim for the critic some of the authority invested in the law and
therefore vindication for his 'stern' words. Holker for the greater part ignored
Ruskin's brief, but retained and emphasised the constitutive role of criticism in the
arts, asserting that '[i]f art is to live and flourish, so must criticism, for no artist can
obtain fame except through criticism' (163). The vitality of the arts and thus, the
livelihood of its practitioners as well, depend on criticism. Criticism is here accorded
a status on par with, if not greater than, that of art itself: the artist produces the work
of art; criticism in this formulation produces the category of art.
On his part, Whistler argued that the critic is a needless mediation between
art and its audience, indeed, an intervention harmful to art itself. The critic's
knowledge, acquired at a remove, is inferior to that of the practitioner, and criticism
is thus a secondary and parasitic profession: 'I hold that none but an artist can be a
competent critic. It is not only when a criticism is unjust that I object to it, but when
it is incompetent' (148). Whistler called into question not just the propriety of
Ruskin's words, but the authoritative platform from which Ruskin speaks.
Enshrining praxis over scholarship, Whistler fuses the functions of critic and artist.
He was even more scathing in his post-trial pamphlet, 'Whistler v. Ruskin: Art and
Art Critics': 'a life passed among pictures makes not a painter—else the policeman
in the National Gallery might assert himself... Let not Mr. Ruskin flatter himself
that more education makes the difference between himself and the policeman when
both stand gazing in the Gallery.'67 It would seem that Ruskin's identification with
the law has unwittingly redounded on him, and, in Whistler's caustic comparison,
66 Ruskin, 'Instructions' 290.
67 Whistler, Gentle Art 26-7.
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has been demoted from a moral-cultural guardianship to a less exalted patrol.
Whistler's hostility towards art criticism bespeaks an anxiety about the encroachment
of the literary onto the visual arts. The libel suit, Whistler claims, was not a personal
vendetta between two individuals, but a 'war,' one fought between the brush and the
pen, between artist and critic.68 Citing Ruskin and Sidney Colvin as litterateurs
deracinated, Whistler derides the 'madness' of entrusting institutions of art in the
hands of 'the readiest writer or wordiest talker.'69 From this perspective, Whistler's
libel charge can be seen as an attempt at a violent sundering of the sister arts in face
of the loss of autonomy threatened by the colonising literary force.
If the ostensible topic debated in court was the critic's right to voice his
opinion, underlying this contest were more intrinsic issues to do with the concept of
art itself, its definition and its discourses. Expert witnesses testified for both sides,
each with his own conception of art whether to discredit or to affirm Whistler's
standing. While the presentation of witnesses followed standard courtroom procedure
with each witness introduced by an elaboration of credentials, this process also
mirrored developments in art criticism. Elizabeth Prettejohn identifies a 'bifurcation'
in art criticism from around the 1860s, when there emerged a professionalised form
70
of criticism in reaction to the more generalist modes prevalent at the time. Against
an art criticism founded on shared cultural values which judged paintings according
to their narrative content, this new professional criticism drew on artistic criteria for
judgement, bolstered by an exhaustive knowledge of art history and theory. Hitherto,
criticism had largely been anonymous, anonymity understood to symbolise the
universality of the opinion voiced; professional criticism by contrast gained
legitimacy from the erudition of the critic and the critic's name thus became source
and guarantor of authority. The rise of the expert critic, one who is no longer
representative of lay opinion but purveyor of specialised knowledge, is analogous to
71
that of the expert witness in court, and in this instance, the two figures converge.
Significantly, even Whistler, with his meticulously crafted persona of the dandy
68 Whistler, Gentle Art 25.
69 Whistler, Gentle Art 33. Ruskin had been appointed Slade professor of Fine Art at Oxford in 1870
and Colvin Slade professor at Cambridge in 1873.
70
Prettejohn, 'Aesthetic Value' 73. See also Flint, Victorians and the Visual Imagination.
71 While there were tensions between the different modes of criticism, they co-existed, if uneasily so,
with generalist criticism retaining its popularity in mass circulation newspapers while professional
criticism dominated the more exclusive publications.
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genius, acceded to these conventions, to the extent that he established his credentials
as a serious artist, under direct examination by his counsel, by detailing his education
and exhibition history, his past sales and patrons, and his associations with
institutions of note, such as the Royal Academy, the Parisian Salon, the British
Museum, and Windsor Castle.
In following these testimonies, it becomes clear that each witness had his own
conception of what constitutes art, in terms of subject matter, its treatment, and the
technical processes involved. Ruskin's witnesses put forth the idea that 'finish' is
• 79
vital in a work of art. Conceding Whistler's skill in colour, they nonetheless argue
that his works were deficient in form, composition, and detail, a lack which
disqualified them as 'serious work[s] of art' (173). These were 'unfinished
beginnings of pictures ... in the nature of sketching,' and accorded a minor
competence as decorative art, allied more to wallpaper than pictures (180).73
Testifying in support ofWhistler, William Rossetti proffered an alternative
conception of art, defined in terms of intentions. For Rossetti, Whistler's work can
legitimately be considered art '[bjecause it represents what was intended. It is a
picture painted with a considerable sense of the general effect of such a scene and
finished with considerable artistic skill' (157). Finish is discarded as a criterion, since
the work as it stands fulfills Whistler's aesthetic intentions.74 Tonal nuance in this
instance is a realisation of the artist's vision rather than that which takes
disproportionate attention away from technical finish. The artist Albert Moore,
arguably Whistler's strongest witness, asserted without hesitation that Whistler's
works are the ' [mjost consummate art,' succeeding in the 'extraordinary' task of
painting the air (159, 158). When asked by Holker whether he found 'eccentricity' in
Whistler's paintings, Moore replied, 'I should call it "originality"' (159). If the
72 See testimonies from Edward Burne-Jones, William Powell Frith, and Tom Taylor. The issue of
lack of finish was brought up by Burne-Jones and not part of Ruskin's original critique. Indeed,
Ruskin's opposition to sterile imitation would suggest that finish, understood as meticulous attention
to detail, is far from his artistic criteria. David Craven reconciles this apparent discrepancy by arguing
that Ruskin invokes two senses of the word 'finish': technical finish, referring to an emphasis on
detail, and conceptual finish, referring to 'intellectual associations,' and it is in the latter, Craven
claims, that Ruskin finds Whistler lacking ('Ruskin vs. Whistler: The Case against Capitalist Art,' Art
Journal 21.2 (1977-78): 141).
73 The aligning of Whistler's work to the decorative arts was a common response. Henry James, for
example, likens the Grosvenor Gallery entries to 'incidents of furniture or decoration' (Painter's Eye
165).
74 Merrill makes the distinction between 'finish' and 'completion' to highlight this difference.
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contest was over what qualifies as art, it was also a semantic struggle, a struggle over
the terms in which art, and specifically, Whistler's art, might be spoken of.73
Thus, Whistler v. Ruskin can be seen as the confrontation between two
philosophies of art, its content, its function, and its value; between Whistler's
aestheticism and Ruskin's moral criticism. For Whistler, Ruskin was at the helm of
the onslaught by the literary, and his own theories in response tended to resist this
76 •
co-option. His synaesthetic nomenclature, for instance, shifts attention away from
the linguistic orbit of the anecdote, thwarting any narrativising impulse on the part of
the spectator:
By using the word "nocturne," I wished to indicate an artistic interest alone,
divesting the picture of any outside anecdotal interest which might have been
otherwise attached to it. A nocturne is an arrangement of line, form, and color
first. (144)
In this regard, it was one of the defence's principal witnesses, William Powell Frith,
who might be seen as Whistler's antithesis. Replete with scenic detail, Frith's
paintings, such as Derby Day, are pictorial narratives, or at least, are conducive to the
narrativising treatment of popular art criticism. Moreover, Frith's demand for 'true
representation' (177), as exemplified by his own works, was from the outset in
conflict with Whistler's anti-mimeticism.77 For both Holker and Huddleston as well,
representation implied a direct mimetic relationship between the painting and its
subject, as their line of questioning suggested: 'Which part of the picture is the
bridge,' asked Huddleston, 'Are those figures on the top of the bridge intended as
people,' from Holker (150, 151). For Whistler, representation is subjectively
grounded; it is impressionistic, not imitative. Rather than the empirical specificity
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Playwright and painter, William Gorman Wills, testified along similar lines: '1 consider the
nocturnes in blue and silver original. I will not call them eccentric, nor do I call them gems. They are
beautiful works of art in my opinion' (160).
76 Alexandra K. Wettlaufer argues that even while conceding the expressive limits of language
compared to the possibilities of visual imagery, Ruskin's art criticism ultimately displaces the painting
that is its subject, arrogating for himself the productive powers of the painter by recreating for his
readers not so much the visual experience, but an emotional and thus non-visual one ('The Sublime
Rivalry ofWord and Image: Turner and Ruskin Revisited,' Victorian Literature and Culture 28
(2000)).
77 Frith's use of photographs in preparation for his paintings shows his deep allegiance to mimetic
representation (Paula Gillett, The Victorian Painter's World (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1990) 85. In
fact, the Illustrated London News suggested that Derby Day provided 'photographic glimpses of
character' (cited in Charlotte Klonk, 'Mounting Vision: Charles Eastlake and the National Gallery of
London,' Art Bulletin 82.2 (2000): 341).
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expected by Holker, who asked if his Nocturnes were a 'correct representation' of
particular scenes, Whistler's paintings merely aimed to 'bring about a certain
harmony of color' (151).78 In its mimetic guise, the level and success of
representation can be gauged by the painting's adherence to its referent. In Whistler's
version, the result of his representative efforts is highly unstable, fluctuating
according to the perceiver: 'To some persons it may represent all that I intended to
do; to others it may represent nothing' (151). The onus of judgement shifts to the
perceiver, but the perceiver also becomes the subject of judgement. Art fails, the
statement implies, not because of its intrinsic qualities, but because the spectator is
incapable of perceiving the work as art. This is the crux ofWhistler's claims: that it
is only the practitioner who has the requisite skills and experience to expound upon
aesthetic matters, and Ruskin, merely a desultory commentator, falls short in this
regard.
Ruskin, by contrast, argues in Modern Painters that the 'critical' and the
'executive' facilities are independent entities, and that the cultivation of one must
necessarily be at the expense of the other.79 Appealing to the utpictura poesis
tradition, Ruskin posits a notion of poetry that is not purely literary, but one defined
by nobility of usage, whether in the visual or in the literary arts. Ruskin's
theorisation of the poetic employment of the arts is quite complex and merits further
discussion. In the first volume ofModern Painters, he writes:
Painting, or art generally, as such, with all its technicalities, difficulties, and
particular ends, is nothing but a noble and expressive language, invaluable as
the vehicle of thought, but by itself nothing ... all those excellences which are
peculiar to the painter as such, are merely what rhythm, melody, precision,
and force are in the words of the orator and the poet, necessary to their
greatness, but not the tests of their greatness. It is not by the mode of
representing and saying, but by what is represented and said, that the
respective greatness either of the painter or the writer is to be finally
determined.80
781 use the term 'impressionistic' guardedly, for while his contemporaries did associate Whistler with
the French Impressionists, his work and method were vastly different. Where the Impressionists
worked rapidly to convey an immediate sense of the scene, Whistler's technique demanded speedy
execution but required lengthy cogitation on and processing of the scene. His method, he explains,
was to complete 'the mass of the picture in one day, after having arranged the idea in my mind' (152).
For a discussion of the differences between the proto-impressionist elements within Ruskin's moral
aesthetics and Whistler's more solipsistic and subjective form of impressionism, see Adam Parkes, 'A
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For Ruskin, the craft of the painter is comparable to that of the wordsmith, and both
can be spoken of interchangeably, insofar as both function as communicative
mechanisms, acting as conduits for the painter's or speaker's ideas. It is when these
means are used to elicit the noblest emotions that greatness in art—or poetry—is
attained. It is in this sense that Ruskin in volume three ofModern Painters claims
that '[pjainting is properly to be opposed to speaking or writing, but not to poetry.'8I
That is, the art of painting is of the same order as the verbal arts, but poetry refers to
the highest forms of both. Poetry, in thus uniting the two, allows Ruskin to transform
the derogatorily intended 'litterateur' directed at him by Whistler into hegemonic
licence over both pen and brush.
The art of painting is defined in terms of fidelity of representation, and the
subject of representation—'what is represented and said'—is the ultimate
determinant of the artwork's greatness. In a telling condemnation, Ruskin warns
against the meretricious attractions of unworthy subjects: 'energetic admiration may
be excited in certain minds by a display of fireworks, or a street of handsome shops;
but the feeling is not poetical, because the grounds of it are false, and therefore
ignoble.'82 The rejection of commerce in the form of 'handsome shops' signals
Ruskin's social concerns even at this early stage, but more suggestively, the
inculpating of fireworks sets up aesthetic parameters that would decades later
preclude Whistler's nocturnes from serious consideration. Yet Ruskin's theory of
representation is not an arid mimeticism; indeed, he eschews imitation as a form of
visual deception, arguing that a slavish adherence to detail is a 'libel' on the beauty
and truth of nature.83 The pleasure derived from imitation is a debased and
'contemptible' one, elicited by a trickery that precludes the viewer from a true
'impression and address of the thing represented' and thus from the nobility of
emotion experienced in the encounter with nature.84 Instead, the modern landscape
painters reject 'at once all idea of bond fide imitation, [and] think only of conveying
81
Ruskin, Works 5: 31.
82 Ruskin, Works 5: 29.
83 Ruskin, Works 3: 167.
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the impression of nature into the mind of the spectator.'85 It is this sense of the
'impression of nature' that is invoked when Ruskin claims that greatness is gauged
by what is represented rather than how it is represented. Truth in art encompasses
both the moral and the material, corresponding to a truth of impression and thought
(the moral), and a truth of form and matter (the material).86 While both are
constituent elements of art, Ruskin assigns greater weighting to the former terms.
Yet despite Ruskin's textual bias—what George Landow calls his 'habit of
impressing the nature of verbal upon visual art'87—and despite Whistler's objections
to this bias, it would be erroneous to conflate Ruskin's writings with the narrative
didacticism of popular art criticism. While both forms of criticism gauge aesthetic
greatness by criteria found beyond the canvas, Ruskin's moral criticism was a
conceptually sophisticated and rigorous analysis of the ideas animating art rather
than banal storytelling as such. Kate Flint, in a Bourdieu-influenced reading, argues
that the aim of conventional Victorian art criticism was to consolidate class
allegiances rather than to fulfill any educative purpose in the technical sense, despite
its claims otherwise. Thus, she asserts, '[possession of shared knowledge, and
shared opinion, was considered far more important than the activation of the
oo
individual eye.' This may be true for popular publications, but Ruskin's theories
and pedagogy were very much concerned with the 'individual eye' and his
literariness, if one might call his criticism thus, is of a different order from standard
criticism. Indeed, it was in part Ruskin's erudite commentary and his insistence on
OQ
intensive study that paved the way for the emergence of professional criticism.
As is frequently remarked, much of Ruskin's art theory is articulated in terms
of the visual.90 His characterising of an aesthetic sensibility in terms of an ' innocence
ofthe eye' in his manual for the amateur painter, Elements ofDrawing typifies this.
85 Ruskin, Works 3: 168.
86
Ruskin, Works 3: 104.
87
George Landow, The Aesthetic and Critical Theories ofJohn Ruskin (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton UP, 1971) 84.
88
Flint, Victorians and the Visual Imagination 196.
89 Claire Wildsmith discusses the crucial role Ruskin played in shifting the basis of the authority of
aesthetic discourse from traditional aristocratic sources to professional bourgeois ones ('"Candid and
Earnest": the Rise of the Art Critic in the Early Nineteenth Century,' Ruskin's Artists: Studies in the
Victorian Visual Economy, ed. Robert Hewison (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2000)).
90
See, for instance, George Landow, Ruskin (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985); and Aesthetic and Critical
Theories ofJohn Ruskin.
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Promoting a kind of visual essentialism, Ruskin valorises an artistic eye that,
unjaded, has access to a visual purity unadulterated by convention:
The whole technical power of painting depends on our recovery of what may
be called the innocence of the eye; that is to say, of a sort of childish
perception of these flat stains of colour, merely as such, without
consciousness ofwhat they signify,—as a blind man would see them if
suddenly gifted with sight.91
The most accomplished artists best approximate this 'condition of infantine sight,'
but the apprentice painter is also exhorted to train the eye 'to accurate perception' in
a similar fashion.92 Entrenched in habitual modes of observation, the viewer finds it
increasingly difficult to differentiate between visual truths and conventions.
Formulaic replications masquerade as truthful representations, engendering a
deception that conditions the viewer to misrecognise stagnation for vitality, banality
Q-3
for beauty. The cultivation of the innocent eye can combat these debilitating effects
by paring off these obfuscations to get to a purer reality or a greater truth. In this
sense, Ruskin's art criticism can be seen as an educative project with the aim of
teaching its readers how to see ethically, not just the work of art, but the world
itself.94 Yet this visual innocence is not an abstracted disinterest; the process of
seeing entails more than the physiological functioning of the human eye and is
imbued with moral significance: the 'impressions of beauty ... are neither sensual
nor intellectual, but moral.'95
Ruskin's interest in the eye and the visual was shared by Whistler and the
conceptual differences between the I'artpour I'art ofWhistler's aestheticism and
91
Ruskin, Works 15: 27. E. H. Gombrich points out the fallacy of Ruskin's ideal, claiming that the
projected separation of sensation (retinal stimulation) from perception (intellectual processing) is
untenable (Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology ofPictorial Representation, 5th ed. (London:
Phaidon, 1977)250-2).
92 Ruskin, Works 15: 28, 38. In this text, Ruskin stresses the importance, if not the priority, of seeing
over technical prowess, assuring his pupils that 'when once we see keenly enough, there is very little
difficulty in drawing what we see' (Works 15: 13). Correspondingly, the exercises he prescribes pay
equal attention to the eye as to the hand.
93 Ruskin writes in the first volume ofModern Painters, '[w]e are constantly supposing that we see
what experience only has shown us, or can show us, to have existence, constantly missing the sight of
what we do not know beforehand to be visible' (Works 3: 145).
94 The success of this project might be gauged by responses to Ruskin's works. Charlotte Bronte wrote
of Modern Painters, '[hjitherto I have only had instinct to guide me in judging art; I feel now as if 1
had been walking blindfold—this book seems to give me eyes' (James Thomas Wise ed., The
Brontes: Their Lives, Friendships, and Correspondence, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Porcupine, 1980)240).
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Ruskin's moral view of art can be expressed in terms of differences in their
respective understandings of visual perception. The court case was thus a contest to
determine which way of seeing took precedence and whose gaze was more
authoritative. Both believe in a superior kind of vision, but where Whistler sees this
as a sensitivity to beauty, Ruskin sees perceptual sensibility as the mark ofmoral
man. Remarking on the futility of explaining the 'peculiar beauty' ofNocturne in
Black and Gold, Whistler ruminated in court, 'I daresay I could make it clear to any
sympathetic painter, but I do not think I could to you [Holker], any more than a
musician could explain the beauty of a harmony to a person who has no ear' (153).
Although not explicitly stated, the insinuation is sufficiently clear that one might
substitute 'eye' for 'ear' and deduce a charge of aesthetic blindness against Holker.
Likewise, Ruskin's failure to perceive formal beauty is the blindness of the
amateur.96 These implications are fleshed out in Whistler's 'Ten O'Clock,' a public
lecture given in 1885. Here, expounding on an autotelic concept of art, Whistler
warns against confounding beauty with virtue, against expecting moral utility from
the artwork, as in conventional practice:
Hence it is that nobility of action, in this life, is hopelessly linked with the
merit of the work that portrays it; and thus the people have acquired the habit
of looking, as who should say, not at a picture, but through it, at some human
fact, that shall, or shall not, from a social point of view, better their mental or
moral state.97
Trained to process visual data according to a narrativising logic, the viewer's eyes
fail to apprehend the picture in and of itself, but look through it to an external and
extraneous end. The materiality of the artwork is overlooked as the painting becomes
a mere conduit to a moralising fable and is judged according to what it depicts rather
than the skill in depiction.98 Thus constrained by his myopic 'literary point of view,'
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Compare Whistler's comments to Ruskin's: '[I]t is impossible to direct fine art to an immoral end,
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displays were frequently organized to present a coherent narrative as a means of imparting a particular
point (Colin Trodd, 'Culture, Class, City: The National Gallery, London and the Spaces of Education,
1822-57,' Art Apart: Art Institutions and Ideology Across England and North America, ed. Marcia
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the art critic treats the picture as a mere 'hieroglyph,' and in the process of this verbal
translation claims a sham ownership that distorts and degrades art itself." It is in this
context that Whistler's practice of painting on the frames takes on significance.
Holker commented on this proclivity during the trial, stating that 'it would have been
better, perhaps, if a great deal of the color had not escaped form the picture and
wandered over the frame' (166). But this 'escaping' of colour draws attention to the
physical limits of the painting precisely by exceeding them and is not so much
evidence of a want of care as Holker suggests, but an artful technique to emphasise
the framing of his works. In so doing, Whistler reinforces the status of his painting as
artefact, not narrativising aid.
In addition to distorting his appreciation of art, the layman's faulty perception
also hampers his experience ofNature. Whistler sets up an opposition between the
superficial gratification of the 'tourist's' visual experiences and the painter's
aestheticising gaze, which sees in Nature the 'suggestions of future harmonies,' the
potential for aesthetic beauty to be fulfilled by the painter.100 Misrecognising the
'casual' for the 'sublime,' the 'holiday-maker' relishes the hackneyed delights of'a
very foolish sunset,' while the painter, possessing superior faculties of vision, 'turns
aside to shut his eyes,' returning only with the departure of the holiday-maker, when
'the evening mist clothes the riverside with poetry, as with a veil.'101 The affinity
between Nature and artist forged in the indeterminacy of evening light is particularly
salutary given the reservations expressed in court over Whistler's choice of subject
matter. Burne-Jones commented on the difficulty of portraying night, adding
emphatically that Nocturne in Black and Gold was 'only one of a thousand [such]
failures' while Taylor suggested that the night, 'on canvas, ... is a shadowy subject'
(173, 180). Yet the attraction of such a 'shadowy subject' might also have been its
resistance to interpretative clarity; the enigmatic subject matter together with
Whistler's non-imitative treatment foster an esotericism that reinforces the artist's
supremacy of vision. 'Mr. Whistler does not see things as other people do. He sees
things we cannot see and hears artistic voices we cannot hear,' Holker stated in court
Pointon (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1994); Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum: History,
Theory, Politics (London: Routledge, 1995).
99 Whistler, Gentle Art 146.
100 Whistler, Gentle Art 145.
101
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to highlight Whistler's eccentricity as part of his strategy of delegitimation (168).
That the statement met with laughter testifies to the Holker's astute manipulation of
his audience, but there is in fact some truth in his quip. It seems that Whistler himself
would concur that he 'sees things we cannot see,' that the artistic eye is indeed an
extraordinary one.
Whistler's position would thus appear to be in diametric opposition to
Ruskin: where Whistler's art is inward-looking and self-consolidating, Ruskin's is
externally oriented; where Whistler disavows any moral significance in the aesthetic,
Ruskin's definition of art is bound up with ethical concerns. Yet although
theoretically irreconcilable, the relationship between the two is more complex than
an outright antipathy. E. H. Gombrich argues that both were responding to what they
perceived as the 'ugliness and squalor of their surrounding,' albeit in opposing
manners: Ruskin by appealing to a common moral sense and Whistler by turning
inwards to an inner aesthetic sensibility.102 Nicholas Shrimpton suggests that Ruskin
was not so much the enemy of aestheticism as alleged by Whistler but a mediatory
figure between Aestheticism and Puritanism (Arnold's non-conformist Philistines),
attempting to reconcile the artistic prerogatives of the one to the religious and moral
1 AT
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concerns of the other. In this sense, we return to the point made earlier that
Whistler v. Ruskin is less a generational struggle than a rupture within the field of art
that laid open the tensions implicit in Victorian aesthetic theory. Ruskin sought to
revitalise the arts by emphasising their broader social and moral significance.
Whistler defended the integrity of the visual arts qua visual in a strategy of isolation
and elevation. These were competing definitions of art that had implications for how
it was consumed and how it was valued.
Yet the spectre of the law cannot be excised from this contest. Whether
viewed as a clash between disciplinary authorities or a generational one, transposed
onto the field of law, both critic and artist were subject to an alternative jurisdiction.
The terms of art were translated into a legal vocabulary of expressive freedoms,
consumer rights, and compensatory measures. In an illuminating reading of the case,
Costas Douzinas aligns Ruskin's conservative mode ofjudgment with the




functioning of common law. Both are founded on normative criteria, drawn from
traditional practices, habits, and values.104 By contrast, Whistler's formalist aesthetic,
he argues, judges according to its own internal logic. This logic operates in the guise
of the law, and it is through this logic functioning as law that the artistic truth can be
reached: 'art operates as if it has a truth and as if it follows a law. Its truth can be
approached only if it is purified from all extrinsic considerations and allowed to
develop its own internal formal logic.'105 That is, Whistler's autotelic conception of
art works by miming the processes of law even while it rejects the authority of
institutions and knowledges beyond its boundaries.106 Douzinas thus concludes, '[i]f
Ruskin turns art into law, Whistler turns law into art.107
But Douzinas does not account for the specific functioning of English law. As
discussed in Chapter Four, the adversarial nature of the nineteenth-century English
legal code meant that trials were conducted as contests between opponents. The
parameters of the case were defined by both parties and each party presented its
argument after first gathering and formulating its evidence. Cases were determined
by juridical consensus rather than through an exhaustive investigation to establish the
details of the 'truth' as such, as was characteristic of the inquisitorial approach of
Continental codes. In the adversarial system, the truth was arrived at by arbitrating
between two competing accounts. In this sense, the process of judgment at work in
the English court reverses the process of aesthetic judgement according to Whistler.
For Whistler, while the reception of the work varies and is subjective, the 'truth' of
art, dependent on its own logic, remains constant, and it is this 'truth' by which the
observer is judged. In Gentle Art, Whistler takes issue with a concept of art reduced
to a function of taste and opinion and writes critically of contemporary trends: 'Art is
joyously received as a matter of opinion; and that it should be based upon laws as
rigid and defined as those of the known sciences, is a supposition no longer to be
tolerated by modern cultivation.'108 Art should not be at the mercy of the vagaries of
lay opinion; rather, opinion—or judgement—should be assessed according to artistic
truth and it is the observer, the one ostensibly making the judgement, who comes
104 Costas Douzinas,' Whistler v. Ruskin: Law's Fear of Images,' Art History 19 (1996): 360.
105 Douzinas,' Whistler v. Ruskiri' 362.
106
Art, Whistler asserts, is 'withal, selfishly occupied with her own perfection only' {Gentle Art 136).
107 Douzinas,' Whistler v. Ruskin' 362.
108 Whistler, Gentle Art 32.
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under scrutiny. Whistler measures, and finds wanting, the tourist's or the holiday-
maker's facile judgements which fail to recognise beauty in nature's indeterminacy.
In Whistler's aesthetic, 'truth' interrogates the judgement. In law, judgement
produces a 'truth.'
Thus when Whistler called upon the law in his battle with Ruskin, he in fact
invoked a process ofjudgement that was contrary to his own procedures and beliefs.
What Henry James saw as an ill-judged spectacle in fact reveals some surprising
affinities as well as fundamental differences between art and the law. The defence
claimed that Whistler misappropriated libel law as a weapon against the critic's
expressive freedom to the detriment of art. At the same time, the law functioned in a
more enabling manner, providing a public stage from which each party could
disseminate his theory of painting. Yet this public arena was one circumscribed by
the demands of law. Performances and utterances made from the witness stand were
filtered through an interpretative grid such that paintings became exhibits in the legal
rather than artistic sense, aesthetic statements became grounds for criminal
condemnation, and artistic practice became indictments of character. Yet in a further
twist, these legal interpretations were themselves subject to re-inscription. In a
manner comparable to the post-trial incarnations of 'Zola' as signifier, Whistler's
Gentle Art transformed the ambiguous result of the trial into an opportunity for self-
advertisement. We have perhaps come full circle in more ways than one: where the
quarrel between Whistler and Ruskin in the realm of art was displaced onto the field
of law, in Gentle Art, the events of the courtroom are re-inscribed in a literary form.
Where Whistler once condemned Ruskin's intrusion into the visual arts, in Gentle
Art, the artist wields not a paintbrush, but a pen.
The two positions mapped out in Whistler v. Ruskin—an ethical-moral criticism and
a formalist aesthetic—also inform debates about the nude, the subject ofmy final
chapter. The status of the nude was highly unstable and its defenders sought to rescue
the nude by invoking a Whistlerian aesthetic. In a process of rarefication, both of the
undraped figure and of vision itself, the nude, and the contemplation of it, were
elevated above social and moral exigencies. At the same time, these processes had
186





If Whistler v. Ruskin can be read in the light of competing theories about seeing, then
the case of the nineteenth-century nude demonstrates how concerns over
spectatorship informed debates about the morality of art with respect to one of art's
most controversial subjects. While there were instances when action was taken
against offending images under the Obscene Publications Act—the Society for the
Suppression of Vice claimed to have seized over two hundred and fifty thousand
obscene photographs and prints between 1868 and 18801—the battle to control the
visual realm extended far beyond legal repercussions. Measures taken to protect the
nude from such prosecution were a part of this struggle, and the defenders of the
nude sought to produce and consolidate a category of art, based on a mode of
legitimate spectatorship, that would be immune from moral censure. Against the
threat of censorship from the nude's critics, its proponents exercised a kind of pre-
emptory censorship themselves: by delineating abstract rules of aesthetic
appreciation, they produced not only a demographic of visual connoisseurship and a
category of high art centred on the nude, but also a model of visual consumption that
perpetually sought to expunge an unruly, bodily gaze.
1 Alison Smith, The Victorian Nude: Sexuality, Morality andArt (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1996)
64. See Myrone for a discussion of specific prosecutions. Myrone argues that the problem of
pornography was exacerbated by new technologies of representation and mass production.
Photography, broadly understood as an authorless means of replicating nature, lacked the
authentication of artistic intent to protect it from charges of pornography. This forms a telling contrast
to the discussion of censorship and agency in Chapter Two. Foucault locates the emergence of
censorship at the point of the emergence of the concept of authorship, arguing that prosecution is only
possible when agency is ascribed to a defendant. By contrast, here, it is the absence of agency, or
rather, the mechanical agency of reproductive technologies adduced as evidence of the absence of
artistic agency, and thus the absence of legitimate artistic purpose, that leads to censorship.
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I begin with a discussion of the 'British Matron' controversy of 1885, which,
while not an isolated attack on the immorality of contemporary art, effectively
captures the gamut of public and expert opinion vis-a-vis the nude. I then argue in
the next section that attempts to defend the nude against censorious opinion invoked
a dichotomous vision along Cartesian lines: a legitimate aestheticising gaze was
differentiated from a sexualised bodily one. In defining a proper aesthetic response,
the defenders of the nude also projected a proper audience for the artwork. Thus, in
the last section of the chapter, I place the overall controversy not just in the context
ofpurity agitation in the 1880s, but in the greater context of regulation of the visual
arts. Specifically, I argue that it was the moment when art passed from private
ownership to a public trust that the issue of audience came to the fore.
The 'British Matron' Affair
Writing to the Times in May, 1885, the self-styled 'A British Matron' protested
against the iniquity of nude exhibits. Nakedness, being unlawful in life, should
likewise be proscribed in representation, and she claims that galleries have abjured
their noble purpose in flagrantly displaying such paintings.2 On behalf of social
purity, she attacks the formalist tendencies of artistic practice in lay terms, alleging
that 'electing a subject painted for no purpose but to testify to the painter's skill' is
an insult to modesty and a travesty upon the gallery's edificatory goals.3 The letter
generated a heated exchange, with both supporters and detractors writing fervently in
response. Those writing in support of the British Matron emphasised the size, and
hence, visibility and unavoidability, of the offending paintings—the 'enforced
contact,' as 'Another British Matron' calls it—advocating instead a segregated
display, if the display of the nude was indeed indispensable for the development of
the arts.4 Concern was also raised over the process of producing the nude itself,
2 The moral parity the British Matron draws between life and art has a more authoritative precedent in
Ruskin's comments on the nude: in his 1872 Eagle's Nest lectures, he states as a 'p°s'hve and
perpetual law, that so much of the nude body as in the daily life of the nation may be shown with
modesty, and seen with reverence and delight,—so much, and no more, ought to be shown by the
national arts, either of painting or sculpture. What, more than this, either art exhibits, will, assuredly,
pervert taste, and, in all probability, morals' (Works 22: 234).
3 'A Woman's Plea,' Times 20 May 1885.
4 Times 23 May; 'Clericus's' letter of 21 May makes similar claims.
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centring on the dual issues of the exploitation of female models and the propriety of
the life class.5
The position of the British Matron's opponents is succinctly expressed by 'A
British Parent': 'Honi soit qui mal y pense.'6 Any offence lies less in the paintings on
show than in the impugnation on British innocence by the British Matron, who, as
'Commonsense' asserts, 'suggests] evil where healthy-minded people would never
• 7 • • i • •
suspect it.' Citing the divine beauty of the human figure, these correspondents argue
that its depiction approaches true nobility. In a satirical variation, Jerome K. Jerome
points out that the British Matron's condemnation of painters who 'merely copy
Nature' is an incomplete censure, exhorting her to extend her reprimand to God
Almighty for 'having created such an indelicate object' in the first place.8 Others
challenged a semiotics ofmorality that gauged decency according to drapery,
pointing out, as artist John Brett does, the illogical transformation of 'dress and
finery' to indicators of virtue.9
The most significant contributions were from the painter Edward Poynter and
'H,' widely accepted to be the nom de plume of Academician John Callcot Horsley, a
vocal opponent of nude study.10 'H' dismisses the well-meaning yet ignorant protests
of the uninitiated, allowing that the nude can approach true nobility, but only under
the most conservative provisos: it must appeal to aesthetic sensibility and not
physical 'appetite'; its representation must be idealised rather than 'a literal transcript
of individual fact'; and the painter must adhere to conventions of execution. Artistic
endeavour is thus firmly reintegrated into its social provenance, for the conditions of
legitimacy to which the painter must accede are beyond his control. Moreover, the
skill and mastery necessary to produce the nude in its nobility are now 'an almost
extinct art,' and 'H' posits Edward Poynter's Diadumene as an example that falls
short of the noble ideal: it is 'a fine, firm, true, but not a magnificent creature.'
5 See letters from 'Senex' (22 May) and 'X.Y.Z' (23 May).
6 Times 21 May.
7 Times 21 May. See also letters from 'An English Girl' and 'A British Parent' (21 May), and H. G. F.
Taylor (25 May).
8 Times 23 May.
9 Times 22 May. See also letters from 'U. M. B.' and artist Frederick Wheeler (23 May), and artist
Edward J. Martyn (25 May).
10 Times 28 May. Alison Smith claims that Horsley also penned the initial 'British Matron' letter,
based on a reference by Robert Browning in his Parleying, but the connection does not seem fully
substantiated (Victorian Nude 227).
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Having been thus publicly censured, Poynter responded in defence of his own
works. The painting in question took as its subject the Esquiline Venus, excavated
from a Roman site in 1873 and Poynter attempts to recreate the origins of the statue's
creation.11 Poynter uses a mimetic argument to justify his painting, for if he is to
recreate the nascence of the sculpture, then 'the forced introduction of drapery would
be a prudery which would increase the evil, if evil there is.'12 He appeals to an
aesthetic sensibility and historical similitude from a broadly educative stance,
arguing that the painting purposed to 'form a beautiful setting to a beautiful figure'
while at the same time 'giv[ing] some idea ofwhat the bath-room of a lovely Greek
or Roman girl might be.' In highlighting these classical roots, Poynter insists that his
painting is far from the Salon baigneuses 'H' accuses his work of replicating, but
legitimate forms of art of which key English figures, such as Millais and Leighton,
have essayed. Contrary to being acts of overweening ambition, Poynter counters that
his attempts are a homage to the great masters forged in humility rather than
competition.
The immediate impetus for the British Matron's outrage was exhibitions of
'indecent pictures' at the Royal Academy and the Grosvenor Gallery, including
Poynter's Diadumene. Reviews of the two exhibitions show that there was a
perceived need to defend the nude on the part of critics, to delineate a category of
legitimate representations against less salutary depictions of the undraped figure. The
reviews also reveal that while individual works elicited different responses, there
were similarities in the reasoning behind particular assessments: criticism arose
11 As such, the painting can be seen in the context of the Pygmalion genre popular at this time.
12 Times 28 May. Poynter later painting drapery over the figure, additions he was to regret (Joseph A.
Kestner, Mythology andMisogyny: The Social Discourse ofNineteenth-Century British Classical-
Subject Painting (Madison, Wisconsin: U of Wisconsin P, 1989) 227).
The justification of historical or mythological similitude while commonly heard, was also
treated with scepticism. The Pall Mall Gazette, for example, notes cynically the pragmatic use of
'archaeological' contexts: 'You wish to paint from the nude [but] ... you are just a little bit afraid of
the British Matron ... [you] turn to your classical dictionary or to your history primer, and select a
legend. Put in two draped female figures in the background, and the picture becomes "The Judgment
of Paris." The addition of a male nude or of an ichthyosaurus will turn the model into Andromeda'
('Archaeology and Art,' Pall Mall Gazette 16 May 1891: 1).
13 'A Woman's Plea,' Times 20 May 1885.
The paintings included: at the Royal Academy, Poynter's Diadumene, Albert Moore's White
Hydrangea, Edward Armitage's After the Arena, Harrington Mann's Ulysses Unbinding the Sea-
Nymph's Veil, Philip Calderon's Andromeda, J. W. Waterhouse's St Eulalia, John Collier's Circe; and
at the Grosvenor Gallery, Charles William Mitchell's Hypatia, George Frederick Watts's Love and
Life, and a smaller study of Poynter's Diadumene.
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largely from common ideological and theoretical frameworks of reference, ones
which had been debated and wrestled with throughout the nineteenth century.
Ways of Seeing: The Dichotomy of Vision
If the moral danger of the nude lay in its ability to corrupt visually—the danger is
'exposed to the gaze ofmultitudes'14—attempts to recuperate the nude also sought to
redeem the aesthetic experience as a visual one. Poynter himself promoted life study
as the primary means of training the eye, for it is 'seeing which is the all-important
matter; it is his eye which [the student] must educate to learn the art of painting.'15
This visual schooling enables the artist to see beyond the facile attractions of
'external beauties, which are obvious to all the world,' to find those 'which underlie
the surface, and which only the mind of the artist stimulated by continue study, can
discover.'16 Life study thus has the dual goals of the 'development of faculties,' in
terms of perceptual, intellectual, and technical abilities, and the 'cultivation of
tastes,' in terms of aesthetic judgement.17 The eye is first trained 'to see, and see at
once, the tones and colours of his model,' the mastering of which is a necessary step
in the cultivation of the imaginative flair of the 'mind's eye' which sees beyond the
superficial to latent beauties.18
That the mapping out of a legitimate nude is correlated to a particular way of
seeing is evident in conservative art critic Harry Quilter's assessment of the English
nude. Quilter's comparison of different approaches is articulated not just in terms of
differences in execution, but as different ways of looking:
To one man [the undraped figure] is a collection of muscles, another sees
chiefly the framework on which the muscles are stretched, a third sees only
the form which some pet old masters saw, and models his conception from
14 Time 25 May 1888.
15 Edward J. Poynter, Ten Lectures on Art (London, 1879) 159. Poynter is specifically challenging the
English academic system that permitted drawing from life only after lengthy study of antique casts.
16
Poynter 113-14. Poynter's advice recalls Whistler's privileging of the artist's eye which bypasses
superficial visual pleasures for more esoteric beauty. Significantly, given Whistler's denigration of
Ruskin's visual competencies, Poynter argues that Ruskin is 'blind' to aesthetic beauty: Ruskin






that, another sees nothing under the skin, and another sees only a woman
stripped of her clothes.19
Quilter argues that these ways of seeing the figure—as physiological structure or
anatomical specimen, through the lens of the antique, as surface without form, or in
realist specificity—are 'wrong' ways of viewing the human form. The 'true manner'
apprehends not only the external and the internal qualities, but also that which
animates and ennobles the body, be it 'sense, spirit, intellect [or] soul': 'If a painter
does not see that in the human body, his pictures bear inevitable witness to the fact,
and, no matter how beautifully they are painted, can never be otherwise than
offensive.'20 The cause of offence is not nudity itself, but a deficiency in how the
painter sees the figure. Quilter resuscitates the nude not by separating morality from
art, but by reconfiguring morality as a particular way of looking.
In comparison, P. G. Hamerton's defence of French painter Jean-Leon
Gerome's Phryne before the Areopagus by recourse to an 'artistic spirit' insists on a
rupture between moral and aesthetic sensibilities, and is thus far removed from
Quilter's understanding of'spirit':
The leaning towards sensual subjects evinced by Gerome [is] ... due far more
to artistic predilections for certain qualities of line and modelling, best found
in such subjects, than to prurience of feeling. When the artistic spirit is
powerful, and has predilections of this kind, it is apt to over-rule all other
considerations. The spectator, who does not share this spirit, sees immorality
where none was intended, and, as he sees nothing else, imagines that the
9 1
work was produced only for immoral purposes.
Where Quilter claims that beauty of treatment without a morality of seeing can only
be offensive, Hamerton argues that beauty of treatment transcends all notions of
morality and offence. For Hamerton, the artist's preoccupation with form and
execution informs his entire relationship with his subject, overriding any concern
over the issue of sexual morality. By contrast, the spectator who lacks 'the artistic
spirit' is afflicted with a kind of aesthetic blindness; seeing 'nothing else' but an
imagined immorality, he imputes to others an imagined offence. That Gerome's
painting depicts an act of communal spectatorship—the moment when Phryne
19
Harry Quilter, 'The Art ofWatts,' Contemporary Review 41 (1882): 272.
20
Quilter, 'Art ofWatts' 272.
21 P. G. Hamerton, 'The Artistic Spirit,' Fortnightly Review 1 (1865): 335.
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disrobes before her judges—brings the question of the legitimacy of viewing into the
foreground, exacerbating the ambivalence of the viewing experience. Other
reviewers, while praising Gerome's technique, write more guardedly about his
subject. The Spectator expresses reservation over the 'undue voluptuousness' of the
work, stating that the 'leering gaze and sensual expression which are displayed in the
most prominent of the judges should have been confined to one or two of the
obscurer personages, and not permitted to attract the eye.'22 The Gentleman's
Magazine likewise takes issue with the unwarranted focus on 'the sensual and lustful
expressions,' although allowing that a less exaggerated 'repulsiveness' might
appropriately be portrayed to bolster the painting's denunciation of the judges'
hypocrisy: the distinction between a moral intention and an exploitation of prurience
seems to be a fragile one.23 More significantly, the painting's offence lies not in the
nude form itself—the figure of Phryne unclothed, this reviewer is at pains to note, 'is
perfectly refined and pure'24—but in the disproportionate attention given to an act of
illicit visual consumption.23 In this sense, Gerome's painting and the responses to it
recapitulate one particular reading of the British Matron scenario: it is not nudity that
corrupts its viewers, but the impure viewer who besmirches the nude.
Elsewhere, Hamerton offers a more severe assessment ofGerome. His
Grande Piscine de Brousse, with its strict adherence to life, its preponderance of
detail, and its meretricious handling, violates the principles of ideal treatment:
[T]he want of idealisation alike in the forms and the attitudes of the women,
place [s] us in the position of some over-curious spectator who has bribed the
22 'Exhibition of French and Flemish Pictures,' Spectator 1983 (30 June 1866): 719.
23 'Exhibition of French and Flemish Schools,' Gentleman's Magazine n.s. 1 (1866): 883.
24 Gentleman's 884.
25 This instance might be compared to the case ofMillais's The Knight Errant (1870), a medieval
chivalric scene depicting an armoured knight freeing a naked maiden bound to a tree. In the earliest
version, the woman's gaze is directed at the viewer; in a later revision, Millais repainted the figure so
as to avert her glance. The editing, a kind of self-censorship, was a placatory nod to Victorian gender
conventions which imbued a feminine immodesty to a direct gaze. Richard Jenkyns suggests that the
spectatorial connection in the original design *involv[ed] the spectator with her and the knight in a
disagreeable triangular conspiracy of lust' (Dignity and Decadence: Victorian Art and the Classical
Inheritance (London: Fontana, 1992) 118).
The pictorial significance of the female gaze as a symbol of transactional promise can also be
seen in the Saturday Review's tirade against the Holywell Street traffic in pornographic prints, citing
the obtrusive window displays of 'stereoscopic slides, representing women more or less naked, and
generally leering at the spectator with a conscious or elaborately unconscious impudence' ('Holywell-
Street Revived,' Saturday Review 21 August 1858: 180). Here again is the conflation of the undraped
body and a suggestive gaze.
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bath-keeper for a furtive inspection of the scene. The feelings excited by a
work of this class are as different as possible from the charm of the ideal.26
The anxiety over the representation of a prurient spectatorship in Phryne bespeaks an
implicit unease over the viewer's own act of spectatorship; here, Hamerton openly
critiques the way in which Grande Piscine positions the viewer and circumscribes
and defines his visual experience. The viewer is interpellated as a lascivious
spectator and the pool-side scene is presented as a spectacle for clandestine physical
gratification: the shared ogling and culpability that remain unspoken in reviews of
Phryne is made explicit. The result is a life-sized portrayal of nakedness on 'a very
low moral and intellectual level' rather than an aesthetic rendering, and shows how
the 'civilising' potential of the art can be distorted by a prurient end.27 Foregrounding
an act of spectatorship that is impure, Gerome's paintings challenge the fortitude of
their viewers: it is therefore not only the artist's gaze that is under examination, but
the audience's as well.
Implicit in these comments is a Cartesian bifurcation of visual perception into
an ennobling gaze, whether intellectual, spiritual, or moral, on the one hand, and a
bodily or sensual gaze, on the other. This dichotomy recalls Joshua Reynolds's neo¬
classical theory of painting in his addresses to the Academy. Privileging mind and
reason over body and matter, Reynolds establishes a hierarchy of value based on
intellect, in terms of both the 'mental labour' invested in the artwork and the 'mental
pleasure' it generates.28 At the acme of artistic achievement is the 'grand style' in
painting which extracts the sublime from nature and distils the perfect form from the
ephemeral particularities of lived experience. The pursuit of the greatest art is also
the pursuit of the ideal, and the painter is released from the shackles of fact and
materiality to range free in an idealising imagination. The opposition between the
intellectual and the bodily persists throughout the Discourses: simplicity and repose
are set up against meretricious posturing; 'the most sublime ideas' against 'the
lowest sensuality'; 'the desires of the mind' against 'the gross senses'; the gravitas of
26 P. G. Hamerton, Man in Art: Studies in Religious andHistorical Art, Portrait, and Genre (London:
Macmillan, 1892)42.
27
Hamerton, Man in Art 42.
28 Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art, ed. Robert R. Wark (1797; New Haven: Yale UP, 1997) 57.
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Raphael against the 'bustle' of Paulo.29 These explicit binaries suffuse Reynolds's
writing in a more general manner. The bias against the secondary term is evident in
his description of the Venetian school, for instance, where he indicts the 'seducing
qualities' of such artists as Tintoretto and Paulo, who have 'exhausted all the powers
of florid eloquence, to debauch the young and unexperienced.'30 The consumption of
such works is figured metaphorically as an act of seduction, and against the 'mental
pleasure' proffered as the pinnacle of aesthetic experience, these works offer a
physical, and blatantly sexual, encounter.
Reynolds's theory was formulated against the backdrop of late eighteenth-
century England. The rise of modern commercial society had eroded the ideals of
civic humanism that held sway in the first half of the century and Reynolds sought to
resuscitate these ideals by redefining and appealing to a public art.31 Ideal form is
thus set up specifically against the mechanistic as a bulwark against the
individualising tendencies of mercantilism and the pursuit of private interests.
Although concerned about the encroachment of individualist principles of political
economy onto the more expansive ideals of a civic humanist republic, these ideals at
this stage still seemed salvageable. But by the nineteenth century, the composition of
the polity had changed substantially and irrevocable, such that the issue of the public
had become a highly charged one and assumptions about a shared culture had
become overburdened by the public's heterogeneous membership. The republic of
taste that for Reynolds both replicated the political republic and prepared its citizens
for membership in this political republic was no longer a tenable ideal. Thus, the
echoes of Reynoldsian theory in the latter part of the nineteenth century borrow his
ideas but either rearticulate them in a later political or social context or insert them in
a depoliticised aesthetic. Barrell suggests that Reynolds sought to 'shape ... an
29
Reynolds 65, 244, 64.
30
Reynolds 67.
31 See John Barrell, The Political Theory ofPainting: From Reynolds to Hazlitt(New Haven: Yale
UP, 1986).
32 Barrell suggests that in pursuit of this political function of art, the ability to abstract from the
particular to the ideal had a two-fold benefit: first, it allowed the viewer to transcend the particularity
of individual differences to find commonality in the contemplation of art; second, the viewer trained
to recognise abstract concepts is also able to grasp the abstract virtues defining the civic polity (78-9).
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audience into a public,' and while commentators almost a century later wrestled with
similar ideas, this was a vastly different public to Reynolds's.33
Nonetheless, Reynolds's opposition between an abstract ideal and the
materiality of quotidian detail informs reviews of the 1885 exhibitions. Criticism of
nude exhibits centred on the discrepancy between a purported elevated subject,
whether mythological, allegorical, or biblical, and its deficiency in execution. The
Academy's Claude Phillips judges Moore's White Hydrangea a 'failure,' citing an
anachronistic distortion of its classical subject by the 'pretty, modern, girlish head'
which renders the whole less exalted than 'comic.'34 The Builder finds a 'ludicrous
impropriety' to the figure's realistic depiction: 'it is as ifwe were sitting in a rather
aesthetic drawing-room, and the young lady of the house suddenly tripped in, with a
little conventional simper on her face, and an unfortunate but entirely innocent
forgetfulness of the fact that she had nothing on but her cap.'35 Calderon's The
Woodland Spring suffers from a similar 'prosaic' treatment, depicting less a nymph
than 'a plump country girl who is catching cold by sitting out naked on the bank of a
brook.'36 Quilter censures Watts's Love and Life for failing as allegorical art: the
nude figure 'is simply a little snub-nosed girl,' lacking the gravity to bear the weight
■j n
of the allegorical message.
In Reynoldsian terms, these paintings all fall short of a universalising ideal,
failing to abstract from the naked body to the artistic nude. Traces of the artistic
process and contemporary resonances—the snub-nosed model, the girlish figure—
have not been adequately expunged from the works, and the all-important
transformative moment from the painter's material present to a mythological or
historical realm has failed to eventuate. While assessments of individual paintings
may differ, the criteria for these judgements remain largely similar: they take as a
33 Barrell 93.
34 Claude Phillips, 'Fine Art. The Royal Academy,' Academy 21 (9 May 1885): 335.
35 'The Royal Academy Exhibition,' The Builder 48 (9 May 1885): 647.
36 'The Royal Academy Exhibition; 647.
37
[Harry Quilter], 'The Grosvenor Gallery. (First Notice),' Spectator 9 May 1885: 611. These
examples are typical of much critical commentary. See also reviews from the Saturday Review, the
Athenaeum, the Spectator, and the Art Journal.
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premise the separation of visual consumption into an intellectual and a physical or
sensual form.38
Blackwood's Magazine more explicitly condemns the countermanding of
Reynoldsian principles in contemporary practice. Artists have abandoned the pursuit
of the ideal to pander instead to a debased public taste and in so doing, 'might seem
in malice to reverse the Discourse.'39 The result is a kind ofMalthusianism in the art
field where 'the few may prosper, but the many must starve' with an output of the
'vainest mediocrity,' a situation akin to the crisis in the literary sphere as conceived
by Gissing. Blackwood's mounts a surprising defence of the nudes on display,
invoking a familiar argument based on viewer sensibility: '[t]he ignorant—those, for
example, who howl against Mr Poynter's "Diadumene"—see but naked nature. The
educated overlook the nudity in the art.'40 Censorious injunctions are dismissed as
perceptual deficiencies while the initiated have the ability to see beyond a concrete
materiality. If the British Matron calls for the censoring of offence by its removal,
the 'educated' censor at a prior stage, by a perceptual filtering at the level of
consumption. Indeed, the season's nudes are held up as nodes of resistance against
the trend towards materialism. Where classical art exemplifies the fusion of ideal and
real, the soul and the body, contemporary society is skewed towards the material,
fixating on external elements at the expense of form and ideal type. Seeing 'but
naked nature' is figured as a materialist form of consumption, a kind of mechanical
process akin to the exercises of manual dexterity that art has largely become. This
j8 The etymological variants of the word 'sense' had significant implications in nineteenth-century
discourses of art. While the term 'sensual' referred to the carnal, the term 'sensuous' implied an
intellectual and a spiritual element as well as the physiological senses themselves. See Smith,
Victorian Nude 127.
A further distinction should be made between the idea of intellectual as the mental faculties
and as an overly academic dissection. This latter mode was frequently adduced as an incorrect way of
portraying the nude, resulting in a sterilely naturalistic work devoid of spirit. The distinction is best
articulated by Ernest Chesneau, who specifically targets male nudes, which, even while anatomically
and academically correct, are still 'destitute ofmind.' This criticism is voiced within a broader attack
on those who 'seek in the nude nothing more than a subject for pedantic scholarship' (The Education
ofthe Artist, trans. Clara Bell (London, 1886) 129, 123). More generally, the English aesthetic
tradition that emerged in the nineteenth century forged its identity in opposition to the perceived
academism ofContinental schools by emphasising what Colin Trodd calls a 'liberal empiricism'
('Academic Cultures: the Royal Academy and the Commerce of Discourse in Victorian London,' Art
and the Academy in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Rafael Cardoso Denis and Trodd (Manchester:
Manchester UP, 2000) 180).
39 'Decline ofArt' 1.
40 'Decline ofArt' 13. Other nudes that are praised include Waterhouse's St Eulalia, Watt's Love and
Life, and Armitage's After the Arena.
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kind of artistic impoverishment culminates in naturalism, where art becomes merely
'something to be measured and weighed, as any other commercial commodity.'41
Blackwood's thus merges its critique of the unschooled eye with stylistic analysis
and a condemnation of commodity culture.
The social relevance Blackwood's infuses in its discussion of art is matched
by the political contextualisation ofReynolds's aesthetic criteria specifically into an
1880s setting:
Reason and imagination are gifts comparatively rare, but the senses are
organs pertaining to all sorts and conditions ofmen; therefore the arts pander
to sensation, and, like popular politics, obtain applause by realising through
low expedients the greatest happiness of the greatest number.42
Blackwood's moves seamlessly in condemnation between political democracy and a
demagogy of taste. As fundamental biological attributes, the sensory faculties are too
indiscriminately—too democratically—distributed to be accurate gauges of aesthetic
value, while works that appeal solely to the senses are a betrayal of art's noble
purpose. The political analogy extends to the recent expansion of the Royal
Academy: the decision to increase the number of admissions is condemned as 'acting
the part of certain politicians who lower the franchise, let in the flood of democracy,
and with the consequent multiplication of constituents, open additional voting-
booths.'43 The complicity of the Royal Academy's governing council is an abuse of
its hegemonic role, leaving only the art critic to stem this 'flood of democracy,' a
democracy that conflates the sensual consumer and the sham artist into one
threatening mass.44 Writing a year after the Third Reform Act of 1884, the reference
to the expansion of suffrage has direct contemporary resonance, yet it also recalls
Mill's ambivalence towards the public as discussed in Chapter One. In this sense, an
41 'Decline ofArt' 25. The commodification of art was a particularly contentious issue for the Royal
Academy as early as the time of its inception in 1768. With its ties to royalty on the one hand and its
connection to the art market on the other, the Royal Academy straddled an older mode of production
through patronage and the increasingly dominant power of the commerce (Colin Trodd, 'Representing
the Victorian Royal Academy: the Properties ofCulture and the Promotion of Art,' Barlow and
Trodd).
42 'Decline ofArt' 3.
43 'Decline ofArt' 5. Blackwood's comments make sense when read in light of the passing of the
Third Reform Act in 1884 and the Redistribution Act in 1885, which significantly extended suffrage.
44 The reviewer writes of the critic's task,' [t]he worst works must be eliminated, and when the gross
mass has been well winnowed, the chaff can be thrown on one side, and the good grain weighed or
measured' (2). For a discussion of the formation of the Royal Academy, see Gordon Fyfe, Art, Power
andModernity: English Art Institutions, 1750-1950 (London: Leicester UP, 2000).
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art review that takes issue with a facile and censorious moralism is allied to Mill's
broader social and political commentary. Both are responding to changes in the
composition of a public: Mill, the public of the enfranchised, and Blackwood's, the
public of art patrons.
This convergence of issues of the public, art, subjective vision, and regulation
was already evident in the 1857 debates over the passing of the Obscene Publications
Act. Challenging Lord Campbell's Bill on the grounds that it failed to discriminate
between high art and obscene prints, Lord Lyndhurst presented a hypothetical
situation involving an uncultured informer's or policeman's encounter with a
Correggio print:
[He] sees in a window something which he conceives to be a licentious print
... He sees the picture of a woman stark naked, lying down, and a satyr
standing by her with an expression on his face which shows most distinctly
what his feelings are and what is his object.45
Ignorant of the classical protocols which provide a conceptual template that
contextualises and elevates, he sees in a celebrated work only material for
prosecution. Jupiter and Antiope are ousted from a mythological empyrean to a
smutty scene, and a great master's work is seized and destroyed. In response, Lord
Campbell reassured his opponents that there 'was a broad and marked distinction
between such pictures [as Correggio's]' and 'abominable prints ... which possessed
no artistic merits, and which could only be regarded with aversion by every right-
minded person.'46 Campbell takes for granted that this distinction is self-evident and
that 'artistic merits' can be recognised communally, but the anxieties about the nude
in art and the effort expended to differentiate the artistic nude from pornographic
versions suggest otherwise. On the contrary, the boundary between the two had to be
constantly restated and reinforced, and legitimate images continually sectioned off
from illegitimate ones. The targeting of prints and photographs used for academic
study in the decades following the passing of the Act blurred this boundary further:
prosecutions were made despite protestation that these were artistic aids. That such
actions were taken against nude prints in spite of claims of academic intent suggests
that the distinction between art and pornography lay in perceived final usage rather
45 Hansard, vol. 146 (25 June 1857): col. 331.
46 Hansard, vol. 146 (25 June 1857): col. 337.
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than in original purpose. If this legislation sought to regulate obscene publications,
then its focus needed to be on these publications' destination and once again,
censorship's focus is shifted from the contents of the image to its audience, to its
public.
From Mid- to Late-Century: The Genealogy of Regulation
That the British Matron exchange debated the obscenity of paintings in the Royal
Academy and the Grosvenor Gallery would seem to suggest that Lord Lyndhurst's
fears had eventuated. Critics such as Alison Smith and Philip MacEvansoneya rightly
identify an added urgency in attitudes towards the nude in the 1880s, spurred on by
the social and political exigencies of the decade.47 The social purity movement
during this period focused on the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Act, targeting the
hypocrisy of male upper-class vice. More specifically, 1885 was a critical point
which saw the setting up of the National Vigilance Association whose prosecution of
Vizetelly was discussed in Chapter Three, the publication ofWilliam Stead's
sensational expose of prostitution and white slavery, 'The Maiden Tribute of Modern
Babylon' in the Pall Mall Gazette, and the subsequent passing of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act.
Most obviously, the issue of life modelling was caught up in the momentum
of these agitations. Defenders emphasised its pedagogical role and the
professionalism of both artist and model: Hamerton asserts in Ruskinian terms that
life drawing in the Royal Academy was all 'work and discipline,' and that models are
'a respectable class of people' employed in 'a business which is all patience'; The
Artist insists on the respectability of the model, arguing that her requisite physical
beauty would be destroyed through dissipated living.48 Nonetheless, the figure of the
female model was the site of contradictory projections: as an unclothed female, she
contravened Victorian proprieties, yet an artistic rendering elevated this infringement
to high art, and the resultant instability of the nude meant that its artistic legitimacy
47
Smith, Victorian Nude] Philip MacEvansoneya, '"A Libel in Paint": Religious and Artistic
Controversy Around P. H. Calderon's The Renunciation ofSt Elizabeth ofHungary,' Journal of
Victorian Culture 1.2 (1996).
48
Hamerton, Man ofArt 37; 'Models and Morals,' Artist 6 (1885): 33 i.
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was never fully assured.49 Moreover, professional models were largely drawn from
the working classes, a social status in tension with the mythological subjects for
which they posed. The categories ofmodel, actress, and prostitute were merged in
the public imagination into a compound figure of the public woman. 50 As working
women taking part in economic transactions, they impinged into the public
masculine world of commerce and exchange and physically breached the borders of
the domestic realm, thus violating the ideology of separate spheres. As such, the
model, as was the prostitute, was considered an unruly and dangerous figure.51
In this sense, the British Matron controversy can be situated within a greater
movement against vice and immorality in the 1880s. But equally, it is also possible
to view the affair in the context of the history of the regulation of the visual arts, a
perspective that is less emphasised in extant studies of the nineteenth-century nude.
To do this, I return to the incipience and early years of the public gallery. Agitations
for a public gallery had already begun in the latter part of the eighteenth century,
with intermittent calls to establish a national collection, but the state at this point was
reluctant to commit to such a project.52 Private collections could be viewed by
appointment, but access was necessarily limited and the shift from a private to a
public trust did not occur until the early decades of the nineteenth century. The
underlying impetuses and explanations of this shift are complex but in his history of
the National Gallery, Jonathan Conlin singles out three specific functions of the
public collection: as military monuments, artworks would have commemorative
functions; to improve British manufacturing by providing the means of cultivating
49 France Borzello, The Artist's Model (London: Junction, 1982) 73. Borzello thus concludes that the
female nude model represented 'a clash between the values of art and those of life.' For further
discussion of models and specific paintings, see Ilaria Bignamini and Martin Postle, ed., The Artist's
Model: Its Role in British Artfrom Lely to Etty (Nottingham: Nottingham U Art Gallery, 1991) and
Martin Postle and William Vaughan, ed., The Artist's Model: From Etty to Spencer (London: Merrell
Holberton, 1999).
50 There was, however, evidence that on occasion, the professions ofmodel and prostitute did indeed
overlap. See Martin Postle, 'Behind the Screen: The Studio Model,' Postle and Vaughan 61.
51 The connection is made explicitly by 'Senex,' whose letter to the Times denounces the exhibition
nudes as 'mute yet speaking evidences of the sad fate of other English girls—once as innocent and
modest as they are—whom hunger and want have driven to one of two courses, each equally
humiliating if not quite equally deplorable'(77we.s 22 May 1885).
52 Noted figures in the art world such as Reynolds, James Barry, and John Flaxman had discussed the
possibility of a public gallery, and there were moves to acquire Sir Robert Walpole's collection in
1777, which eventually went to Catherine II of Russia in 1779.
53 Giles Waterfield, 'Palaces of Art?' Waterfield 17-28. See also Conlin for a discussion of the
eighteenth-century origins of the National Gallery.
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taste in Britain's labourers; and to preserve a historical canon by collating the
nation's best works.54 This movement also followed a shift in the balance of social
and political power from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie, and in the art world, a
shift in the modes of production from individual patronage to a commercial art
market. The Royal Academy straddled these two paradigms of production (see note
41), while the first public gallery, the Dulwich Picture Gallery, formed in 1817,
emerged from commercial enterprise, but a fully state-sponsored public exhibitory
space was not established until 1824, with the founding of the National Gallery
through the state's purchase of the collection and Pall Mall residence of the deceased
banker, John Julius Angerstein.55
In addition to the three practical aims identified by Conlin, underlying the
idea of the public gallery was also the belief in the power of art to educate and
elevate, and hence the issue of public accessibility recurs in discussions throughout
the century.56 If art was to have a social function, then the question of its audience
becomes crucial as well. The founding of the National Gallery can be seen in the
context of the drive to provide 'rational' recreation for the working classes from the
1820s onwards, itself a response to fears of Chartism and urban unrest. The provision
of edificatory amusements, it was hoped, would direct working-class energy away
from both grosser pastimes such as drinking and cockfighting and subversive social
movements.57 Public institutions such as galleries and museums were held up as
positive and productive alternatives to traditional working-class pursuits, inculcating
54
Conlin, 47.
55 The Dulwich Picture Gallery was formed after the state refused to purchase the collection of old
masters amassed by the art dealer Noel Joseph Desenfans. Desenfans had been under instruction from
King Stanislas Augustus of Poland to assemble the core of a national collection, only to be stymied by
Augustus's abdication. Desenfans's heir, Sir Francis Bourgeois, ultimately bequeathed the collection
to Dulwich College.
56 Charlotte Klonk contends that the National Gallery's origins were enmeshed in debates over class
interests and definitions of nationhood that were current in this period, with the passing of the 1832
Reform Act. As such, its founding was inextricably connected to questions of public and the
composition of this public ('The National Gallery in London and its Public,' Consumers and Luxury:
Consumer Culture in Europe 1650-1850, ed. Maxine Berg and Helen Clifford (Manchester:
Manchester UP, 1999)230-1).
57 See Peter Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian England: Rational Recreation and the Contestfor
Control, 1830-1885 (1978; London: Methuen, 1987) for an account of the rational recreation
movement.
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a refined sensibility whether understood as the rightful heritage of the common
worker or as an instrumental form of social control.58
This idea of culture, and specifically, the culture of the visual arts, as social
panacea and spiritual restorative, is expressed by Charles Kingsley, who, in 1848,
exhorts England's labourers to find solace in the offerings in public galleries:
Picture-galleries should be the workman's paradise, and garden of pleasure,
to which he goes to refresh his eyes and heart with beautiful shapes and sweet
colouring, when they are wearied with dull bricks and mortar, and the ugly
colourless things which fill the workshop and the factory.39
For Kingsley, the beauty of nature is God's blessing to us—it is his 'handwriting'
revealed to man—and while the 'foul alley [s]' and 'crowded lodging[s]' of the
metropolis offer no such bucolic succour, a stroll through the National Gallery will
more than suffice.60 This is where 'the townsman may take his country walk,' and for
the 'toil-worn worker,' the beauty on display acts as a promise of beauty in the
hereafter, an escapist yet placatory foretaste of a Christian paradise.61 Kingsley is
perhaps overly sanguine about the meliorative effects of the visual arts: the
transformation in the street urchin is immediate, his 'countenance seem[ing] to grow
handsomer and nobler on the spot' as he 'drink[s] in and reflect[s] unknowingly, the
beauty of the picture he is studying'; the labourer comes to realise that the noble
figures depicted are 'men of like passions with himself,' and discovers in this
moment of fraternal identification a new sense of self-worth. Art in Kingsley's
formulation becomes a kind of elixir, its transformative powers and the sense of
shared humanity it fosters allowing the labourer to transcend urban degradation and
poverty. Yet the cultural topography Kingsley maps onto the London cityscape is
open to an alternative interpretation, and the model of beneficent exchange he
envisions is easily and dangerously invertible. In his Utopian vision, art elevates and
the Gallery space itself is geographically a beacon amidst its industrial environs.
Viewed less optimistically though, galleries are not so much interspersed sanctuaries
58
Again, it is clear that the public projected in this ameliorative ideal is different from Reynolds's
republic of taste comprising of free, gentlemen citizens.








nourishing the urban surrounds, but isolated pockets under siege to a monstrous and
inexorable force.
This tension between the ideas of culture as a civilising power and as fragile
artefacts under threat is evident in mid-century inquiries into the efficacy of public
art institutions. Debates over the ideal location for the National Gallery, for instance,
raised concerns over the effect of the urban environment on artworks. The 1850
Select Committee on the National Gallery, appointed to consider the housing of the
Gallery, and the 'best mode of Preserving and Exhibiting to the Public the Works of
Art given to the Nation,' investigated the potential harm caused by industrial and
urban effluvial deposits—sulphurous discharge, miasmata, dust, and smoke—on
paintings. The place of the Gallery's visitors in this matrix of harm is a complex
and ambivalent one. The continual flow of patrons opens up physical channels
through which external contaminants can enter into the building. At the same time,
the multitudes are bearers of pollution, tracking in mud on their shoes or leaving
behind detritus, such as food scraps and other refuse. In a further slippage though, the
crowds themselves become sources of pollution, as concern is voiced over the effects
of human effluvia, of sweat, breath, or even, as the Keeper of the National Gallery,
Thomas Uwins, testifies, Tittle accidents .. .which are constantly visible upon the
floors' by the offspring of 'the lower class of people.'64 The 'dirt and dust' of
London that is physically transferred by the crowds is metonymically transferred
onto the crowds, such that they are at once, channels, carriers, and sources of
injury.63 Yet there is still a reluctance to relinquish the original educative intentions
of the Gallery. Echoing Kingsley's approach to the visual arts, the Committee Report
stands by the claim that 'one of the great objects of all public Institutions is, if
possible, to form the public taste, and gratify the public eye,' but concedes that
further regulation is warranted, as for instance, the exclusion of young children,
following the practice of the British Museum, and greater vigilance in policing.66
63 Great Britain, House of Commons, Select Committee on National Gallery. Report, Minutes of
Evidence, Appendix, Plan, Index, Parliamentary Papers 15.1 (1850): iii.
64 Select Committee on National Gallery para. 83. See also the 1857 Report on the National Gallery
Site Commission, where the Dean of St Paul's questions the 'bad effects' of'human exudation' (Great
Britain, House ofCommons, Royal Commission on Site for National Gallery. Report, Minutes of
Evidence, Appendix, Index, Parliamentary Papers 24.1 (1857): para. 1197)
65 Select Committee on National Gallery vii.
66 Select Committee on National Gallery v.
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That there is concern over 'improprieties' in usage of the Gallery—'as a place to eat
luncheons in, and for refreshment, and for appointments'—implies a corresponding
proper usage and is thus an acknowledgement of the founding ideology of the
institution.67 That remedial measures encompassed monitoring the behaviour of the
Gallery's patrons suggests that, in this instance, the regulation of the consumption of
the visual arts was conceived as an issue of public order.
At the centre of this anxiety was the encounter between the work of art and its
audience, a confrontation appositely expressed by Matthew Arnold's opposition
between Culture and Anarchy. Insofar as Arnold defines culture as 'the best that has
been thought and known in the world,' the National Gallery as the depository and
exhibitory site of allegedly the nation's and Europe's finest works would seem to be
r o
the apotheosis of visual culture. Like Kingsley, Arnold bestowed a great social
power to culture. But where Kingsley saw art as a means of realising a socialist ideal
through the mutual appreciation of beauty, for Arnold, culture is the fostering ground
for a new class of governing elite. Writing in 1867, Arnold addresses what he sees as
a crisis in authority. The traditional holders of power, the aristocratic Barbarians,
possess sweetness but not light: their 'high chivalrous style' is testament to a
sensibility to beauty in its external forms, but the paucity of the interior attributes of
reason or intelligence render them ineffectual rulers in an age of expansion.69 Nor yet
has the emergent Philistine middle class provided a viable alternative, abjuring
sweetness and light in its adherence to a sterile and instrumental machinery, whether
of free trade, reform, industry, or wealth. To the working classes, Arnold concedes a
kind of ruffian honesty, but this is as yet an 'inchoate and untrained' virtue, and thus
at some remove from perfection.70 Wed to a philosophy of self-gratification, the
hegemonic classes lack the fortitude to govern, while the resultant fragmentation of
society has led to a loss of a national vision. This atomisation ensures that power
inheres in no group, which, while safeguarding against individual tyranny, is
67 Select Committee on National Gallery para. 82. That there are such 'improprieties' would also
suggest that readings of art institutions strictly as dispensers of an official culture fail to account for
resistance in usage and reduce the complex interactions into a purely instrumental account of art and
culture.
68 Matthew Arnold, Culture andAnarchy and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1993) 79.
69
Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 90, 102.
70
Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 97.
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defenceless against the threat of anarchy with the spread of this 'doing as one likes'
philosophy to the Populace or residuum.71 Thus, to combat this threat, Arnold argues
for the reassertion of the principle of authority: 'We discover that only in right reason
can we get a source of sure authority; and culture brings us towards right reason.'72
In the progression from culture to right reason to sure authority, Arnold raises the
status of culture from effete academism to political colossus. Culture, defined as the
'love of perfection'—the love, and also the study and pursuit of perfection—is the
cultivation of the best self, and it is from this pool of cultivated individuals that
Arnold proposes to draw the nation's rulers.
Arnold sets up the conceptual categories as well as the rhetorical terms which
were to prevail in discussions of the nude throughout the latter part of the century.
The eponymous pairing of 'Culture and Anarchy' recurs in various guises throughout
the essay: 'order and security' against 'anarchy and social disintegration'; harmony
and perfection against error and confusion; best selves against ordinary selves.73
These terms are reminiscent of Reynolds's binaries, but are placed in the social and
political context of the 1860s.74 Culture as defined by Arnold becomes a mandate for
reform and licence to speak as a universalising and national voice: culture is 'not
satisfied till we all come to a perfect man,' and the exercise of any authoritative
power or coercive force is legitimated as the pursuit of perfection.75
The interplay between culture, order, and authority is consonant with the mid-
century concerns over National Gallery attendance and more generally, the efficacy
of culture as a civilising process. Thus, while Kingsley praises the British Museum in
71 Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 105. Arnold reconfigures traditional class boundaries, claiming that
the diligent labourers of the working class share with the Philistines an over-reliance on industrial
machinery.
72
Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 151.
73
Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 89.
74 The ominous prognosis of Culture andAnarchy was in part Arnold's response to the 1866 'Hyde
Park riots,' when members of the Reform League marched to Hyde Park to protest the defeat of the
Reform Bill. See Edward Alexander, Matthew Arnold, John Ruskin, and the Modern Temper
(Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1973); Linda Dowling, The Vulgarization ofArt: The Victorians and
Aesthetic Democracy (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1996). John L. Mahoney suggests that Arnold's
cultural ideal, with art given a socio-political function, is anticipated by Reynolds. This may be true to
some degree, but we need to consider the different contexts of the problems each commentator was
addressing ('Reynolds's "Discourses on Art": The Delicate Balance of Neoclassic Aesthetics,' British
Journal ofAesthetics 18.2 (1987): 130). Catherine Gallagher finds similarities between Mill's On
Representative Government and Culture and Anarchy, which suggest a similar anxiety about an
overburdened body politic (The Industrial Reformation ofEnglish Fiction: Social Discourse and
Narrative Form 1832-1867 (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985) 228-37).
75 Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 78-9.
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which is everywhere evident 'order, care, attention,' critics of gallery visitors rue the
disturbance to order, the lack of care, and the want of attention of these offenders in
their improper usage of the gallery space, as evident, for example, from Uwins's
Select Committee testimony.76 A similar vocabulary is evident in the 1880s. The
1885 Blackwood's review recalls this Arnoldian binary: in pointed response to the
President's selection rationale of 'variety in aim and variety in expression,' the
reviewer maintains that the contents of this particular exhibition are 'not merely
varied ... but absolutely chaotic andpurposeless.'11 James Jackson Jarves in 1874
claims that the noble ideals of the classical nude have fallen victim to 'the cravings
of disordered imaginations in shapes of absolute sensuality.'78 Arnold writes of
'outbreaks of rowdyism' in the descent to social and political anarchy, yet the phrase
is as apt a description of unruly gallery patrons as of Blackwood's dismissal of the
Royal Academy's haphazard offerings or a critique of a national aesthetic.79
In contrast to anarchy and disorder, Arnold posits the art of Ancient Greece
as the exemplar of perfection, lauding its repose and grace, 'a serenity which comes
from having made order among ideas and harmonised them.'80 That the terms echo
those employed in the legitimation of the nude is not surprising, given that both
Arnold and the defenders of the nude share a Victorian valorisation of certain
Hellenic qualities.81 David J. DeLaura claims that Arnold's Hellenism is heavily
biased towards Appollonian at the expense of Dionysian elements, privileging the
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more conservative virtues of balance, harmony, and repose. But these were
precisely the terms—the 'noble simplicity and sedate grandeur' that Winckelmann
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Kingsley 184.
77 'Decline ofArt' 6, my emphasis.
78 James Jackson Jarves, 'The Nude in Modern Art and Society,' Art Journal n.s. 13 (1874):
65, my emphasis.
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Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 85.
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Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 90.
81 Blackwood's, for example, defends the year's nudes as being 'singular for repose, reticence, and
decorum' ('Decline ofArt' 12). Hamerton makes explicit reference to the neutrality of expression in
Greek sculpture: 'the right treatment of the naked figure requires a minimum of expression in the face;
and the finest art has the calm of the Greek statues' (Man in Art 43).
82 DeLaura traces Arnold's influences back to the eighteenth-century German Hellenists, such as
Goethe, Schiller, and Winckelmann, but argues that Arnold's one-sided appropriation presents a more
tempered version than the more rounded and hence more factual Hellenism of Pater's (Hebrew and
Hellene in Victorian England: Newman, Arnold, and Pater (U of Texas P, 1969)).
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saw in Laocoon—that appealed in the battle to legitimate the nude.83 Using a visual
metaphor that recalls Ruskin's innocent eye, Arnold describes the Hellenic ideal as a
synthesis of the sweetness of beauty and the light of knowledge: '[t]o get rid of one's
ignorance, to see things as they are, and by seeing them as they are to see them in
• 84 • •
their beauty.' Claims to a privileged aesthetic gaze and the corresponding
allegation that the moralist fails to see the beauty of the artistic nude thus follow in
this Arnoldian mould. Within this justificatory framework, obscenity is the result of a
prurient vision that is impaired by falsifying conventions, conventions which can be
exposed by the artist's eye—or Ruskin's innocent eye—to reveal a truth that is
synonymous with beauty.
The British Matron's uncompromising moralism, on the other hand, aligns
her with Hellenism's counterpart, Hebraism. For Arnold, Hellenism and Hebraism
are the two propulsive forces of civilisation, both with the common goal of attaining
perfection, but pursued by different means. Hellenism, with its quest for intellectual
enlightenment, is the province of light and knowledge; by contrast, Hebraism focuses
on doing rather than knowing, on proprieties of conduct, the demands of duty, and
the importance of obedience: '[t]he governing idea of Hellenism is spontaneity of
oc
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consciousness; that of Hebraism, strictness ofconscience.' Neither Hellenism nor
Hebraism are sufficient of themselves, and the two should be complementary rather
83 Johann Winckelmann, Reflections on the Painting and Sculpture ofthe Greeks, trans. Henry Fuselli
(1765; London: Routledge/Thoemmes, 1999)30.
84 Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 130.
85 Arnold, Culture andAnarchy 128. Pater makes a similar distinction as Arnold in the context of its
implications for art. Greek sensuousness, he claims, 'does not fever the conscience: it is shameless and
childlike.' Christian asceticism, with its distrust of the sensuous, 'has from time to time provoked into
strong emphasis the contrast or antagonism to itself, of artistic life, with its inevitable sensuousness'
{The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, ed. Donald L. Hill (1893; Berkeley: U of California P,
1980) 177).
Arnold's terms also recur in the debate over the nude. Art critic P. H. Rathbone locates the
origins of an excessive prudery that is in fact a clandestine prurience outside ofAryan culture, setting
up an opposition between 'Asiatic' misogyny and European civilization in a manner echoing Arnold's
Hebraic and Hellenic duo. The 'unholy origin of the objection to the nude as a fit subject for art' can
be found in Asiatic ideas that took hold with the Turkish invasion in the fifteenth century. As chattel,
women were merely objects of pleasure, and the female form was thus stripped of its nobility only 'to
be hidden, partly from shame, but chiefly for the purpose of stimulating exhausted passion.' The
legacy is a failure to recognise the ideal female form, as exemplified by perverse ideas of beauty in the
distortions of contemporary female attire: ' [t]he extreme development of the low dresses ... when the
stays crushed up the breasts into suggestive prominence, would surely have been checked had the eye
of the public been properly educated by familiarity with the exquisite beauty of line of a well-shaped
bust.' In this instance, sartorial convention and the innocent eye are in conflict ('The Nude in Art: Its
Defense Before the British Social Science Congress,' New York Times 10 November 1878. Originally
published in the London Standardly October 1878).
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than antagonistic concepts, functioning ideally as harmonising checks of the excesses
of the other. The current historical moment sees the ascendancy of the Hebraising
impulse, of which Puritanism is one of its most visible legacies, having arisen in
reaction to the Hellenic excesses of the Renaissance. The evangelical tradition from
which the purity movement emerged places it firmly on this side of Arnold's
opposition and part of the Hebraising Zeitgeist. The Hebraic project is characterised
by an overriding consciousness of sin, a one-sided outlook that is akin to the
zealotry—as alleged by her detractors—of the British Matron's hunt for the obscene.
In this sense, the debate over the nude is as much a contest in the field of art as it is a
part of a greater dialectic informing Victorian thought, a part of a broader discussion
on the concepts motivating the nation as a whole.
In comparison to Arnold's Culture andAnarchy, I would like to look at an
essay written two years later by Sidney Colvin.86 These two texts are articulated from
oppositional ideological positions: where Arnold insists upon the moral force of art
and more generally of culture, Colvin argues for an irrevocable separation of art and
morality. Presaging the mutually exclusive domains of pen and brush that Whistler
was to insist upon in court, Colvin claims that the impressions of art which appeal
through 'the delights of form and colour' are not 'translateable' into literature or
87
language, the medium par excellence of moral edification. To search for morality in
art results in a sterile naturalism, 'mak[ing] fidelity to the real the foremost of such
virtues, and classing] incorrect drawing sinful, as a misrepresentation of the works
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ofGod.' Colvin's position aligns rather with continental theory via Winckelmann
and others, predicated on a separation of the beautiful from the agreeable, the ideal
from the real. Enshrining a neo-Kantian disinterested contemplation, Colvin rejects
for art any utility value. Colvin delineates a hierarchy of senses, maintaining a
similar Cartesian split as the Blackwood's reviewer, but proffering a more stratified
model of the senses where Blackwood's indiscriminately groups them together as
purely bodily functions. At the top of Colvin's hierarchy are man's 'two most
intellectual tastes,' sight and hearing, whose cerebral superiority rests in their
86 The essay is anonymous, but Alison Smith attributes authorship to Colvin. She writes that it is
'presumably' Colvin (Victorian Nude 113) but I have not found any substantiating evidence. For
convenience, I have followed Smith in designating Colvin as author.
87




disinterestedness: the pleasures associated with sight and hearing are 'independent of
all direct utility in [their] object.'89 The sense of taste resides at the other extreme:
'its pleasures are intimately connected with the alimentation of the body; tasting and
eating, the sensation and the utility are inseparable.'90 By extension, the pleasures of
the visual arts appeal to the highest sense alone, that of sight, and the act of painting
itself elevates by expunging the tangible elements of the object, sublimating the
physicality of experience into an ideality mediated through reason and the
imagination. Thus at one remove, we no longer have the 'scene' in its material
existence, but a 'sentiment of the scene,' and the 'monopolist' nature of the lower
senses—monopolist because they are the most subjective and self-interested,
according to Colvin—gives way to the inclusiveness of communal appreciation.91
Such is the difference between the aesthetically beautiful and the physically
pleasurable, the latter the province of taste and smell, and thus confined to an
'inferior class to which we do not allow the name of artistic.' The bias against the
mechanical recalls Reynolds, but Colvin rejects the explicitly political aspects of the
critique vulgar consumerism.
In Arnold and Colvin, we see two antithetic traditions: on the one hand, an
understanding of art as a moral force which confers on it a powerful social agency;
on the other hand, what might be called the aesthetic position that espouses the
elements of art for art's sake, divorcing it from the extraneous world and divesting it
of social utility. What is surprising is that defences of the nude in the latter part of the
century seem to merge elements from these divergent positions. I am not claiming
that they reconciled these ideologies but that elements of each are present in much of
the commentary. These criticisms take Arnold's framework and rework it from an
overtly social perspective to the aesthetic, while Colvin's ranking of the senses
provides a useful framework for understanding the distinction between art and
Q9
obscenity that was reinforced repeatedly throughout the century. Colvin's terms by







92 Thus, for instance, Henry Mayhew claims in his 1850 investigation of the urban labouring class,
that '[t]o cultivate the sense of the beautiful is necessarily to inculcate a detestation of the sensual'
(London Labour and the London Poor: The Classical Study ofthe Culture ofPoverty and the
Criminal Classes in the 19lh-Century (1861; New York: Dover, 1968) 42.
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creations that appeal to the higher faculties, presenting the viewer with a visual
experience that mediates its subject through intellectual, spiritual, and imaginative
means: the visual image encapsulates 'the spirit of the scene,' rather than the scene
itself, as one RA lecturer asserted.93 Concomitantly, Colvin's category of non-art
comprising of works which elicit bodily responses is a fitting description of art's
other, pornography. This latter form of consumption is a somatic or kinetic
experience, one that aims to move physically rather than intellectually or
emotionally.94 Just as taste, and to a lesser degree, smell, operate within a limited
sphere, their effect extending only to the individual's immediate experiential range,
so too is the pornographic effect of obscene works inwardly and narrowly oriented.
The difference drawn between self-interest and disinterest informs both Colvin's
ranking of the senses and Arnold's social formulation of culture. The perceptual
basis ofColvin's analysis maps onto Arnold's socio-political one, and both in turn
onto the art/pornography binary: the sterile solipsism of the lower senses is akin to
that of the individual driven by a laissez-faire mentality, just as the carnal pleasures
of pornography were thought to be solitary and equally unproductive.
Arnold's opposition between the order of social authority and the chaos of
civic unrest is rearticulated in Colvin's hierarchy of perceptual faculties. The idea of
order suggests the processes of separation and stratification. The spatial distance
maintained in viewing a work of art preserves a sense of separation between the
viewing subject and the visual object and the myth of disembodied consumption is
sustained. By contrast, exercising the sense of taste involves an encounter that
dissolves the boundaries between the sensory subject and the comestible object. The
act of digestion is one of physical incorporation: the form and structure of both
subject and object are disturbed and intermingled in a manner that brings the bodily
nature of consumption to the fore. Mary Douglas defines pollution as that which
threatens the boundaries and violates the order of any given system and from this
93 H. O'Neil, 'On the Character ofNature in General, and on the Mission ofArt.' A lecture delivered
to the Students of the Royal Academy, February 12, 1866. Gentleman's Magazine n.s. 1 (1866): 851 -
64, 864.
94 For a discussion of pornography's historical affinity with philosophical materialism, see Margaret
C. Jacob, 'The Materialist World of Pornography,' The Invention ofPornography: Obscenity and the
Origins ofModernity, 1500-1800, ed. Lynn Hunt (New York: Zone Books, 1993); and Michelson.
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perspective, Colvin's lower senses are intrinsically dangerous operations.93
Douglas's anthropological observations also provide a link between Colvin's
policing of the aesthetic sensibilities and the earlier policing ofNational Gallery
visitors and the recuperative measures taken to protect the Gallery's paintings. For
Douglas, dirt is 'matter out of place'; it is a substance that exists not in isolation, but
within a specific locational—or dislocated—context.96 Contaminative deposits on
paintings compromised materially the substance of these works but according to
Douglas's model, conceptually, these deposits as displaced matter also threatened the
works' systemic integrity. So too was the circulation of visitors a disturbance of the
Gallery space, while concern over ventilation and points of ingress and egress
bespoke an unease over the Gallery's boundaries. Censorship as exercised by
vigilance societies or law enforcement sought to eradicate the metaphorical 'dirt' of
obscene materials and thereby eliminate a moral disorder, while the controversy over
actual dirt on paintings and those who transfer this dirt centred on the issues of social
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and logistical order. The orderly response of Colvin's aestheticising gaze is defined
against the disorderly one of a bodily consumption: the somatic response to the nude
instigates a kind of bodily anarchy, anarchical because these responses were felt to
be uncontrollable. A common binary shapes these various forms of control, whether
of the gaze or of the Gallery's public.
It is thus evident that the issue of the morality of the nude was as much about
the body of the viewer as the body represented. Lynda Nead makes this point in the
context of the eighteenth-century excavations at Pompeii. Nead contends that the
encounter with these artefacts was a testing ground for the hegemonic bourgeois
male subject, an opportunity, if not a demand, to demonstrate a sovereign control
over the body and its responses. The bourgeois viewing subject must necessarily be
'beyond incrimination,' his body 'still, composed, and unified, as opposed to
aroused, disturbed, and fragmented.'98 Over a century later in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, a similar aesthetic persisted; moreover, the Pompeian references
in works such as Poynter's Diadumene recall this particular historical epoch, but the
95
Mary Douglas, Parity andDanger: An Analysis ofConcepts ofPollution and Taboo (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) 121.
96
Douglas 35.
97 See Cleere for a discussion of the picture cleaning controversy.
98
Nead, 'Bodies' 205. See also Pease.
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context had changed substantially. In the eighteenth century, access to the unearthed
artefacts was limited, displays being housed in secret rooms and Latin quotations left
untranslated. By contrast, the controversy over the 1885 nudes focused in large part
on their visibility; indeed, several of the letter writers called for a form of segregated
display in the manner of the museum in Naples. In line with the shift from private to
public exhibition in the intervening years, there was a shift in focus to, and changing
attitudes towards, the audience. In Nead's scenario, the nude was a testing ground for
bourgeois manhood; by the 1880s, it had also become the damning ground for
susceptible viewers, defined not just by class, but also by gender and age. If the aim
of public exhibition was in part to facilitate public access, this call for a greater
inclusiveness brought with it in turn the problem of audience.
Measures for the regulation of visual consumption centre on the relationship
between audience and the artwork. While the issues brought up in mid-century
inquiries focused on the effect of the viewer on the artwork through the
contaminative effects of bodily and environmental effluvia, the concern over
obscenity in art reverses the direction of influence, investigating the effects of the
artwork on the vulnerable viewer. The vulnerable viewer is in danger because she
sees pornography in place of a work of high art, a naked body in a mythological
tableau. The ostensible issues are the individual and social consequences of the
encounter with a dangerous work of art, but conceptually, we have not moved far
from Arnold's view of art as salvation, for to speak of the civilising or the corrupting
force of art is to speak of the same things: the power of art—whether positive or
negative—and its transformative effect on its viewers. In a less explicit move,
however, there is a further shift in the relationship between work and spectator. In
Chapter Four, I discussed the instability of the scientific status of Ellis's Sexual
Inversion; a similar uncertainty characterises the reception of the nude, and herein
lies its central contradiction: the nude is lauded as the epitome of artistic endeavour,
yet a formulation that defines the undraped figure according to the sensibility of its
viewer holds it strangely hostage to this viewer. If the most efficient means of
regulating the visual obscene is by eradicating the polluting agent at its source, this
contradiction suggests that the regulatory task is stymied from the start as causality
itself becomes obscured. Censorship claims to protect the sensitive viewer from
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corruption, yet it is unclear whether it is the nude that corrupts the viewer or the
viewer that corrupts the nude.
In fact, this contradiction is encapsulated in what was considered by Arnold
and others as the apogee ofHellenic purity, the sculpture of classical Greece.
According to Walter Pater, the limitations of sculpture—it has available fewer tools
for an elucidation of detail and context when compared to the tonal subtleties of
painting and the discursive capacity of poetry—entail that it is the art that most
closely approximates pure form. As such, sculpture best demonstrates the Hellenic
ideals of Heiterkeit—'blitheness or repose'—and Allgemeinheit—'generality or
breadth.'99 Following Winckelmann, Pater commends the purity of classical
sculpture's 'broad, central, incisive lines' and its purging of the grotesquery of
excessive passion and the febrility of complex action to retain 'its central passivity,
its depth and repose.'100 These terms resonate with the vocabulary of legitimation
used in defence of the nude. If the kinetic effect of pornography grips the body in a
grotesque distortion, then the calm contemplation of the artistic nude aims for the
stasis of the classical Heiterkeit. If pornography appeals to its user in a corporeal
solipsism, then the nude transcends this narrow bodily focus to approach in its
universal beauty the Allgemeinheit of the Greeks. Yet Pater moves beyond
Winckelmann to acknowledge the nascent presence of 'the romantic temper' even in
the Hellenic ideal:101
Again, the supreme and colourless abstraction of those divine forms, which is
the secret of their repose, is also a premonition of the fleshless, consumptive
refinements of the pale, medieval artists. That high indifference to the
outward, that impassivity, has already a touch of the corpse in it... The
suppression of the sensuous, the shutting of the door upon it, the ascetic
interest, may be even now foreseen. 102
The relationship between Pagan and Christian—or alternatively, Arnold's Hellenism
and Hebraism—is less antithetic than continuous; the sculptural exemplars of the
103
classical 'abstracted gods' in fact 'wander as the spectres of the middle age.' The
classical virtues themselves invite less propitious readings: tranquil pallor suggests a
"Pater 170.





ghostly attenuation while a self-sufficient composure is tinged with deathly torpor.
The 1885 Blackwood's review describes a proper response to the undraped figure as
one in which '[pjassion cannot intrude. Such is the spell of beauty and perfection as
personified by the Greeks, and apostrophised by Winckelmann.'104 Yet in a further
installment, Pater finds in classical sculpture a disconcerting prescience that calls
into question the premises of Blackwood's defence of the nude. If the conditions of
legitimate viewing are predicated on Hellenic ideals, then Pater undermines these
conditions by showing their classical foundation to be less than stable.
The order of repose and the turmoil of conflict that Pater places in diachronic
proximity are also conceptually present in the physicality of nude sculpture. Rarefied
into allegory, it is nonetheless the most concrete and materially present of the arts, its
three-dimensionality intruding into the viewer's space.105 Purity of form, symbolised
by the smooth surface and whiteness ofmarble, abjures what Michael Hatt calls 'the
messy interiority of the human form,' yet this 'messy interiority'—the body's
corporeality, its biological functions, and its psychic processes—is never fully
expunged from the viewer's mind.106 Just as 'colourless abstraction' forebodes the
'fleshless' and 'consumptive,' the marble sculpture in its concrete tangibility
foregrounds the human body with its defects and distortions.107 Arnold's 'Culture,'
exemplified by a classical sculpture that suggests its opposite even while
representing the ideal, as Pater has shown, rather than being the antidote to
'Anarchy,' contains within it its own undoing.
From this perspective, one might draw a continuity between the mid-century
regulatory concerns over social order and the later controversies over the nude.
Charles Eastlake's testimony in the 1857 Commission which sought to protect the
nation's artistic treasures calls into question the omnipotence of culture. Raising
concern that' [i]t is the confined space in which the crowd now moves which is the
cause of the evil,' Eastlake implicitly places Culture and Anarchy not so much in
104 'Decline ofArt' 13.
105 See Alex Potts for a Freudian reading of the ambivalence of the encounter with sculpture ('Male
Phantasy and Modern Sculpture,' OxfordArt Journal 15.2 (1992)).




juxtaposition, but in precarious envelopment.108 The National Gallery building, both
symbol of and vessel for culture, is scarcely able to contain and regulate the seething
anarchy of its visitors' movements within. The contradictory projections onto the
Victorian nude make it a similarly volatile entity. As it vacillates between high art
and lowly gratification according to the viewer, the nude, construed as the epitome of
order and serenity, becomes highly unstable itself, notwithstanding the efforts to
orderliness by the imposing ofmythological, literary, or aesthetic interpretative keys.
The defining and inculcating of a purifying gaze intended to preserve the sanctity of
the nude—and the concomitant expulsion of a lascivious one—merely render it a site
of ontological confusion. The contest fought along class lines between Arnold's
'Culture' and 'Anarchy' in the 1860s is here internalised such that Culture itself, in
this confusion, becomes anarchical.
Controversy over the nude in art was thus more complicated than the 'British
Matron' affair superficially suggests. While its opponents did indeed seek to
suppress these exhibitions, the arguments mobilised in defence indicate a richer
cultural history. The displacing of culpability from the work of art onto the viewer,
locating obscenity not in the undraped form but in a sensual gaze, suggests that these
debates run parallel to developments in the optical sciences. Psychological and
physiological studies affirmed that perception was inherently subjective just as the
delineation of visual responses to the nude figure presupposed a subjective eye. A
neutral gaze purged of bodily desire is only conceptually possible in opposition to its
other, a prurient, self-interested gaze. Art exists in opposition to non-art, whether as
frivolous pretension, as alleged ofWhistler's paintings, or as pornography, as the
nude was described by its more inflexible detractors. Yet, as I have shown, these
categories and opposites were highly unstable, undermining both strategies of
regulation and of resistance, and calling into question the concept of art itself. Within
the paradigm of subjective vision, the nude shifts from high art to pornographic
depiction according to the beholder. Arnold's Culture, with the classical nude
sculpture as its ideal, thus vacillates in a similar manner, making it dependent on the
public even while Arnold attempts to tame this public. The simple, adversarial model
of censorship is once again proved inadequate.
108
Royal Commission on Sitefor National Gallery para. 3.
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Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to provide an account of censorship in late Victorian
Britain that does not rely on static models. In Chapter One, I identified one difficulty
in such a project: that of reconciling, on the one hand, the historical aspect of a
nineteenth-century investigation, and on the other, the vibrant theoretical debates that
have shaped recent censorship studies. While theoretical developments provide
illuminating frameworks for understanding particular instances of censorship, these
events also give insights into the theories themselves.
Traditional models present censorship as a struggle between the censor and
the censored, yet this narrative of antagonism pitting an aggressor who silences
against his voiceless victim is merely one manifestation of censorship. Censorship
can alternatively be a process of negotiation, of complicity, or of compromise.
Moreover, this narrative presupposes distinctly recognisable categories, yet
designations of 'censor' and 'censored' are at times highly unstable while the
boundaries between the two cannot always be maintained. The Duchess in The
AwkwardAge, for instance, is Aggie's moral guardian yet is herself subject to the
gaze of her peers. Nordau employs delegitimating strategies which are redeployed
against him.
Traditional accounts also presuppose a causal logic within a temporal
framework: innocence encounters evil and corruption ensues, resulting in a fall. Yet
as I showed in the case of science in Chapter Four and the nude in Chapter Six,
causality and agency become confounded. If obscenity is variable, depending on the
sensibility of its consumer, then the status of science or art, defined in opposite to
obscenity, also becomes contingent on its reader or viewer. Causality is reversed: the
effect is not of the cultural object on its audience, but of the audience on the object.
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Part One of this thesis looked at literary censorship in the greater context of the
nineteenth-century political and social milieu. John Stuart Mill's warning against a
hostile social censorship is echoed in the literary field by writers condemning an
industry operating on a commercial logic. The public en masse is designated agent of
censorship, a public that has degenerated from the rational citizenry of the
eighteenth-century to the passive dupes of a culture industry as theorised by Jiirgen
Habermas. The ideal of discursive freedom informing Habermas's public sphere
offers a seductive counterbalance to the vagaries of censorship, yet is itself a
theoretically tenuous concept. I used Henry James's novels to explore these
contradictions and to suggest a way of theorising resistance outside of these
idealising communicative structures.
Part Two examined two prosecutions—Henry Vizetelly, for publishing
offensive French authors, and George Bedborough, for publishing Havelock Ellis's
Sexual Inversion—arguing that trials cannot be looked at in isolation of other social,
political, and intellectual currents. These various regulatory practices are situated on
a continuum of censorships such that explicit means of suppression, such as
destruction orders or imprisonment, exist with more productive forms of regulation,
such as the processes of subject formation, or less overt but more nebulous
apparatuses of control, such as delegitimating discourses. These censorships operate
at times in direct opposition to each other; at other times, they work in conjunction
against a common target; or alternatively, they coexist in tenuous caution.
Part Three looked at censorship in the visual realm, specifically, in the
regulation of the visual arts. The courtroom contest between Whistler and Ruskin
was a struggle over authority, pitting Whistler's aestheticism against Ruskin's moral
criticism, articulated as correct ways of seeing. Thus, the debate over freedom of
expression—artistic and critical—was also a fight over whose visual paradigm
should have primacy. Competing ways of looking were also integral to controversies
over the artistic nude. Against allegations of pornographic intent, the nude's
defenders sought to recuperate the genre by promoting a legitimate way of viewing,
expunging a bodily and lascivious gaze from an idealised contemplative
appreciation. This conceptual segregation was arguably a more insidious form of
regulation: if obscenity law granted the police power to target offensive images, the
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locating of offence in the viewer's gaze placed the viewer's body directly under
scrutiny. At issue then was not so much the undraped figure but its public, and
underlying discussions about the morality of the nude were anxieties about the
composition of this public and who might be the legitimate consumers of art.
We thus return, via the stalwarts of traditional accounts of censorship—
obscenity trials and purity activism—to the question of the public raised by Mill. In
Mill's writing, there is a deep ambivalence towards this public and he vacillates
between notions of a corrigible body of individuals and an uncheckable censorious
force. But if the public is the agent of censorship, Mill's attempt to redefine this
public by stipulating conditions for membership is equally a form of counter-
censorship. A similar concern about the public and audience runs throughout the
examples of censorship I have looked at, whether it is the public of semi-educated
readers, frenzied acolytes of decadence, or the newly enfranchised. Already, we are
far removed from Foucault's understanding of censorship as 'instances of muteness,'
for these instances of censorship speak eloquently and revealingly of the anxieties of
the period.1 The public might exercise a 'hostile and dreaded censorship' but the
result of this censorship is not paralysis nor silence, but an intricate response of
counter-censorships, of appropriations, parodies, inversions, and reversals.2
1 Foucault, History ofSexuality 17.
2
Mill, CW 18: 264.
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